

**THE WRITINGS OF EAST AFRICAN NATIONALIST LEADERS AS SITES OF  
REPRESENTATION OF THEIR IDENTITIES**

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**A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the  
Award of the Master of Arts Degree in Literature of Egerton University**

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## DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATION

### DECLARATION

This Master of Arts thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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## DEDICATION

To *mama*, Alice

*tata*, Aaron Ngotya

For Your joint teachings on values of hard work,

Your fervent prayers,

Your encouragement and love,

Your trust and patience

Your generosity, even in

Glaring lack

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## ABSTRACT

It is commonly accepted that independence did not deliver the African masses from the burden of life-in-suffering. It is thus necessary to persist in the attempts to elucidate those murky aspects of the colonial past and postcolonial present which may resolve the conundrum of failed independence. The literary scholar can intervene in this undertaking by endeavouring to examine the mind-work of the leaders who steered the nationalist project and determined to a large extent its outcome. This mind-work, which crucially involves the nationalist leaders' understanding and representation of their own selves, finds expression in their writings, which the student of literature is best equipped to investigate. This study, therefore, concerned itself with the representation by East African nationalist leaders of their identities in their writings, i.e. speeches and autobiographies. The objectives of the study were to establish how Jomo Kenyatta's *Suffering Without Bitterness* (1968), Julius Nyerere's *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja* (1968), and Yoweri Museveni's *Sowing the Mustard Seed* (1997) construct the identities of a nationalist leader; to identify the literary strategies used by the authors in this construction; and to establish the ways in which the anticipation of audience shapes the construction of these identities. The study was based on the assumptions that in the three texts Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni engage in the construction of their identities as nationalist leaders; that the three authors use various literary strategies to construct these identities effectively; and that the anticipation of particular audiences plays a part in the way they construct their identities. The study used the postcolonial theory of autobiography. This theory deals, most importantly, with cultural identity in formerly colonised societies; the dilemmas of developing a national identity after colonial rule; and the ways in which writers articulate, celebrate and interrogate that identity (often reclaiming it from and maintaining strong connections with the coloniser). Interpretivism was the research methodology for the study. The speeches and autobiography provided the primary data. Scholarly work and other secondary material complemented it. Data was analysed interpretively. The study established that the three texts project identities desired by the three authors – the father of the nation (Kenyatta), *Mwalimu* (Nyerere), and revolutionary saviour (Museveni). In the context of the problematic unfolding of the nationalist project these identities serve to mask negative aspects of the leaders' personalities. This construction is made possible by Kenyatta's use of myth, Biblical allusion, metaphor, and paradox; Nyerere's use of repetition, historical allusion, parallelism, and figurative language; and Museveni's use of Biblical parables and imagery. Identity construction incorporates the leaders' responding to sceptical, dissatisfied and critical views of them through placation, reassurance, outright dismissal and counter-accusation. The study was able to conclude that identity representation for the three leaders became a complex process of projecting selves that were at marked variance with their true inner core. A dichotomy was created between the leaders' desires of how they wanted to be perceived by the masses and the deviations from this ideal that they gradually became, shaped by personal ambitions for power before all else. This was a dichotomy the leaders never tried to overcome; instead they focused their energy and attention on concealing their ambition-deformed personalities behind the masks of the positive self-identities they constructed. In the resultant hide-and-seek game with their peoples, the opportunity for selfless leadership and genuine service to nation-building was lost. The study helps to understand East African nationalist leaders from a new perspective and in so doing expands the understanding of the region's historical, political, literary and ethical heritage, which has a bearing on its present.

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## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

The phrase “between hope and despair,” incidentally the title of a book on the history of Kenya (Branch, 2011), or variations of it, is so consistently used in discourses on Africa that one cannot fail to see it as typifying the perceptions of Africans, and foreign observers of Africa, of the state of affairs on the continent some fifty years after independence. During the struggle for independence and in the years immediately following its successful outcome, it was widely believed that after the exit of the colonial powers African countries would forge ahead to realise their aspirations of political sovereignty as well as social, economic and cultural prosperity. The first independent African governments were expected to put an end to poverty, illiteracy and disease, and thus to open the gates to all-round development. However, this was a vision whose realisation has been problematic and to date remains largely incomplete (Lazarus, 2004: 1-21; Sivanandan, 2004: 22-34).

There have been numerous attempts, in scholarship and other fields of thought, to account for this unfulfilled prospect. Some scholars have argued that the rhetoric of anti-colonialism was reductive and narrow – that it implied that there was only one struggle to be waged, that is, against colonialism (Anderson, 1991; Chatterjee, 1986; Loomba, 1998; Parry, 1994; Spivak, 1999). It was assumed that independence by itself would deliver the entire stretch of freedoms and conditions for national construction. One can find a confirmation of this argument in Kwame Nkrumah’s famous appeal to the oppressed to, “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added onto you” (Nkrumah, 2006: 1). The idea of freedom, according to this view, was rarely given concrete and real meaning. It thus remained an illusion, a false totalising narrative (Sivanandan, 2004: 24).

There is also the view that the achieved political independence was hollow. Under its shell, there were no authentic indigenous institutions through which the nation would be built. Instead, the new African regimes inherited the colonial institutions whole-sale and went on to utilise them in a manner they had adopted from the colonial regime – and this under the constitutive presence of imperialism as a world system (Sivanandan, 2004: 31). The writings of Fanon (1968: 148-205) and

Cabral (1969) were clairvoyant in their understanding of the potential perils of inheriting the structures of the colonial state by its successor, the post-colonial state.

What is notable in these explanations is their generalising pathos, the desire to understand the “phenomenon” of the emergence of the post-colonial state out of colonialism. Whereas such an approach is legitimate and understandable, we know that there were also individual forces that had a considerable impact on the nation-building process. These forces were the nationalist leaders of the anti-colonial struggle who acquired positions of political prominence after independence, and especially those who became the (first) presidents of the new nations, and thus played a crucial role in moulding the nation’s character.

To the extent that attention has been paid to these leaders this has been done in a manner that has somehow stereotyped them as figures whose very way of coming onto the historical scene put severe limitations on their vision and their actions. It has thus been pointed out that, in most cases, decolonisation gave power “not to revolutionary vanguards but to the national bourgeoisie poised for reintegration into subordinate positions within the imperialist structure” (Ahmad, 1992: 28). This bourgeoisie failed to transform social structures in the interests of the people. What accounts for this failure is the supposed fact that the national elites, who received colonial education, fought for independence in a state of confusion because their mentality remained deeply dependent and derivative (Chrisman, 1995).

These stereotypes, however, generate limitations with respect to the richness of knowledge that can be garnered if we were to approach these leaders as concrete, individual human beings with a complexity of character that is intrinsic to the human person. Such an approach can be sustained by turning our attention to one particularly promising aspect of the nationalist leaders – that of writers, which is what many of them were; and by examining the literature that they produced and how, in this literature, they construct their own identities.

The problem at the core of the prevailing critical examinations of their leadership is that the perspectives that these leaders bring to intellectual discourses concerning Africa in that respect have not been properly assessed. Yet we must put into consideration not only what scholars have said about them but also what they themselves have thought and said about their life and their world.

Literature envoices the human person, subjectivises him; it constitutes an ideal arena for the subject's intense mental work and of his revealing of himself to the world. It is in literature that the subject constructs his identity. Literature thus becomes a privileged source of knowledge about the subject. The literary scholar can thus draw on this knowledge to form a significant understanding of the nationalist leaders (Mkandawire, 2005: 14; Holden, 2008: 6).

The writings produced by nationalist leaders are both political and autobiographical in nature, belonging to the genres of autobiographies, and speeches. Both speeches and autobiographies use persuasion as a writing strategy (Heddon, 2008). They employ autobiographical recall, a strategy which invests the subject with agency and narrative authority and enables the author "to talk out, talk back, talk otherwise" (Heddon, 2008: 3). Autobiographers and speech writers use this quality of their writings for self-clarification, self-explication or self-justification. In addition, speeches by nationalist leaders, just like autobiographies, make use of ideographs, words which contain a unique ideological commitment and are used to reinforce a common identity (McGee, 1980). Ideographs help to identify the discursive means for political control and advance a new national ethos. Thus, both speeches and autobiographies can be viewed as autobiographical in nature and they can be productively used to explore the relationship between the personal and the political, engaging with and theorising the discursive construction of selves and experience (Heddon, 2008: 162).

These writings contain a great deal of knowledge regarding human nature insofar as it applies to the contemporary African reality. In particular, from their written works we are able to acquire significant knowledge concerning the processes of identity formation insofar as they relate to the way the writers construct their sense of self and relate it to their circumstances. It will be recalled that it is primarily on the basis of the frames of reference that we possess as individuals, or authors, that we are able to assess and make sense out of our circumstances. As Saussure (1986) observes, we construct our identities on the basis of our differential relationships with an Other, on the basis of which we delineate a "space" that possesses attributes that are different from all other entities in the universe and that are, therefore, unique.

In East Africa, on which we focused in order to understand this region and community better, autobiographical and political writings form a significant part of the literature of the region. In

Kenya, nationalist leader and first president Jomo Kenyatta wrote *Suffering Without Bitterness* (1968). The first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, is the author of *Freedom and Unity/ Uhuru na Umoja* (1968) and other works. Yoweri Museveni, the current president of Uganda, wrote *Sowing the Mustard Seed* (1997). Although Museveni is not the first president in Uganda and in that differs from Kenyatta and Nyerere, he is essentially their counterpart because it is under him that Uganda overcame its turbulent post-independent history and became a modern nation. It was a worthwhile task to undertake a study of these writings as sites of the authors' representation of their identities.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

There is a wealth of scholarly literature whose purpose is to unravel the complexities of the socio-political situation in post-independence African states. One of the directions this scholarly enterprise has taken is to account for the role played by nationalist leaders in the process of nation-building. Such studies have, however, largely offered a critique of the nationalist leaders from an overall historical and political perspective. They have, as a rule, not taken an interest in the personalities of these leaders, and particularly in them as writers. Yet the literature these leaders have produced, which is mainly in the form of autobiographies and speeches, constitutes a valuable site from which knowledge can be generated concerning the leaders' self-representation. This knowledge is, in turn, a significant component in the integrative process of assembling as complete a truth about these leaders as possible. This study delved into this literature. The study's concern thus was the representation by East African nationalist leaders of their identities in their writings.

## **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

This study sought to achieve the following objectives:

- i. Establish how Kenyatta's *Suffering Without Bitterness*, Nyerere's *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, and Museveni's *Sowing the Mustard Seed* construct the identities of a nationalist leader.
- ii. Identify the literary strategies used by Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni in their writings to construct their identities.

- iii. Map out the ways in which the anticipation of various audiences shapes the construction of identities in the writings of Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni.

#### **1.4 Research Premises**

The study was based on the assumptions that:

- i. *Suffering Without Bitterness, Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja, and Sowing the Mustard Seed* engage in the construction of the identities of Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni respectively as nationalist leaders
- ii. Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni use various literary strategies in their writings to construct their identities as nationalist leaders.
- iii. The anticipation of particular audiences plays a part in the construction of the identities of nationalist leaders in the writings of Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni.

#### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

The study derives its significance from the fact that it offers a new direction in the study of East African nationalist leaders, and thus a new way of understanding the region's historical, political, literary, and ethical heritage. Such an understanding is crucial for any nation, but particularly in times of major transformations in the life of nations, as is the case with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda today. The study contributes to the field of scholarship, particularly identity studies, by focusing on the hitherto neglected subject of self-representation of nationalist leaders (in Africa) through writing. The study provides useful insights into the understanding of how the writings of East African nationalist leaders intertwine personal identities with the historical growth of the nations. It also gives as an additional perspective from which to assess the current leaders of (East) African countries.

#### **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The study limited itself to three East African nationalist leaders' writings. These are: Kenyatta's speeches collected in *Suffering Without Bitterness*, Nyerere's speeches in *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, and Museveni's autobiography *Sowing the Mustard Seed*. The choice was justified by the fact that it is in these texts that the three authors engage in identity construction most effectively, even as they dwell, primarily, on issues of national and historical significance. One limitation of this study was its inability to interrogate the writers to clarify further certain

aspects of the texts. This was because two of them are no longer alive and the third, by virtue of his high office, would have been difficult to access. But there exists abundant scholarship on these leaders, which was used to fill the void.

## 1.7 Definition of Terms

**Audience:** Prospective readers an author has in mind as he writes an autobiography or a speech.

**Identities:** These are “contingent attributes of the self” simultaneously co-existing in an individual along such lines as private, public, political and historical (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 8).

**Nation:** A large body of people associated with a particular territory that is sufficiently conscious of its unity to seek or possess a government peculiarly its own; in this study these are Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

**Nationalist leader:** An advocate of national independence or a strong national government in East Africa; in this study these are Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Yoweri Museveni.

**Post-colonial/ Post-independence:** Denote the time after colonialism ended, following the achievement of independence, at which point a country breaks away from governance by another state.

**Representation:** A subjective process of using one’s voice in a text in order to portray multilayered public and private selves (Kincheloe, 1997: 67).

**Writings:** Autobiographies and speeches by nationalist leaders in East Africa as exemplified by Kenyatta’s *Suffering Without Bitterness*, Nyerere’s *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru naUmoja*, and Museveni’s *Sowing the Mustard Seed*.

## **1.8 Literature Review**

### **1.8.1 Introduction**

This section reviews literature related to the representation of the identities of East African nationalist leaders in their writings. It is organised around the main concepts and aspects of the study. Subsection one discusses the concept of identity. Subsection two and three examine scholarship on identity representation in autobiographies and speeches. Subsection four zeroes down on literature that deals with African autobiography in light of identity representation. Subsection five reviews biographical and other studies on the three East African nationalist leaders so as to compare these leaders' representation of their identities with the way they have been seen and portrayed by others.

### **1.8.2 Identity**

Identity has for some time now been a key concept and subject of inquiry in scholarly literature. Fearon (1999) distinguishes between two types of identities, i.e. type identity and role identity. Fearon refers to role identities as labels applied to people who are expected or obligated to perform some set of actions, behaviours, routines, or functions in particular situations. Type identities refer to labels applied to persons who share or are thought to share some characteristic or characteristics, in appearance, behavioural traits, beliefs, attitudes, values, skills, knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like region or place of birth), and so on. The identities of East African nationalist leaders as represented in their writings fall under both these categories. Hall (2001) clarifies that some identities or social categories involve both role and type. For example, leadership is a role, but nonetheless we expect certain beliefs, attitudes, values, preferences, moral virtues, and so on, to be characteristic of people performing the role of a leader (Hall, 2001). The present study made use of this varied understanding of identities to account for the representation of identities in the works of the three authors.

Hall (2001) deals with the formation of personal identity as well as different areas of collective identity such as gender identity, ethnic identity, or national identity. He argues that identity is not an unchangeable, given entity, but is temporary and subject to change in the light of the individual's changing experiences and expectations. Thus, the individual constantly re-creates his or her identity and actively preserves it through restructuring and adjusting according to circumstances. Elsewhere, Hall (1990: 12) emphasises the procedural quality of identity and its

existence as a process of reconstruction. Identity representation in the writings of East African nationalist leaders was examined for the presence of these qualities.

Two other scholars (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 7-8) argue that the concept of identity has moved from being conceived as focusing on “self-interest” to “self-understanding”. Self-understanding, according to them, is an aspect of identity but self-interest is not. They argue that people everywhere have particular stories and self-understandings and these inform the kind of claims they make about themselves. The concept of identity can be understood as the “evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses which highlight the unstable, multiple, fluctuating and fragmented nature of contemporary selfhood”; and self-understanding is trying to capture the “alleged core” and the “foundational aspects of selfhood” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 8). The writings of East African nationalist leaders were examined as products of such self-understanding.

### **1.8.3 Studies on Autobiographies**

There are various understandings of autobiographies and various terms are in use to refer to the type of writing they represent. Smith and Watson (2001) make a distinction between life-writing and life-narrative. They relate life-writing to forms of writing that deal specifically with lived experience, and life-narrative to forms of self-referential writing such as autobiographies, personal speeches, memoirs, diaries, journals, and personal letters. They posit that despite their generic difference, life-writing and life-narrative share similar characteristics, namely life representations and self-constructions. Autobiographical works have been studied in terms of understanding one’s personal experience and how this experience has been related to self-definition by the author. Lejeune (1989: 1) defines autobiography as a “retrospective prose narrative produced by a real person concerning his own existence, focusing on his individual life, in particular on the development of his personality”. According to Weintraub (1975), in an autobiography the author is “intent upon reflection on this inward realm of experience” (824). In a “genuine” autobiography, the author is committed to leaving imprints of his point of view on life and history. In a false one, the author might distort history and make it serve the functions of self-explication, self-discovery, self-clarification, self-presentation and self-justification (Weintraub, 1975: 823-824). In Freeman’s (1993: 9) view, writings about the self are always fictions; these are “texts which ... deal with recollections of experience, and this brings out countless distortions and falsifications”. He argues that people remember selectively and confer meanings on experiences that did not possess these

meanings at the time of their occurrence. Writing about the self is thus ultimately an attempt to rewrite the self (Freeman, 1993: 9).

One major point of divergence among scholars of autobiography is whether an autobiography is a creative work or a true account of the author's life. Pursuing the view that autobiography is fiction, Sparrowe (2005) analyses some literary strategies used by autobiography authors. Narrative voice is important in an autobiography because the content in the text has been interpreted by the author. This narrative voice overlooks certain things and privileges others. Through plot, the author builds a meaningful story from a diversity of events or incidents; creating and reconstructing circumstances, the socio-economic and political environment. That is, events whose relationships to one another are not immediately evident are drawn together so that their temporal and logical interdependencies can be grasped. Sparrowe (2005) argues that plot brings together factors as heterogeneous as agents, goals, means, interactions, circumstances, and unexpected results. Further, plot reveals a glimpse of the story as a whole so that it can be followed. It does this by narrating the way towards a conclusion. This study engaged these arguments and sought to discover how these literary strategies work when autobiographical writings are produced by nationalist leaders and how they are geared towards the representation of their identities.

For Wallace (1988) autobiography is fiction because "it uses all the devices a novel does: characters and the chronicle of the family, maxims and lyrical passages, confessions and narrative" (166). Eakin (1988: 35), however, advances the argument that, "the structures of narrative reflect, and are derived from, the fundamental structures of consciousness." Thus narrative is not necessarily the product of imagination though it may include imagination (Eakin, 1988). This study sides with Eakin's view, making a distinction between fictionalisation and the work of imagination. In another work, Eakin (1999) argues that autobiographical narratives are the result of both the memory and the imagination of the author. Eakin (1999) regards memory as changing and created anew in every act of remembering. For that reason, the self that is at the core of the narrative is subject to change. He understands autobiographical writing as a means of identity formation and regards narration as a process of self-experience. The self presented in the text is not necessarily preceded by a self existing outside or before the text. Thus, Eakin (1999) argues for an understanding of autobiographical writing as an integral part of a life-long process of identity construction. This study looked at the writings of Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni from a similar

lens of memory and imagination as engaged in the work of identity construction and representation.

Assuming that “because we can never suppress ourselves in the texts we write we in fact create the persons we write about”, Alvermann (2002: 56) focuses on the difficulty for a writer to sustain the claim to write about the self. When a writer writes an autobiography, he or she writes himself or herself into the life of the subject written about. Furthermore, when a reader reads an autobiographical text, that text is read through the life of the reader. Hence, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) conclude, writers and readers conspire to create the lives they write and read about. This position was interesting for this study because its validity was tested by comparing the writings of the nationalist leaders with other records of their lives. Again, this study was also concerned with establishing how nationalist leaders, through writing, created the persons they wrote about.

What matters in life narratives, Desai (2001) reasons, is “what those associated with the event make of it” (116). Therefore, when people write about their lives, they tell stories that are useful rather than truthful. Thus speakers and authors of life stories engage in doublespeak in order “to pass the test of appropriateness” not only for themselves but also for their readers (Desai, 2001: 116). Furthermore, this doublespeak is a way to deal with the writer’s own hybrid self (Desai, 2001: 116). Therefore, in Desai’s (2001) view, if we detect contradictory assertions in self narratives, we must read them not as lapses but rather as the efforts of a subject to appropriate a workable and meaningful account of his/her own life. This study scrutinised the autobiographical texts and speeches by Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni for the possible employment of such doublespeak. This study delved in their writings in order to establish how the three nationalist leaders portray “appropriate” selves that their citizens/ readers would be satisfied with.

Friedman (1988) proposes the use of the phenomenological approach in interpreting autobiography. For her, this approach is inclined to emphasise the autonomy of a subject in providing the meaning and interpretation of its life. According to this view, the origin of autobiography is tied to the beginning of self-awareness of one’s place in history. In this regard, autobiography becomes a document of personal achievement that marks an individual’s control over his/her own life-history. Friedman (1988) contends that autonomy is at the heart of autobiographical writing because the author is fully responsible for selecting the period, the events,

and the way the self and others are to be presented. Through its claim of the author's exclusive place in writing, autobiography denies the role of community as the informant of individual identity. This view was tested in this study because of the implications of the suggested dichotomy between individual autonomy and community for the autobiographical writings of nationalist leaders.

For Gusdorf (1980: 37), in the *autobiographical* moment of writing, authors possess superior knowledge of the past. The difference here is not merely between art and life, but between habitual self-reflection in the midst of everyday experience and the act of consciously and *deliberately* self-reflecting for the purposes of "reconstructing the unity of a life across time". "Every autobiography", writes Gusdorf, "is a work of art and at the same time a work of enlightenment; it does not show us the individual seen from the outside in his visible actions but the person in his inner privacy, not as he was, not as he is, but as he believes and wishes himself to be and have been" (45). This was one perspective from which this study examined the representation of identities in the writings of the East African nationalist leaders.

There is an interesting view that autobiographies are metaphorical in nature. Olney (1972) argues that an autobiographer, in the moment of writing an autobiography, moves towards a symbolic realisation of his own humanity while searching for possible meaning in a world that eludes external explanation (50). Olney argues that the interest of the autobiographer is to make a perfection of the metaphor of self. This view was useful in this study in the way it linked autobiographical writings with the author's self-representation through symbolic realisation.

Bruss (1980: 298-320) argues that the autobiographical act echoes and reinforces a structure already implicit in our language, a structure that is also very like what we usually take to be the structure of self-consciousness itself: the capacity to know and simultaneously be that which one knows (301). Renza (1980: 268-277) considers that truth in autobiography comes from the very act of narrative writing. She goes on to say that, "Nothing prevents us from exploring the issue of how discrete acts of writing become identifiable as autobiographical to the writing self as he writes" (Renza, 1980: 273). This has much to do with the fact that autobiography is a genre in which the author and the subject are one. In its interpretation of the three texts, this study was guided by such a privileging of the "I" of the author.

#### **1.8.4 African Autobiography and Identity Representation**

Olney in *Tell Me Africa* (1973) argues that African autobiographers do not write about the self. In identifying and distinguishing an African autobiographical mode from a European one, Olney posits that all African autobiographies partake of the same generic and “narrative” elements. To wit, the “African community of existence” accounts for the “typicality and archetypicality” of African stories and tales (Olney, 1973: 76). The African subject, immersed in this community, metonymically recapitulates his or her social formation. Although this study took exception to Olney’s view of a fundamental difference between African and European autobiographies, it was tentatively informed by his view of the communal nature of the African subject, especially considering that the writers in this study were nationalist leaders.

Grohs (1996: i) argues that “there are as many ways of autobiographical writing in Africa as elsewhere”, but insists that the history of African autobiographical writing is characterised by a tension between the modern “me” and the traditional “we”. The author is particularly interested in “political autobiographies” and sees their proliferation and relevance in the fact that the political aspirations of the newly independent African countries were closely connected with their leaders, and in their ideological value. In his view, political autobiographies are easier to understand by ordinary people than abstract political programmes. Grohs (1996) predicts that political autobiographies in Africa will assume the functions they have in Europe or elsewhere, that is, the self-justification of a political career, a kind of self-defense against the objections of political adversaries and successors, but also an independent source of information. Groh’s views were relevant to this study since the writings of East African nationalist leaders could indeed be viewed as political autobiographies.

#### **1.8.5 Speeches, Audience and Identity Representation**

According to Katzenstein (1996), speeches play a significant role in the representation of identity. Because of this, in his view, they have attracted a wide range of interest from scholars to critics who analyse them from the functionalist perspective. Young (1990), for instance, argues that speeches are used to bring out the identities of the speaker. The scholar asserts that the presence of the personal in speech is determined by various factors like rhetoric and social, or political placement, and that there are always specific ends that the speaker aims to meet in a speech. According to Young (1990), when one writes a speech, he or she considers the reactions of the

audience to the contents, and the short-term and long-term influence. This means that the speaker must be aware of what he or she is writing and the intended purpose of the speech.

Discussing how the audience influences the content of a speech or self-writing, Allen (2000) argues that almost every idea and experience that a speech writer uses has been borrowed or has been forced by his/ her intended audience. According to the same author, writers or speakers create their ideas out of the sea of former ideas and experiences that surround their audience. Moreover, writers craft their message from the perspective of their audience's presumed reaction to their work. For a writer, it makes good sense to know who one is directing one's work to and what it is one wants one's work to accomplish. Allen (2000) further contends that this influence is not limited to literary concerns; it determines how utterances are located within and what attitudes are taken towards a social context constituted by the audience. The audience plays a significant role in the content of any speech, and this role shapes the identity that a speech writer constructs in his writing. These considerations were valuable to the present study which was also concerned with the ways in which the audiences Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni had in mind gave direction to the representation of their identities.

The awareness of purpose in speech is made clear by Ladefoged and Broadbent (1958) who posit that every speech writer has a reason for crafting a literary piece. They argue that the writer is always aware of what to include and what to omit based on the way the content will affect the listener. According to this view, political speeches are ideological texts, which serve to propagate the desired interests of the writers. This line of thought was useful to this study because nationalist leaders by virtue of their very position pay special attention to their mass audiences, and are concerned about making their ideologies the ideologies of their nations.

According to Fulkerson (1979) most speeches are meant to counter their writers' critics. The scholar contends that political leaders use their speeches to construct an identity. In his view, it is significant to interrogate the ideological, philosophical, and social stand of speech writers through their speeches in order to understand how they represent their identities in their writings. This view was important to this study in that it linked standpoints to identity representation.

### **1.8.6 Studies on East African Nationalist Leaders**

Kenyatta's personality and leadership have attracted considerable scholarly and other attention. Some writers see Kenyatta as a nationalist leader, who worked to establish harmonious race relations, safeguarded the whites and urged Africans to forget past injustices, and forge a new nation. Murray-Brown (1972) argues that Kenyatta's slogan *Harambee* urged whites and Africans to work together for the development of Kenya. According to Rosberg (2001: 397), Kenyatta echoed the "new nationalism" of the period by galvanising people's will to unite. The argument that Kenyatta was a unifying factor in Kenyan politics is also advanced by Lewis (2000).

On the other hand, however, there are many critical assessment of Kenyatta. Macharia (1991) argues that after independence Kenyatta became a neo-colonial comprador who betrayed his erstwhile nationalist comrades. Macharia argues that after he was given the mantle of leading the country, Kenyatta went through a political metamorphosis. Kaggia (1975) argues that Kenyatta was peripheral to the Mau Mau movement and its ideals. He accuses Kenyatta of having created tribalism in Kenya. Ogot and Zeleza (1988: 4) take Kenyatta's leadership to task, arguing that Kenyatta ruled through a post-colonial clique which largely consisted of his relatives, other Kikuyu, mostly from Kiambu District, and Kikuyu colonial collaborators and their offspring, while giving scant reward to those who were the real fighters for Kenya's independence. This clique became and remained the wealthiest, most powerful and most influential group in Kenya, and held the country back, blocking reform and change, and undermining the emergence of fresh progressive leadership in its manoeuvres to maintain its power and wealth.

Odhiambo (1976) has criticised Kenyatta for encouraging the culture of wealth accumulation by public officials using the power and influence of their offices thereby deeply entrenching corruption in Kenya. Development and resource allocation in the country during his reign was seen to have favoured some regions of the country, mainly Nairobi and the Central Highlands, over others.

These assessments were significant to this study because they constituted an alternative platform from which to examine Kenyatta's representation of his identity.

Nyerere became the President of Tanganyika in 1962 and was President of Tanzania (Tanganyika and Zanzibar) from 1964 to 1985. Assensoh (1998: 8) argues that Nyerere, once described by an

American official at the United Nations as a “symbol of African hopes, African dignity, and African successes”, was among the most respected and influential leaders of the emerging modern nations of Africa. The scholar contends that Nyerere emerged on the political scene during a period of upheaval in West and Southern Africa. In neighbouring Kenya, the Mau Mau uprising was fighting against white settler rule. Assensoh (1998) praises Nyerere for the versatility of his radical thought: He began as an anti-colonial African nationalist seeking the independence of Tanganyika, and retained his nationalist ideals under the condition of independence.

Kassam (1995) argues that linked to Nyerere’s nationalism from quite early on was his Pan-Africanism, a commitment to the pursuit of African unity and the adoption of the principle of African solidarity whenever possible, and that it was due to this commitment that in 1960 he offered to delay Tanganyika’s independence if this would help achieve the creation of an East African federation of Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda.

Other critics see Nyerere’s praises as misplaced. They contend that Nyerere’s approach devastated much of postcolonial Africa. Forbes (1999) wonders how a leader could wreck a country’s economy yet die a national hero. This view has it that it was Nyerere’s inefficient leadership that drained Tanzania of resources. Nyerere’s socialist strategy in Tanzania is portrayed as a classic example of misplaced philosophical idealism, squandered developmental opportunities, and broken political promises (Scott, 1999; Johnson, 2000). To critics on the ideological left, Nyerere’s Tanzania was merely a professed socialist state whose leadership elite either abandoned or never really undertook the class-based struggle for a genuinely socialist society (Shivji, 1974). To those not sympathetic to the socialist ideology, Nyerere and the ruling elite were seen as having robbed the Tanzanian society of the personal freedoms, private incentives, and individual rewards that are essential for a transition to a modern, prosperous and democratic society (Yeager, 1989: 1).

There are those writers who, while acknowledging some of the flaws in the Tanzanian experiment, argue that Nyerere’s political approach was basically a sound attempt at avoiding the post-independence perils of inequality, elitism, and political instability in Africa (Pratt, 1976; Boesen, et al., 1977; Versi, 1999: 7-13; Ishemo, 2000: 81-85).

While some of these commentaries are based on empirical research and analysis of the Tanzanian experience, many others border on the speculative, conforming to a pattern that Cooper has

described as “Africa bashing” (1997: 189). This study examined Nyerere’s *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, against the backdrop of this critique, to see how the identity he represented in it related to the various interpretations of his personality and leadership.

As for Museveni, Leymarie (1997: 2) contends that he was a “pragmatic breed and a manager” rather than a “prophet”. Museveni was initially hailed by many scholars and political analysts. These praises coincided with the optimism about the new wave of democratisation that was believed to have swept through the continent and witnessed the fall of several single-party states and military dictatorships in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Osaghae, 1999). Onyango-Oloka (1997) avers that accounts written at the time showed that observers believed that a *nirvana* in Ugandan leadership had indeed arrived. According to these accounts, Museveni had banished the archaic modes of governance, corruption, discrimination, and marginalisation employed by leaders of the past (Onyango-Oloka, 1997).

Other scholars praise him, calling him the African “other statesman”, second to Nelson Mandela (McKinley, 1997: 3). Museveni’s autobiography reveals an almost messianic focus on his capture of political power and ascendancy to the helm of national politics in Uganda. This has led scholars like Mazrui (1987) to use the phrase “philosopher king” to refer to Museveni’s intellectual capability, a phrase which Ogot (1996) denies him and instead replaces with the word “narcissism” to refer to Museveni’s stance in the politics of Uganda. Ogot (1996) goes ahead to argue that Museveni’s autobiography depicts him as Ugandan *Narkissos* [a Greek god celebrated for his beauty but out of arrogance, fell in love with his own reflection in a pool, and destroyed himself], on the grounds that he has used Ugandan history for self-justification and to manipulate the past in his favour (224).

Mujaju (1997), Rosenblum (2002), and McNulty (1999) have shown discontent with Museveni’s regime, using the terms “regional trouble maker” and “an African Bismarck” to show his expansionist appetites. Mamdani (1996) argues that dissident groups in Uganda came up as a result of Museveni’s politics of marginalisation. Some critics even see a resemblance between Museveni and those whom he regards as his enemies in his autobiography – Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Museveni is related with Amin in his affection for matters military (Khadiagala, 1993; Cheru, 2002), while Obote is his mentor and nemesis and the two men stand in roughly an “oedipal”

relationship (Ogot, 1996: 223; Ingham, 1994). The present study interrogated these writings in a bid to trace the similarities or deviations between Museveni's identity as represented in his autobiography and the images of him as derived from these sources. In doing this, the study dug deeper to see how Museveni might have used his autobiography to refashion Uganda's political past as well as his own image.

### **1.9 Theoretical Framework**

This study was informed by the postcolonial theory of autobiography developed by David Huddart. The theory asserts that an autobiography is never simply about the constitution of a stable, knowable self, even if that is the desire in the writing. The writing of the self involves thinking through the relationship of writers to audiences, negotiating public forms of rhetoric, and making interventions into the debate about the role of the postcolonial subject (Huddart, 2008). The theory further contends that autobiographers are limited on what they may want to describe in their writing about themselves, consciously or not, by the fact that they are the objects of what they describe. The writer may presume that he or she has certain qualities. However, this is not true in many cases because he/ she ends up writing what he/ she thinks is the ideal "make-up" or qualities of a person.

A key goal of the postcolonial theory of autobiography is to prepare space for multiple voices about social, cultural, or ethical identity within the framework of concerns. This goal is real and varies across space and time. This is especially true of those voices that have been previously silenced by dominant ideologies (Huddart, 2008). The postcolonial theory of autobiography provides a framework that destabilises dominant discourses of history, challenges "inherent assumptions", and critiques the "material and discursive legacies of colonialism" (Kumaraswamy, 2006: 41). In order to challenge these assumptions and legacies of colonialism, postcolonial autobiographical studies need to consider the historical consciousness of the people by working with tangible identities and processes.

The postcolonial theory of autobiography deals with cultural identity in formerly colonised societies: the dilemmas of developing a national identity after colonial rule; the ways in which writers articulate and celebrate that identity (often reclaiming it from and maintaining strong connections with the coloniser); the ways in which the knowledge of the colonised (subordinated)

people has been generated and used to serve the coloniser's interests; and the ways in which the coloniser's literature has justified colonialism via images of the colonised as a perpetually inferior people, society or culture (Huddart, 2008). These inward struggles of identity, history, and future possibilities often occur in the metropolis and, ironically, with the aid of post-colonial structures of power. The postcolonial theory of autobiography is concerned with various aspects of post-colonial times, and in literature, the question is how the literary text, explicitly or allegorically, represents various aspects of postcolonial identity, including the relationship between personal and cultural identity.

The most significant aspects that made this theory appropriate to this study were the concern with cultural identity in colonised societies; the dilemmas of developing a national identity after colonial rule; and the ways in which writers articulate and celebrate that identity.

## **1.10 Methodology**

### **1.10.1 Introduction**

This section gives a description of the methodology that has been used in the study. It is divided into three sections: Research Design, Data Collection, and Data Analysis.

### **1.10.2 Research Design**

The interpretivist paradigm was employed in this study, which aims at understanding the complex world of a lived experience from the point of view of those who live it (Creswell, 2003). The paradigm helped to evaluate the writings of East African nationalist leaders, focusing on how the authors understand themselves and how they represent their senses of self. The paradigm was suitable because it holds the view that the world of lived reality, that constitutes the general object of investigation, is constructed by the social actors. The research was library based.

### **1.10.3 Data Collection**

#### **1.10.3.1 Data from Primary Sources**

Three books constituted the primary sources for this study, from where data was drawn. These are Kenyatta's *Suffering Without Bitterness*, Nyerere's *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, and Museveni's *Sowing the Mustard Seed*. The data included themes, motifs and literary strategies found in these writings, which were related to identity representation.

### **1.10.3.2 Data from Secondary Sources**

Data was also drawn from secondary sources such as books, peer-reviewed journal articles, seminar and conference proceedings, theses, and newspapers. The data was in the form of theoretical discussions, debates, arguments and views on the issues of identity and representation and the writings of the three nationalist leaders.

### **1.10.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation**

Following Neuman's (1997) observation that qualitative researchers organise data into categories on the basis of themes and concepts, information extracted from the nationalist leaders' writings were analysed and discussed thematically. The data collected, through careful reading of the autobiography and speeches, was analysed through interpretation of the key issues raised in the texts which were related to identity. At each stage of analysis, I drew conclusions. These conclusions involved drawing comparisons or contrasts between the East African nationalist leaders' representation of their identities in their writings and critical views about them expressed by other authors. Data analysis started from the time of data collection.

The data derived from the three works was broken down into quotations, images, symbols, recurrent figures of speech and tropes. I employed content analysis to discuss and analyse common patterns, running themes, motifs, and symbols as they relate to identity representation. Through narrative analysis, the writer's presentation of his life story was isolated and interpreted, as well as contextualised within the broader historical and cultural context. The authors' accounts of their countries' history, and their participation in the socio-political growth in their countries, was interrogated with a view to examining how the nationalist leaders represented their identities. The interpretation of the data was informed by postcolonial theory of autobiography throughout the study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONSTRUCTING THE IDENTITY OF A NATIONALIST LEADER

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines Jomo Kenyatta's *Suffering Without Bitterness* (hereafter *Suffering*), Julius Nyerere's *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja* (*Freedom*), and Yoweri Museveni's *Sowing the Mustard Seed* (*Sowing*) to unravel the identities the three authors construct of themselves as nationalist leaders. In the chapter, it is argued that the three authors use their writings to construct identities that in the context of the problematic unfolding of the nationalist project serve to mask negative aspects of their personalities. The texts present discursive contradictions between their authors' leadership as theorised and as actualised by them, thus constructing identities that are strategically engineered to aid these leaders to safeguard interests they have developed with respect to their paramount political positions and power.

The images presented by the authors of themselves in the three texts are meant to persuade people to believe them and place their trust in them. The authors, therefore, must look for ways in which to create a "metaphor of self" that will cause people to think of them as people worthy of trust (Gusdorf, 1980: 37).

The speeches and autobiography are examined as records of how leaders create, develop, and manipulate situations and circumstances in order to construct an identity that presents them as acceptable to the people. The identities that these leaders construct are invariably creating distinct selves that can be the transitory "here-and-now constellations" that when connected and aligned, constitute a "gestalt of coherence" that can be called one's life (Brockmeier, 2001: 454). Thus, the construction of identity in these texts is not a singular act, but a process that involves an enactment through reproduction and reinterpretation.

The identity of those who have been formally colonised, as in the case with the three authors under study, is produced in specific moments, that is, through the intersection between colonial imposition of identity (i.e. subject-race) and the subordinate's attempt at self-definition. This argument suggests two aspects of identity. First, identities can be institutionally and socially produced in the colonial process. Secondly, these leaders did not submit to the imposed category but tried to navigate it by offering their own interpretations of themselves.

The speeches and the autobiography under study thus construct identities of their authors. This construction of identities is made possible by the fact that the process of writing speeches and autobiography involves the act of selecting events that are considered worth knowing, or assigning reported speech or examples to illustrate a point and piecing them together to convey the appearance of coherence (Angrosino, 1992: 265). The idea of identity construction brings into attention what is included and excluded in these writings, which is ultimately an ideological decision.

## **2.2 *Suffering*: Father of the Nation**

*Suffering* is organised in three parts. The first part is the Foreword where Kenyatta outlines events that allegedly shaped his life. He dedicates a significant portion of the Foreword to the imprisonment he served under British colonial rule for allegedly leading the Mau Mau liberation movement, his release and his inauguration as Kenya's first head of state. The Foreword serves to give the other parts of *Suffering* authenticity and compass. Kenyatta grounds his writing in history, which he describes as a half century of challenges. He uses this section to set the tone for the rest of the text expounding on what he understands by politics, unity, and patriotism. He gives idealistic definitions of these which the reader is supposed to link to Kenyatta himself. It is here that he launches, though implicitly, the construction of his identity as a father of the Kenyan nation. He consistently builds on this endeavour in the second and the third parts of the text.

The second part (the narrative part) is a biographical sketch of Kenyatta, written by an anonymous author. Having been incorporated in the book, whose authorship belongs to Kenyatta, there is every reason to consider this part as also autobiographical in nature in the sense that it presents Kenyatta's life as Kenyatta would have liked it presented. In this part, the writer espouses Kenyatta's trial, his subsequent imprisonment and his homecoming. Kenyatta's trial, as the biographer opines, lasted several months and was a travesty, witnesses were dishonest, and the judge was openly hostile to Kenyatta (22, 30, 61). The author deconstructs the narrative that Kenyatta, as described by colonialists, was "the leader unto darkness and death" (113) through offering his view of Kenyatta as the very light that shone on Kenya, delivering it from the darkness of colonialism. The narrator aims to counter these representations and package Kenyatta as a nationalist and a pan-Africanist who fought for Kenya's independence with singular consistency and determination. Through the presentation of Kenyatta's trial and subsequent imprisonment, his

suffering in Kapenguria and Lodwar, the narrator aims to present Kenyatta's life as entirely constituted by service to the nation.

The biographical sketch includes excerpts from articles that Kenyatta published in the *New Statesman*, the *Nation* in 1936 (38) and the *East African Standard* (47) in 1943. These texts are meant to be seen as part of an enterprise Kenyatta undertook early in his life to bring about Kenya's independence. These pieces show that Kenyatta did not share the radicalism espoused by other nationalists. The purpose of including such material in the biographical sketch may have been to present Kenyatta as a moderate thinker and leader, thus acceptable to the West and to capitalist investors.

Kenyatta's 15-year absence from local and national politics paradoxically shields him, in the biographical sketch, from the ethnic conflicts in Kenya during colonial days. His absenteeism is made to cast him in the eyes of the black population of Kenya as the one person who was free from ethnic bias and who was not part of the factional infighting of the new political parties. This perception led Kenyatta into receiving the hero-like welcome when he was released from prison in 1961, and catapulted him into becoming the President of the new Kenya without much scrutiny.

The last section of the book contains twenty-eight speeches given by Kenyatta on different occasions. Their selection serves to emphasise Kenyatta's identity as the father of the nation. The speeches are arranged in the chronological order of their delivery. Every speech is preceded by an introductory remark that grounds it historically and contextually. The introductory remark wraps up the subject matter of the speech and leads the reader into understanding the speech the way Kenyatta intends it to be understood. This compelling tone is authoritarian, in the sense that it reveals an aspect of Kenyatta's personality which manifests itself in his leadership as Kenya's first President.

In the speeches, Kenyatta equates his personal life with his political life indicating that his life has been dedicated to serving Kenyans. This service to the Kenyan people is portrayed, in the speeches, as an enduring aspect of Kenyatta's personality. However, it is a contention which, when closely examined, raises doubts with respect to his leadership. These speeches insistently point to a logic running through Kenyatta's life, which steadily leads to his emergence as the supreme nationalist leader in Kenya.

In *Suffering*, Kenyatta grapples with new challenges that beset the Kenyan state after independence. There were issues relating to the rebuilding of the nation from colonialism, there was unity to be forged among many ethnicities, there was the pressing problem of breaking foreigners' dominance of the Kenyan economy and transferring it to Kenyans in the spirit of Africanisation, there was the need to decide between the competing ideologies of socialism and capitalism and there was the land question (Mbato, 1969). In the midst of all these challenges, Kenyatta had also built his own specific agenda: to retain power. He had a capitalist disposition and wanted to amass wealth, to accumulate land and to protect his powerful position (Osolo, 1968). In order to deal with the challenges facing the nation, even as he pursues his agenda as a politician, Kenyatta, in the book, constructs images that suppress the visibility of that agenda and present him as a nationalist leader whose primary interest is the advancement of the interests of the people in general. He uses the book to obscure core aspects of his personality and thus be assured of retaining power.

After Kenya attained independence, the most pressing challenge that lay ahead was in nation-building. There was need to mould a unified nation out of the multiplicities of ethnicities, races and regions that formed post-independent Kenya. Kenya's colonial economy had been moulded into a distinctive pattern by the long years of colonial rule. It displayed characteristics typical of an underdeveloped economy at the periphery: the preponderance of foreign capital, the dominance of agriculture, the limited development of industry and the heavy reliance on export of primary products and imports of capital and manufactured consumer goods. This underdeveloped state of the economy meant that independent Kenya would have to formulate policies that would not only arrest Kenya's mounting poverty but also put the economy into the hands of the indigenous people. To realise an all-round development, Kenyans would have to work hard to improve on existing infrastructural facilities, such as communications, health care, energy supply, educational and financial institutions (Turnabull, 1962: 56; Mbato, 1969: 234; Ogot, 1996: 96).

Leaders in independent Kenya had a direct responsibility of addressing the problem of the import-oriented economy, reversing it to an export-oriented economy. Most of what was produced in Kenya during the colonial period benefited the Empire (Maloba, 1996: 23). The task of the *uhuru* government was therefore to formulate policies that would ensure that the citizens of Kenya benefited from the economy of their country. The achievement of independence brought vital

political decisions under the control of the indigenous elite, who have shaped much of post-independent Kenya (Ogot, 1996: 98).

Africanisation, in particular, was one of the most emotive political slogans in the tumult before independence and Kenyatta's promise to the people. It will be recalled that before independence, large-scale agriculture, industry and commerce were dominated by non-Kenyans. Europeans controlled agriculture and industry, while commerce and trade were dominated by Asians (Osolo, 1968: 184). Thus, after independence, one of the most pressing problems was to break the foreigners' dominance of the Kenyan economy and transfer it to Kenyans. In addition, due to the fact that the land issue had been at the root of most of Kenya's political troubles, it was necessary to find solutions to it in the interest of stability and growth in the post-independence era. The issue of land was the most sensitive item in the nationalist agenda. After independence, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) government had to tackle the land issue by resettling the landless on land previously owned by Europeans (Kaggia, 1975: 5).

In a bid to deal with these issues, the Kenyatta government came up with *Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965* which, among other things, contends: "The state has an obligation to ensure equal opportunities to all its citizens, eliminate exploitation and discrimination, and provide needed social services such as education, medical care and social security" (2). Every country that has moved from colonialism to independence has sought to transform its inherited colonial institutions to serve the culture, needs and aspirations of the newly independent society. In Kenya, the desire for this transformation was often identified with the call for nation-building. Nation-building required that leaders define immediate and finite ends besides devising means to those ends. Kenyatta and his ruling elite preserved what they most needed from the colonial state, and particularly the law and order aspects. Institutions such as the provincial administration, the police and the army were taken over without any changes. Notably, Kenyatta retained the services of European officers (Ogot, 1996: 93). Kenyatta's call to forgive and forget became the keynote of his government. Youth-wingers and radical nationalists who spoke of revenge were roundly rebuked. In the course of colonisation, it had become increasingly clear that the colonial system was designed primarily to exploit the local resources (both material and human) for the sake of advancing the exclusive interests of the Empire. The incoming political elite largely inherited the former colonial institutions. They did not change the constitutional structures, and the gap between

them and the masses was widening. A new national bourgeoisie emerged and replaced the old colonial one, but the material conditions for the majority of people did not improve and in fact got worse (Fanon, 1967; Lazarus, 2004; Sivanandan, 2004: 46).

While direct colonial domination had been defeated, very few of the other promises of independence were realised. In fact, independence marked the beginning of economic decline, continued neo-colonialist practices and political instability. Dictatorial tendencies in the government were inspired by none other than Kenyatta, the national hero of independence himself, who in many ways embodied both the hope of liberation and the brutal reality behind the rhetoric of freedom. As Lazarus (2004: 45) observes, “Independence seems to have brought neither peace nor prosperity to Africa. Instead, it has paradoxically borne witness to stagnation, elitism, and class domination, and to the intensifying structural dependence – economic, political, cultural, and ideological – of Africa upon the imperial Western powers.” Thus Kenyan independence failed to live up to its promises and marked the beginning of increasing disillusionment as it became clear to many Kenyans that hardly anything had changed.

Once independence from direct British colonial domination had been secured, the different interests of many of those who had fought together against colonialism became increasingly apparent. In the mass struggles which were necessary to overthrow colonialism, a wide array of people and groups were united with the single purpose of fighting colonialism in a way that created an image of a united movement which did not take into account the dissension within it. As Lazarus (2004) points out, “the general rhetoric of anti-colonialism was reductive. It implied that there was only one struggle to be waged, and it was a negative one: a struggle against colonialism, not a struggle for anything specific” (46). As a result, as already noted, once colonialism was defeated, a new national bourgeoisie emerged who simply replaced the old colonial government without making any actual change to the existing social structures.

In his influential essay “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness”, Fanon (1967: 148-206) describes this process, pointing out that while nationalism unites people in the anti-colonial struggle, once this struggle is over, its end result is simply to establish and in a sense “liberate” the national bourgeoisie who has been kept down by colonial domination. Divisions become apparent in those who united in the anti-colonial struggle, as it becomes clear that the interests of the new

bourgeoisie are not in the least compatible with those of the masses. In the words of Fanon, “the national bourgeoisie steps into the shoes of the former European settlement [...] its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists prosaically of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism” (180). What becomes apparent is that all that has been won through the anti-colonial struggle is a new national bourgeoisie which is no different from the preceding colonial bourgeoisie.

The national liberation struggle successfully overthrew the colonial government and in its place installed a new indigenous one whose interests as a class were more closely tied with those of the ruling classes of the former colonial powers than with those of the citizens. In the words of Lazarus, “independence let loose the national bourgeoisie to behave as it would, like any bourgeoisie” (2004: 55). Hope thus led to disillusionment as it became apparent that independence did not mean change for the majority of people but simply a transfer of power and wealth into the hands of a new ruling class.

Soon after independence, Kenyatta was accused by his critics of betraying the masses on the grounds that he did not distribute land to the landless and that he had become a dictator, an opportunist and a manipulator of ethnic sentiments (Osolo, 1968: 234; Muigai, 2004: 189). As noted earlier, before independence, he was accused by the colonial administrators of being a trouble maker and an evil leader: “a leader unto darkness and death” (113). These representations endangered his power, which he had to retain because he felt he had strongly fought for it. To resolve this identity problem, Kenyatta delivered a series of speeches to construct images of himself that were meant to present him as a nationalist leader. Kenyatta’s collection of speeches serves the purpose of calculated self-explication, clarification, presentation and justification. The speeches enable him to deconstruct the prevailing representations of him and at the same time justify the reasons why the post-independence Kenyan society could not quickly realise an all-round development under his leadership.

In the speeches, Kenyatta the nationalist leader constructs an identity for himself as the father of the Kenyan nation. This identity of a father, in fact the founding father of a young nation, is of necessity multi-faceted. One of its key aspects is that of a unifier. A unifying identity for Kenyatta

seems to have been necessitated by the travails of tribalism, ethnicity and other divisive social evils. After independence, tribalism and ethnic-based political parties were indicative of the failure of national politics in Kenya. There was largely a lack of a sense of unity when the ethnic calculus was employed in the use of national assets and opportunities, and those not included opted for sectional identification as a source of strength and safety (Kaggia, 1975: 3). Kenyatta, for his part, had to put on the garment of a leader who aspired for unification and one who hated tribalism, disunity and other divisive policies. In his 1964 “Kenyatta Day Speech” (240-245), he railed against leaders whom he claimed were using tribalism to bring division among the Kenyan people, including the leaders of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and the African People’s Party (APP). He makes the determined statement that: “My government [...] will not permit exploitation of tribalism and divisive politics” (241). In saying this, Kenyatta is driven by the desire to depict himself as a true head of state in order to ward off the increasing claims that he was a budding dictator and ethnic chauvinist. A close examination of the speech in relation to the prevailing circumstances reveals that it was a part of his strategy to disguise his actual qualities and intentions. In the speech, Kenyatta writes:

There have been murmurs here in Kenya about the part played by one set of people, or another set of people, in the struggle for uhuru [...] there has been vindictive comment, and a finger of scorn has been pointed at some selected race, or group or tribe. All this is unworthy of our future here. (241)

Here, he creates the impression that he is a leader for all Kenyans. However, in the speech “Kenyatta Day, 1967” (341-348), Kenyatta poses a question to his audience which betrays his own divisive tendency: “Where did you fight? How many weapons did you use? How many guns? [...] apart from Achieng who was with us in Lokitaung, and maybe Kaggia [...] they did nothing.” (343). In other words, the leaders of KPU were cowards who never fought for independence. To put it differently, Kenyatta insinuated that there are leaders who never fought for independence and who therefore had no right to question his actions. This speech polarised the country into two sides based on who fought and who did not fight for independence. The KPU members, who were predominantly Luo, were thus judged as cowards who never fought for independence and who should always remain in the political cold.

In fact, in the same speech, “Kenyatta Day, 1967” (341-348), Kenyatta urges his audience to “crush the snakes” (meaning KPU members) (343). Yet, these KPU leaders were agitating for the eradication of poverty, equal distribution of resources, and eradication of landlessness (Ogot, 1996; Mbato, 1969; Osolo, 1968). Kenyatta’s negative response to their demands therefore reveals a leader who could not listen to any opinion contrary to his. The speech shows Kenyatta’s budding dictatorial tendencies.

Faced with the twin problem of forging a nation from the diverse ethnic communities of Kenya and placating the Kikuyu masses (Tamarkin, 1978: 298), Kenyatta decided to pursue both goals simultaneously. He co-opted the power elite of other ethnic nationalities into his ruling coalition and by so doing, he set himself up as the ultimate patron in the neo-patrimonial state he presided over, without pacifying the poor and the dispossessed. This complex client-patron network within which Kenyatta set up “ethnic chiefs” was aimed at helping him retain power (Muigai, 2004: 209). On the other hand, to mollify the Kikuyu masses, he chose to surround himself with an inner circle of Kikuyu advisors, creating a Kikuyu government within the government. Muigai (2004: 209) observes that by choosing to champion the deep-seated land and power grievances of the Kikuyu, he was perceived as having consented to be the Kikuyu paramount chief. This stand did nothing to help solve the issue of historical ethnic claims.

Another way that Kenyatta used to camouflage his true interests and intentions was the rhetoric of patriotism and nationalism. On the surface, he spoke continuously about the need for Kenyans to rise above their ethnic and regional boundaries in order to forge ahead as a united nation. But beneath the rhetoric appears to have been a systematic programme of “Kikuyunisation” of national institutions and resources.

When Kenyatta became Prime Minister in June 1963, he promised to fight poverty, ignorance and disease as a way of leading the country to the realisation of an all-round development. This, as Kenyatta put it, would be achieved through the spirit of nation-building and Africanisation of agriculture and the civil service. In his Independence Day Speech of 1963 (212-217), he averred that independence was, to the Kenyan people, the turning point of their lives, the reversal of all things in their favour. He proposed the socialist slogan *Harambee* as a call to self-sufficiency. The slogan was devised for the purpose of national development. Kenyatta likened the task ahead of

the new nation to that of workers with a burden which would only be overcome by working together to successfully heave up or pull together their heavy load.

In “Kenyatta Day, 1964” (240-245), Kenyatta describes the political hurdles that he encountered in the fight for the emancipation of the Kenyan people. He presents himself as a leader who suffered, offering himself as a sacrifice for the nation. He narrates to his people the difficulties he experienced in founding the nation, presenting himself as a nationalist who endured and came out of suffering victoriously. He prides himself on fighting for the welfare of the Kenyan people, recalling how he was “heavily chained in detention camps and prison [but how] he never gave up” (243). He supposedly knew that “one must learn to suffer and endure, to replant or rebuild, to move on again” (5). As Kenyatta says in the Foreword, “a practitioner must never lose faith” (6). By presenting himself as a leader who endures suffering without losing focus, Kenyatta aims to be understood as a patriotic leader who is concerned with the welfare of his nation.

It would appear that what Kenyatta was calling nationalisation was indeed the “Kikuyunisation” of Kenya and what he was calling nationalism was the ongoing protection of his political and economic interests. Although he continued to talk of Kenya as one nation and to de-emphasise ethnicity in his public statements and policies on land, service delivery and jobs, the unifying rhetoric of nationhood concealed a less palatable truth. The 1960s saw the entrenchment of Kikuyu power via a web of both formal and informal networks. The senior civil service was increasingly dominated by the Kikuyu (Ogot, 1996: 95). The crucial posts of Provincial Commissioners, for example, were held by a small group of conservative insiders, more than half of whom were Kikuyu from 1964 until Kenyatta’s death, and three of whom were sons of chiefs. Appointments to statutory boards and parastatals replicated the same trend (Attwood, 1967; Osolo, 1968; Mbato, 1969; Ogot, 1996). For instance, Osolo (1968) notes that:

In most of the key positions throughout Kenya’s major infrastructural developments, one found members of Kenyatta’s tribe (Kikuyu). What is perhaps most important to note is that, since independence nearly all key cabinet ministries (Finance, Defense, Foreign Affairs, State, Attorney General and Land and Settlement) were held by a group of members of Kenyatta’s tribe; Mungai Njoroge (Kenyatta’s relative through marriage), Sir Charles Njonjo (Attorney General from Kenyatta’s district) *inter alia*. (234)

A further examination of who was who in the Kenyan economic sector in the early 1960s shows that the Kenyan political economy was controlled by Kenyatta and his close associates. In the central government, Geoffrey Kariithi (a Kikuyu from Kirinyaga and educated at Alliance High School) headed the civil service from 1967 to 1979. Other senior figures included Kiereini (Alliance, also from Kirinyaga and an ex-detention camp warden) who ran the Ministry of Defence, Peter Gachathi (Alliance, Kiambu) was Education Secretary from 1969 to 1979. Duncan Ndegwa (Alliance, Nyeri) was Governor of the Central Bank. Joseph Gethenji (Nyeri) was Director of Personnel from 1968 to 1978, while Joseph Kibe (Murang'a) was Permanent Secretary for Commerce and Industry. There were powerful civil servants who were not Kikuyu, but they generally played a secondary role. A study of top civil service posts in 1972 showed that Kikuyu held 50 per cent of the top jobs, a rapid increase since the 1960s. There were reports that a Posting Committee in the Office of the President (OP) made civil service appointments in advance of interviews by the Public Service Commission, and that this committee was dominated by a Kikuyu ex-Home Guard (Attwood, 1967; Osolo, 1968).

It is important to note that Kenyan tribalism is a relatively new phenomenon. Basically, it is a product of modernity, arising from colonialism, urbanisation and the political culture that sprang up in the course of colonisation (Ahmad, 1992: 22; Legum, 1999: 84; Amin, 1997: 93). Before the coming of the colonialists, Kenyan tribes lived in their own distinct areas with their own cultures, i.e. language, customs, myths of origin, etc. The communities lived free from each other, save for some conflict over water and pasture for livestock. Essentially, tribalism was born when the colonial government haphazardly incorporated the various ethnicities and regions within the boundaries of the relatively new nation-state that came to be known as "Kenya". Tribalism is closely connected to the management and distribution of the available national resources. It arises when individuals are alienated from the centre of power or otherwise discriminated against on the basis of their ethnic affiliation. Oftentimes, this happens when one ethnic group or an alliance of ethnic groups utilises the institutions of the state to monopolise national politics and state resources at the expense of other ethnic groups (Tarimo, 2008: 2-5).

The colonialists magnified differences amongst the various communities/ tribes instigating clashes whereby the communities distrusted and fought one another. This served as the breeding ground for negative tribal stereotypes which then became embedded in popular belief. Tarimo (2008: 2)

argues that the Kikuyu, for example, were given the impression that the fish-eating Luos were lazy, uncircumcised and unreliable while the Luhya were made to view the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) communities as schemers, liars, untrustworthy, arrogant and so forth. This climate of suspicion persisted until the time when independence was realised in 1963. At this point, tribal suspicions shot up as the two major parties, KADU and KANU, began squabbling over power. KANU was a party largely dominated by two tribes: the Kikuyu and the Luo. KADU, on the other hand, was a coalition of the other small Kenyan tribes that feared being dominated by the Kikuyu-Luo alliance under KANU (Ogot, 1996: 49).

After independence, the unity between the Luo and the Kikuyu quickly fell apart. Once Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) became President his administration started favouring the Kikuyu people. This favouritism manifested itself in greater government expenditures for social infrastructure in Kikuyu areas, corruption benefits to fellow tribesmen and privileged access to government and parastatal jobs (Ogot, 1996: 49). The Luo, on the other hand, despite holding the vice-presidency, were largely discriminated against, and their complaints only elicited intimidation and even assassinations in return. Under the Kenyatta government, it was not unusual to have under-qualified staff from the Kikuyu community placed in positions of authority rather than qualified ones from other tribes (Tarimo, 2008: 3). This led to the final falling out between the Luo and the Kikuyu in the government as the Vice President, Oginga Odinga (a Luo), was eventually pushed out of government and detained (Tarimo, 2008: 3). The tribal rift was widened and solidified when a Luo minister, Tom Mboya, who had remained in government, was assassinated in 1969. The assassination was blamed on highly placed Kikuyu politicians, and this was seen as an assault on the Luo by the Kikuyu, and since then Kenyan politics has essentially pitted the Kikuyu against the Luo (Ogot, 1996: 54). As each of the two tribes attempted to attract other tribal groups to its side, Kenyatta sought to reshape and save his face by projecting an image of himself as a non-tribalistic leader.

In this respect, perhaps Kenyatta's most important response against the increasing perception that he was a tribalist were his speeches, especially the ones that were included in *Suffering*. In speech after speech, he sought to focus on the dangers that the division of Kenya along tribal lines posed to the country's future. It will be recalled that at the beginning of his presidency he had cautioned Kenyans that unless they achieved national unity they could become vulnerable to the same forces

of imperialism and colonialism that had created their present conditions (Osolo, 1968: 25; Mbato, 1969: 3). In his verbal addresses to the nation in the course of the 1960s, especially subsequent to the fall-out with Odinga, he repeatedly emphasised that message. But it is debatable whether or not he achieved the objective of creating a more palatable image of himself as far as his handling of ethnic relations was concerned since criticisms of him to that effect persisted in spite of the patriotism he repeatedly communicated to the nation and to the world.

One of the speeches in which Kenyatta sought to exonerate himself from accusations of negative ethnicity is “Dissident Activity, 1966” (302-307). When this speech is examined closely in relation to Kenyatta’s political objectives, it becomes clear that Kenyatta was using it to caution the radicals within the government to desist from criticising him. These radicals wanted him to honour the pledge of steering Kenya as a socialist state, for it appeared to them that what Kenyatta’s government was calling “African Socialism” was simply a cloak for the practice of tribalism and capitalism (Ogot, 1996: 100).

One of the most confounding challenges that the newly independent Kenya faced at the dawn of independence was how to formulate the most appropriate ideology in view of its developmental objectives. There were two conflicting directions that Kenya could follow at the time, and the determinant factor was the ongoing Cold War. On the one hand, there was the Western Bloc of Nations led by the United States of America (Ahmad, 1992: 22). On the other, there was the Eastern Bloc of Nations led by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The West sought to spread the capitalist ideology within the context of the so-called liberal democratic political environment. The East championed the communist ideology as espoused by Carl Marx (Wallerstein, 1996: 34-35).

Each bloc of nations sought to spread its ideology throughout the globe. As a result, most countries around the world, especially weak countries like Kenya, were forced to choose between the two sides. This led to conflicts in various places in the world as communities organised themselves either in line with the capitalist or the communist ideology. Most of the coups and the counter-coups that characterised the 1960s and 1970s were, in one way or another, related to the influence of the two competing sides. In Africa, for example, the struggle for independence in Mozambique,

Angola and Ethiopia pitched capitalist against communist or socialist forces (Wallerstein, 1996: 34-35).

Scott (1999: 9-10) observes that in response to the Cold War and the adverse influence that it had on the developing world, underdeveloped countries organised themselves under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement. The reason was because they wanted to avoid being caught up in the proxy wars that were being fought around the world on behalf of the West and the Soviet Union. It is within this context that the type of capitalism that Kenya under Kenyatta pursued will be understood.

Through the concept of “African Socialism”, Kenya presented itself to the world as a distinct nation that was not necessarily Western-oriented. In this respect, Kenya associated itself with the Non-Aligned Movement. But in fact Kenya was a capitalist country which was firmly in the armpit of Western capitalism. Kenya was important to the West because it played a strategic role in East Africa as a bulwark against communism, especially so because certain countries in the region, including Tanzania under Nyerere and Uganda under Milton Obote, were experimenting with socialism. To reinforce this position, the West provided the country with considerable financial and material support in exchange for the critical role that it played in the Cold War on behalf of the West (Scott, 1999: 9-10).

One of the reasons why Kenyatta fell out with Odinga was the emerging impression that Odinga was sympathetic towards the Communist Bloc of nations. In the course of the 1960s there was increasing criticism towards Odinga to the effect that he represented the interests of the Soviet Union in Kenya and that his intention was to overthrow the existing regime and replace it with a communist one. These impressions were reinforced by the decision by the Soviet Union to provide funds to build a major hospital in Kisumu (Ogot, 1996: 96). Kenyatta took advantage of these accusations against Odinga to engineer his exclusion from the government together with his Luo people, who constituted KPU.

From a close study of the speech “Dissident Activity, 1966” (302-307), it is clear that the basis of Kenyatta’s criticisms of Odinga in this respect could not have been his communist inclinations. The argument that Odinga was a communist who intended to overthrow the established system is not sustainable. In his autobiography *Not Yet Uhuru*, Odinga describes himself as a nationalist

whose primary objective is to advance “African Socialism” which within the Kenyan context is by no means communism (1966: 54). Furthermore, Kagigia observes that the foundation of KPU was to realise the equitable redistribution of resources among Kenyans by bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, which does not necessarily imply imposing communism upon Kenya (1975: 76). Yet in the speech, Kenyatta distances himself from Odinga primarily on the grounds that he is a communist. He argues that the members of the KPU were paid agents of the Soviet Union. He insists that insofar as the requirements of the common *mwananchi* are concerned, the communist system is utterly inadequate. He argues: “It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by simply crying communism” (243).

But if, as we have seen, Odinga was not a communist, then what exactly was the basis from which Kenyatta was criticising him in that respect? In view of the ethnic equation that was driving politics in Kenya at the time, one cannot help but conclude that Kenyatta’s problem with Odinga was that the latter symbolised the interests of the ethnic groups that were affiliated to KPU, of which the Luo were the most dominant.

The same point can be made with regard to the speech “Constitutional Conference, 1963” (209-211). The purpose of the speech is to re-assure the various ethnicities that constituted the new Kenya at the time, including the European former colonisers and the Asian community, in regard to the country’s future potential. But an examination of the speech in light of what we already know about Kenyatta’s true ideological orientation leaves one uncertain as to whether he was genuine in that regard. It would appear that the primary motivation behind these reassurances was the need for him to establish an alliance between the emerging African elite and the former colonisers in order to safeguard the economic interests of the ruling class.

At independence, the African community, in spite of its numerical majority, did not possess the skills that the country required in order for it to forge ahead as quickly as possible in terms of development (Osolo, 1968: 25; Mbato, 1969: 3). The former European colonisers, and to a lesser extent the Asian community, possessed the skills that the country needed in the civil service, the military, the police, and the administration. Kenyatta’s challenge was how to transfer these skills to the local elite without alienating the former colonial masters. He wanted to retain them in the country for as long as was necessary for the new African elite to master those skills so as to

advance the interests of the country on their own (Ochieng', 1989: 213). The speech provided a powerful medium through which he pursued that objective.

Perhaps the most important point that Kenyatta advances in the speech is the idea that Kenyans should not dwell on the past but should move together into the future in unity and fraternity. He assures the former colonisers that his government would not avenge itself against them for whatever injustices they may have committed against the people in the course of colonialism. In addition, he requests the native African citizens to focus on the future rather than on the past. In this connection, the primary pre-occupation of Kenyans should be to strive to realise their dreams, in both their individual and their collective capacities, through hard work. This was because work constituted the most important context through which they would liberate themselves as individuals and as a country.

To put it differently, it was not necessarily the call to nationalism that compelled Kenyatta to forgive and forget the past. Rather, it was the desire on his part to forge an alliance between the emerging African elite that he represented and the former colonisers who possessed the critical skills that the new elite so desperately needed in order to achieve their collective aspirations.

The same concerns about unity appear in the speech "Jamhuri Day, 1965" (294-297). But here again, one might question the true motivations behind the President's call for unity. He utilises biblical imagery to construct the vision of Kenya that he desires. He argues that it is only through unity and a common purpose that the people of Kenya will reach Canaan. But it will be recalled that at the time that he was making this speech it was clear across Kenya that he was effectively establishing a foundation for Kikuyu hegemony (Osolo, 1968: 25; Mbato, 1969: 3). Furthermore, he gave the speech shortly before he fell out with Odinga, the precursor to the exclusion of the Luo community from the centre of power.

So far, we have examined the ways in which Kenyatta endeavoured to mask his ethnic and capitalist inclinations. We have seen that his call for unity and inclusion across ethnic and racial boundaries was in fact a camouflage for his commitment to the emerging, largely ethnic elite, for the most part at the expense of the majority of the people. The same argument can be made with respect to the manner in which he handled the issue of land in the immediate post-independence period. It has been argued that Kenyatta took advantage of his position as the President to amass

large tracts of land for himself and his family (Attwood, 1967: 23; Osolo, 1968: 237; Ogot, 1996: 97; Kipchumba, 2008: 1). A close examination of the speeches contained in *Suffering* indicates that they provided a powerful medium through which he camouflaged this form of abuse of power.

In the speech “Back to the Land, 1964” (232-235), Kenyatta urges citizens to make use of their lands for economic advancement. He reminds them that land is the best resource which every citizen could use to advance himself and the society. He discourages people from loitering and laziness, reminding them that “the time for slogans and empty words has come to an end. We cannot cry for more land, and yet fail to develop that which we have” (234). Kenyatta here implies that the landless were not justified in their quest for land. According to him, they did not deserve their ancestral land back since they could not manage it. He downplays the fact that the people who found themselves landless at the dawn of independence had had their land alienated from them by the European settlers.

Land alienation originated from the confiscation of land from the indigenous people by British settlers. These indigenous people hoped that they would be given back their land after independence, but in fact, this land was, after independence, retaken by politically powerful personalities. Ogot (1996: 98) argues that Kenyatta and his associates benefited from the land left behind by the white settlers, relegating those who had owned the land before the white settlers to the category of the landless.

Tarimo (2008: 2) argues that as many settlers were returning to Britain, Kenyatta and his cronies quickly formed the Settlement Transfer Fund Schemes (STFS) and asked the British for a loan to the Kenyan government to buy off land from colonial settlers returning to Britain. She explains that this idea was noble and that Britain advanced the money because it was assured by Kenyatta that those settlers wishing to stay on in Kenya would not have their land repossessed. This money was used to buy settler land that was officially sold into the Kenyatta initiated STFS. This may be said to be the point at which the rain started beating Kenya. Kenyatta’s then Vice President, Oginga Odinga, cried foul and rejected these acts of “reckless land grabbing” (Tarimo, 2008: 3).

The speech “Kenyatta Day, 1967” (340-348) is specifically a response to Odinga’s criticism. In the speech, Kenyatta blames Odinga and the KPU members for allegedly sabotaging the government’s activities. He dismisses KPU for not fighting for freedom and threatens them: “KPU should

beware! The fighting for our uhuru is on. Whoever has ears to hear, let him heed this. We are ready to fight for our uhuru” (344). True to his word, Kenyatta, as Ogot (1996: 56) contends, detained Odinga and some KPU members without trial two years after this speech. In this score, it can be argued that the criticisms of Kenyatta as a dictator hold truth.

Kaggia, one of the Kapenguria detainees, argued that since land issues had been the fundamental cause of the Mau Mau war against the British settlers in Kenya, and since in his *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938) and *Kenya, the Land of Conflict* (1944), Kenyatta had indicated that African land and cultures were to be returned to, or left for their traditional African owners from whom the settlers had usurped the land, Kenyatta was expected to honour his pledges but he does not do so. Kaggia expected that after Kenya achieved independence, those land tracts that had been taken by the European and Asian settlers would be returned to their rightful owners (Mazrui, 1970: 3). However, to Kaggia’s surprise, no one received his land back as Kenyatta demanded that whoever wanted his land back must first of all pay for it. The rule was simple: no money, no land. Thus the possession of money was mandatory for land restoration and acquisition.

Kenyatta ridiculed and disgraced Kaggia by publicly saying:

Kaggia, we were together with Paul Ngei jailed, if you go to Ngei’s farm, he has planted a lot of coffee and other crops. What have you done to yourself? If you go to Kubai’s, he has a big house and a nice shamba. Kaggia, what have you done for yourself? We were together with Kung’u Karumba in jail, now he is running his own buses. What have you done for yourself? (Mazrui, 1965: 23).

The argument between Kenyatta and Kaggia took place in 1965, but more recent studies on the land question confirm that Kenyatta’s objection to the distribution of land prevailed till his death in 1978 (Osolo, 1980: 43). Land which belonged to X before independence could only be returned to X after independence if X had the money to buy back his own land. Otherwise X had no right over it.

Kenyatta’s demand that Africans must pay to buy land that was formally lost to white settlers was amazing. Kenyatta knew well that most of his people were too poor to buy the land without the benefit of loans and also that no one could get a loan without any substantial collateral or sound

proof of ability to pay back the loan (Mazrui, 1965: 45). Thus he contradicted the promises that he had made to the Kenyan people in his pre-and early post-independence speeches. Kenyatta had promised that his rule would be totally different from the British rule that had excluded Africans from the political process. Unlike the outgoing British government, Kenyatta's government was to fling open all the doors to all Africans. He alleged that he would welcome criticism from the opposition and individuals and concentrate on a cooperative policy that would necessitate nation-building. He declared that without such criticism, his ruling party could not be effective. Thus, Kenyatta had initially viewed the existence of an opposition as a healthy element in the political process in Kenya (Osolo, 1968: 134).

Questions arise as to why Kenyatta had to depart from his declared political ideals given that he had suffered at the hands of the undemocratic colonial rule in Kenya. An analysis of Kenyatta's activities above suggests that his transformation must have been a function of his realisation that he had already solidified his political leadership position well enough not to worry about being accused of self-contradiction. Thus, Kenyatta did not just become a revisionist; he became a deviant political theoretician highly possessed with the enormous economic gains and political prestige attached to the office of the presidency. Like his counterparts in other parts of the developing world, Kenyatta became so flooded with riches coming from corruptive offers from inside and outside Kenya in return for his favours that he would not tolerate criticisms from Kaggia, Odinga and other socialism advocates (Mbato, 1969: 2).

Obtaining these corruptive offers must have been the reason why Kenyatta and his close associates became millionaires within a very short time. The trend of condoning corruption in his government also explains why a leader like Oginga Odinga could not be allowed to continue serving as Vice President by Kenyatta. It also helps explain why Kenyatta wanted the post of President to remain within his Kikuyu tribe; it was in order to protect the wealth he had already accumulated on a large scale; and why Kenyatta could not accept the political ideals of his critics (Pegushev, 1996: 191).

Immediately after Kenyatta's government was installed, land policy became a bone of contention, and Kenyatta would openly express his stand on land. In the speech "Constitutional Conference, 1963" Kenyatta assured Kenyans: "I know that one of the most sensitive questions in our country is land. I now give a categorical assurance that under the Constitution, all tribal land is entrenched

in the tribal authority and no one can take away land belonging to another tribe” (211). Here, Kenyatta presents himself as a strong protector of people’s interests – a leader who understands the plight of his people. However, Kenyatta only protects the interests of a certain group of people. Although he talks in an inclusive manner, he only uses this kind of political rhetoric to appear relevant and therefore retain power. This kind of contradiction does not support Kenyatta’s identity as a patriotic leader that he constructs in *Suffering*; it reveals a leader whose aim was to retain power using all available means.

As noted, after independence Kenyatta departs from the aims that propelled him to power and which he writes about in his earlier works like *Facing Mount Kenya* and *Kenya, The Land of Conflicts*. His main objectives in the struggle against the colonial rule would have been to restore the usurped land to the rightful owners; to eradicate all forms of class distinctions and their causes; and to govern Kenya within the frameworks of *Harambee*, a socialist principle of all against the common enemies, i.e. poverty, ignorance and disease. A significant degree of inconsistency abounds between Kenyatta’s portrayed identities and his actions on the ground. This is especially so because Kenyatta, on the eve of independence gave several promises that he later did not honour. These include his promise to restore usurped land to its rightful former owners; to welcome the opposition and other government critics as essential ingredients for a healthy political process; and to be a national leader and therefore to allow all tribes to harvest equal shares of Kenya’s independence. These and other political omissions by him collectively demonstrate a practical departure from his political theory. These political omissions are also the reason why many people during Kenyatta’s leadership felt that Kenya was Not Yet Uhuru, i.e. not yet independent.

The question of land has been a contested one since independence, and it has haunted Kenya to date. The violent reactions to allegations of rigged elections in 2007 may reflect the pain of deep and historically rooted injustices some of which pre-date Kenya’s independence in 1963. To a certain extent the occasion presented a chance to correct some of the historical wrongs committed against certain communities. Injustice occurred in the area of land ownership, when land was confiscated from the indigenous people by British settlers and later retaken by politically powerful personalities after independence in 1963. Instead of returning the stolen lands to the original owners, the politically connected personalities took advantage of the departure of the white settlers

to grab land, while relegating those who owned the land before the white settlers to the category of the landless. Reactions of discontent have been revealed in the land clashes of 1992, 1997 and 2007. These clashes display the anger among those living in impoverished conditions.

Corrupt systems, tribalism and other vices have been perpetuated and seamlessly transferred from one power regime to the next. However, reading Kenyatta's speeches in *Suffering* at face value, one would not imagine that such a balanced and innocently crafted person could inculcate into a society negative tendencies that would gnaw so deep fifty years after independence.

In recent years, the dominant ethnic groups have been on the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation has resulted in fighting to control the state. Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in the hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did not materialise. The situation has fomented anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competitiveness that has overlooked the common good of the entire nation. Frustration among the poor, both in urban and rural areas, has created a growing tendency to use violence as a means to correct the situation. When violent reactions emerge, under the influence of ethno-political ideologies, they tend to take the form of ethnocentrism, the ideology that animates the competition between ethnic groups.

The phrase "Suffering without Bitterness" could refer to almost any deeply felt passion or political conviction. It is an expression of political desire, a theme that is picked up in the book's subtitle, "The Founding of the Kenyan Nation." At the time of compiling these speeches some people were already disillusioned with Kenyatta's policies but clearly the President expects them to be impressed by his political accomplishments, and to take pride in his aspirations. Moreover, he sees his own career, not from the perspective of the rough-and-tumble of the political arena, but as a political exercise, as a process of education. He also implies that somehow he was destined to become President, which is largely why he tells his life story (Tarimo, 2008: 2) as if everything he ever said or did led directly to his assumption of the ultimate leadership role. In the rearranging of his life, Kenyatta chooses to see himself as a leader of a very special sort—as the founding father of the nation. As such, he is one who has accumulated vast knowledge, and has lived his life so as to put that knowledge at the service of the people. He thus sets out to evoke this father of the nation

self as a suitable image of leadership for a people leaving colonialism behind and needing guidance for a new order.

### **2.3 Freedom and the Projection of the Identity of *Mwalimu***

Julius Nyerere was lauded as the one leader who could ensure the full realisation of the Tanzanian nationalist project. His style of leadership and character evoked a flood of encomiums worldwide after his death in 1999. At the onset of independence, Nyerere appeared to be an avowed socialist who never deviated from his humanist path (Boesen et al. 1977). A leader who sought the pragmatic option that favoured his people, he made original contribution to progressive dialectics with his concept of *ujamaa* as the basis for equitable economic production and distribution. With the idea of *ujamaa*, he popularised the idiom of self-reliance and non-exploitative development. But with time, his political decisions betrayed him as a power-conscious leader, a politician with strong dictatorial inclinations and a false prophet whose approach to changing Tanzania's economic landscape devastated the economy of a potentially wealthy state. By compelling people to follow his line of thought, Nyerere deprived himself of the chance to interrogate his understanding, to expand his horizons. Thus his leadership became inefficient and myopic and dried Tanzania of funds (Boesen et al., 1977).

In his speeches in *Freedom*, Nyerere embarks on a task to construct the overarching identity of himself as *Mwalimu* (teacher). He sees himself as a unique *Mwalimu*, one who has the whole Tanzanian nation as his disciples. The lesson he had to teach, as he saw it, was vast – to mould people into citizens of a nation in formation. Nothing was possible before this lesson was learned, and that is why, in view of the all-importance and nobility of it, he needed all the authority to carry out his task, and all the discipline from those who stood to benefit from it. Nyerere preferred *Mwalimu* instead of other terms of address such as “His Majesty”, “His Excellency”, or “Major General” that some African leaders allot themselves.

Nyerere was one of the first generation of African leaders who struggled for independence. His political career started before the formation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the then only party with a national outlook in Tanganyika. Before leading Tanganyika to independence, Nyerere worked as a teacher, a role which he hoped to keep long after Tanganyika's independence (Johnson, 2000). After independence, and specifically in the years between 1962 –

1966, Nyerere gradually became imposing, willing the citizens and party leaders to understand the issues in the post-independent state exclusively from his own perspective. He found it difficult to accept contrary opinion. This rigidity, with time made Nyerere to be perceived as a dictator whose approach to transforming Tanzania's economy was counterproductive (Boesen et al., 1977; Freyhold, 1979; Ergas, 1980: 387-410). Between 1962 and 1966, Nyerere's leadership became largely inefficient and myopic and dried Tanzania of funds. Mazrui (1967: 22) argues that Nyerere's vision of a socialist Tanzania conflicted with his Pan-Africanist commitment. In several publications, he blames Nyerere for the disintegration of the East African Community. He argues that the requirement to control factors of production, which socialist planning in Tanzania dictated, was harmful to the efforts to bring about greater integration in East Africa.

It will be recalled that the three countries of East Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as Mazrui (1967) argues, attained independence in the 1960s with a common services organisation which included a free-market flow of goods among the three states and a common currency. By 1966 the three states had established separate national currencies and were erecting trade barriers among themselves. Mazrui (1967: 23) argues that a "major reason for the disintegration was the devial socialism which had made Tanzania increasingly impatient of economic factors over which she had inadequate jurisdiction." Nyerere ignored these allegations and went ahead and established Tanzania as an avowed socialist state. This defiance strained the relationship between the three East African states and ostensibly led to the demise of the EAC (Mazrui, 1967: 23; Boesen et al., 1977: 2-4; Freyhold, 1979: 34; Ergas, 1980: 387-410).

One of the issues that became a bone of contention between Nyerere and his critics was Africanisation in the first few years after independence. Critics blamed Nyerere for what they termed as favouring the white(s) (Sivalon, 1992). Sivalon (1992) argues that Zuberi Mtemvu, formerly the TANU Secretary in the Eastern Province, broke away from Nyerere's party and formed the African National Congress (ANC), a party constituted on a racial platform. Its rallying slogan was "Africa for Africans". Nyerere had defined an African as any person living in Tanzania, who thus had to be considered in the allocation of land and other resources from the state. This definition included the white(s) who also qualified to benefit from public resources. Critics advocated for total Africanisation (Legum and Mmari, 1995: 2). The opposition and trade unions rejected this definition of an African and insisted that an African was a Tanzanian with a

black skin. Instead of reasoning with them, Nyerere introduced the draconian Preventive Detention Act, first to suppress trade unions and then to lock up any opponents as he wished. People disappeared, and the total numbers were never published, but victims were estimated to have been in the thousands (Legum and Mmari, 1995: 2). International human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, campaigned against repression in Tanzania.

Adding onto Nyerere's repressive tendencies, scholars have argued that Nyerere's concept of *ujamaa* was tyrannical (Freyhold, 1979: 34; Ergas, 1980: 387-410). *Ujamaa* was repressive because it involved the government burning villages and forcing people to relocate onto collective farms, which greatly disrupted agricultural efficiency and output. It is because of this concept that Tanzania turned from a nation of subsistence farmers into a nation of starving collective farmers. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures multiplied and excessive tax rates set by officials further damaged the economy. Enormous amounts of public funds were misappropriated and put to unproductive use. Purchasing power declined at an unprecedented rate and even essential commodities became unavailable (Stapenhurst, 1999). *Ujamaa* ushered in a system of permits (*vibali*) which allowed officials to collect huge bribes in exchange for them. A foundation for systemic corruption was laid.

Accusations, opposition and dissent with respect to the policy of *ujamaa* seem to have made Nyerere latch even more firmly onto his identity as *Mwalimu*. The image of *Mwalimu* would help Nyerere be seen as the one with the needed skills to give direction to the nation and who understood the realities of underdevelopment, perpetuated by colonialism and nascent capitalism. *Mwalimu* Nyerere thus knew that the travails of the Tanzanian nation were caused by colonialism and could only be addressed by changing the inherited Western model of development. This model had to be substituted by human-centred development. Being a teacher, thus, would buttress his role as nationalist leader who constantly reassessed and explained appropriate and rational choices for the young nation. As a teacher, Nyerere could help the nation to a full realisation of freedom, both mental and physical. Being a teacher would help Nyerere to remain relevant in the nation's political terrain.

*Freedom*, is organised in three sections. The first section is a biographical overview of Nyerere's life detailing his childhood, his education, and his political career. The second section is an

introduction, in which Nyerere raises four issues. Among them is how man relates to his society. Nyerere argues that the society must serve “the individual man, his growth, his health, his security, his dignity and, therefore, his happiness” (7). The second issue Nyerere raises is the need for international unity. In this respect, Nyerere advises all African nations to unite because in unity lay the salvation of the African continent. The third one is the vital nature of the social ethic which he defines as “a sense of what things are right and what things are wrong, both for the institutions in relation to the members, and for the members in relation to one another” (20). Finally, Nyerere emphasise the need for Africa to change: “change from an area where people eke out an existence and adapt themselves to their environment, to a continent which challenges the environment and adapts it to man’s need” (23). Nyerere effectively uses this introduction to portray himself as a knowledgeable leader who understands that liberation comes from within an individual and that to fast-track development the citizens had to know how to master their environment. These issues serve to contextualise the speeches which form the last and substantive section of the book.

In his speeches, Nyerere constructs an identity of himself as a teacher in the broadest sense of the term. He aims to be understood as a counsellor, an ideologue and a liberator. To portray himself as a liberator, Nyerere challenges the imperial narrative with the intention of liberating the mind of Tanzanians. This imperial narrative, as Miller (1985: 44) argues, denied Africans their histories and humanity. Nyerere’s approach to imperialism, as he aims to show in his speeches, is in line with Miller’s argument that the nationalist historiographies sought to correct the one-sidedness and racist historiography that served the colonial ideological apparatus. To Miller, colonial historiography denied Africans agency and was essentially an account of the itineraries of explorers, trade merchants, missionaries and colonisers. Dethroning this view and placing Africans at the centre of the history of their country, Nyerere aims to be understood as one with a message of liberation and decolonisation of the mind of the Tanzanian person.

It will be recalled that post-independent African leaders typically wanted to be perceived as the ones who had the sole responsibility of liberating the citizens from the shackles of colonialism. They wanted to be applauded for leading their nations into freedom single-handedly. Most of them therefore abrogated for themselves the identities of liberators. Nyerere, in his speeches, aims to portray himself as the sole liberator of the Tanzanian nation. He strives to emerge as the one who redeems the humanity of the Tanzanian people, a humanity denied by Hegel’s assertion that

Africans had no history but a “blank darkness” (Miller, 1985: 45). In the speech “Independence Address to the United Nations, 1961” (144-156), Nyerere offers his interpretation of the meaning of independence: “Freedom is responsibility towards our people ... to raise the standards of living of our people and to lift up our economy” (144). He, in this speech, outlines the policies of his government, which aim at liberating the people of Tanzania from the shackles of colonialism and other social ills, such as poverty, disease and ignorance. He advances the idea that without freedom, a human being cannot be productive and is unable to benefit from the environment. These formulations sound as axioms, they do not open up possibilities for interrogation and preclude thought. What is also glaringly lacking in them is the consideration of personal freedoms.

An argument can be made that Nyerere’s understanding of liberation shared one common premise and fallacy of developmentalism. That is, the objectification of African peasants and rural dwellers as hapless victims of underdevelopment who needed to be emancipated to higher levels of social and material well-being (Freyhold, 1979; Ergas, 1980: 387-410). As a result, Nyerere’s commitment to liberation resulted in a situation where improving the conditions of the peasants meant alienating them from their cultural and social backgrounds. This kind of scenario confirms the claim that Nyerere did not understand well the meaning of freedom and this misunderstanding can be attributed to his political myopia alluded to by Versi (1999: 7-13).

Another aspect of the identity of a teacher in Nyerere’s speeches is that of one who keeps his flock of students together, a unifier. The first speech in *Freedom* is entitled “The Race Problem in East Africa, 1952” (23-29), and in it Nyerere points out that to achieve liberation of mind the Tanganyikan nation has to stop “racial animosity” (23). In this speech, Nyerere criticises racial attitudes. He recalls: “It was in Tanganyika where recently at a public gathering and before a minister of the Crown, a European settler declared that he would rather dine with swine than with an African” (23). Nyerere rejects this perverse attitude as an obstacle to the unity of the Tanzanian nation. Nyerere argues that without unity among the races living in Tanganyika at the time, freedom and development could not be achieved. In this speech, Nyerere emphasises unity and argues that in its absence the nation could never attain independence. However, as studies have shown, Nyerere after independence favoured whites in the awarding of state jobs. This is borne out of his definition of an African as anyone living in Tanzania rather than someone indigenous to the place (Boesen et al., 1977: 2-4; Freyhold, 1979: 34). Examining his definition of an African, in the

post-independent state, in line with what he says in the above speech delivered before independence, it can be argued that Nyerere paid serious attention to the problem of racism before independence but after independence, when he is the President, he prefers to overlook this problem in order to emerge as a unifying force.

Similarly, in his speech “Oral Hearing at the Trusteeship Council, 1955” (35-39), Nyerere assures the Asian and European communities that upon attainment of independence, the Tanganyikan nation would not discriminate against them and urges them not to go away when the country becomes independent. What Nyerere was expressing in the speech was the importance of uniting regardless of race and historical backgrounds. The same message is expressed in the speech “Widening Brotherhood, 1958” (61-62), whereby Nyerere expresses gratitude for the solidarity among the masses in Tanganyika before independence: “With this kind of solidarity it is going to be difficult in future for imperialism to exploit by the simple methods of *divide et impera*” (62). In this speech, Nyerere warns the nation against racism because it is an enemy to unity in diversity. In writing this speech, Nyerere aims to be understood as a symbol of the emancipation of the human race.

The same argument can be advanced in respect to the speech “Why I Resigned, 1957” (48-52), in which Nyerere blames the colonial government for not respecting African demands in the “spirit of give and take”. He cites what he terms the “unnecessary invitation of racial suspicions” as the reasons why he resigned from the Legislative Council (51). He does not spare even the African leaders but warns them against suspicion and discriminating against the whites. By appearing to stand outside his race and taking a neutral position, Nyerere speaks from a vantage point — as a significant factor in the then need to have both the whites and blacks in Tanganyika forget their differences and unite for development of the nation.

Nyerere contends that East African states were fighting the same enemies, and that to overcome these enemies, the states had to unite under the umbrella of the East African Federation. Nyerere believed that without unity it was hard for Africa to move forward. In “Groping Forward, 1961” (119-123), Nyerere alludes to Africa’s blindness in the absence of unity. He conceptualises unity as a force that drives the people against a particular backwardness. The idea was rooted in Pan-Africanism, which is what gave it a universal dimension, enabling it to transcend territorial, ethnic,

or racial differences. That prominent identity of a unifier looks over-stated considering the repetitiveness of the contexts in which it is forged. It is meant to solidify his position as an outstanding African leader and crusader of values like love; an identity, that is, that counters his suppressive, domineering tendencies.

A close examination of Nyerere's call for unity shows that he advocated for unity in days before he became the President. Scholars have argued that Nyerere abdicated his call for unity after he assumed the reins of power. He favoured the whites in resource distribution (Johnson, 2000: 1), he pitted the people whom he thought fought for independence against those he thought did not to the extent of calling them religious bigots (Mwakikagile, 2010: 3). Mwakikagile (2010) contends that there were people in every tribe or ethnic group, in every district, every province, and every region who fought for the rights of Africans even before TANU was formed and thereafter. Thus, no-one deserved more credit than others. They all deserved credit – equal credit. And they all were nationalists and patriots, not religious bigots or tribalists as Nyerere referred to them. Although hitherto Tanzania's linguistic nationalism has played a vital role in fostering unity in the country, it can be argued that Nyerere's call for unity was a vehicle for getting onto power. This is because, as already argued in the foregoing, Nyerere ignores the call for unity after independence.

An important concept associated with Nyerere is that of *ujamaa*. It has been argued that Nyerere's socialist strategy in Tanzania was a classic example of misplaced philosophical idealism, squandered developmental opportunities and broken political promises (Gerhart, 1997; Scott, 1999; Johnson, 2000). Scholars see Nyerere as a coercive and forceful leader and as one who robbed the Tanzanian society of the personal freedoms, private incentives, and individual rewards that are essential for a transition to a modern, prosperous and democratic society (Yeager, 1989: 1).

In the speech "Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism, 1962" (162-172), Nyerere formulates a developmental strategy for the nation – a strategy that would help in nation-building. He argues that "our nation building is a collective effort" (167). By referring to a "collective effort", he roots *ujamaa*'s philosophy in traditional African values that had as their core the emphasis on familyhood and communalism. *Ujamaa* was founded on a philosophy of development that was based on three essentials: freedom, equality and unity. The ideal society, Nyerere argues, must

always be based on these three essentials. According to him, there must be equality, because only on that basis will men work cooperatively. There must be freedom, because the individual is not served by society unless it is his. And there must be unity, because only when society is unified can its members live and work in peace, security and well-being. These three essentials, Nyerere further contends, are not new to Africa; they have always been part of the traditional social order. Osabu-We (2000: 171) notes that *ujamaa* “was supposed to embrace the communal concepts of African culture such as mutual respect, common property and common labour”. The challenge was how to extend these traditional values to the modern postcolonial setting. It was in meeting this challenge that Nyerere postulated *ujamaa* – his version of African Socialism – as an answer.

Since Western-style capitalism was seen as incompatible with the aspirations of the newly independent African states, and indeed, the underdeveloped world generally, a more desirable alternative was socialism. In his categorical words, “no underdeveloped country can afford to be anything but socialist” (Nyerere, 1961: 2). Nyerere was not alone in his postulations of African socialism and the appeal to what some critics have summarised as a non-existent idyllic vision of a traditional Africa of manifest harmony and communitarianism (Boesen et al., 1977; Freyhold, 1979; Ergas, 1980: 387-410). Kwame Nkrumah’s agenda for “social revolution”, Leopold Sedhar Senghor’s “Negritude” and Kenneth Kaunda’s “Zambian Humanism” all reflected similar attitudes among postcolonial African leaders (Boesen et al., 1977).

What was unique to Nyerere’s concept of *ujamaa*, however, was the complete rejection of class struggle as the basis of his “African socialism”. For him, the foundation of African socialism is not the class struggle, but the traditional African institution of the extended family system. It was as a result of his or her socialisation in the family – not antagonistic class relations – that the African acquired that attitude of mind, which ensured a predisposition towards socialism. The ideals of traditional African society were, however, destroyed by the impact of colonialism, capitalism and Western-type education. Colonialism shifted the centre of political, social and economic gravity from the African’s own environment to the colonial metropole (Mohiddin, 1976: 167). Nyerere thus saw the central challenge in terms of preserving within the wider society, the same socialist attitudes, which in the pre-colonial days supposedly gave every individual, the security that comes from belonging to the extended family (165). In “Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism, 1962”, Nyerere urges all people to care for one another. It is only through such mutual concern that

Africans can emancipate themselves from poverty, disease and illiteracy (168). Nation-building involves collective hard work, and Nyerere wrote to discourage individualism. The coming up with the concept of *ujamaa* portrays Nyerere as an ideologue. However, the way Nyerere coaxed and forced the Tanzanian people to adhere to this concept betrays dictatorial tendencies in him, tendencies which he sought to conceal, as well as a rigid and narrow-minded obsession with a particular position and point of view.

As it was widely acknowledged, Nyerere's concept of *ujamaa* ended in failure. The quest for an explanation for the failure of this project has been the subject of numerous and varied studies. One of the earliest such studies was a first-hand account of the organisation and operation of *ujamaa* villages undertaken by a multi-disciplinary group of scholars at the University of Dar es Salaam (Proctor, 1975). Another is Hyden's polemical work on underdevelopment and the "uncaptured peasantry" in Tanzania (Hyden, 1980: 24). These and similar studies suggest that the failure of the *ujamaa* scheme was predicated on a number of salient *a priori* and empirical factors. Three of these factors are pertinent to this discourse.

First is the argument that the initiative to start *ujamaa* villages did not come from rural peasants. The scheme failed to gain the necessary ideological acceptance among the vast majority of the peasantry. Right from the beginning, the dominant attitudes of the people ranged from skepticism and mistrust to outright resentment and opposition (Lofchie, 1978: 452). Secondly, the use of coercion to ensure mass villagisation – from threats of forced transportation to short prison sentences under the pretext of tax arrears – militated against the effective operation of *ujamaa* villages. Finally, the efforts at building *ujamaa* villages were greatly constrained by bureaucrats who held out government aid as incentives to peasants to move into villages. Peasants began to perceive such "free goods" as substitutes for available labour resources rather than being complementary factors for increased production. Promises of official assistance resulted in an over-dependence of the villages on government initiatives and incentives that left villages extremely vulnerable when government assistance eventually stopped. However, perhaps the single most adverse limitation of the *ujamaa* programme was the practice which Shivji (1974) and Raikes (1975) have described as "Kulak Ujamaa". This was a practice in which a number of rich peasants, having attained positions in *ujamaa* village committees or forged links with local bureaucrats, began to use the villages to further their own interests. So, although Nyerere aims to

be understood as an ideologue, a thinker, we see how his aversion to opening his mind to other points of view made it impossible for him to see the dark spots in his idea.

It is clear that Nyerere's identity as *Mwalimu* is debatable as regards his idea of *ujamaa* and its eventual failure. One plausible explanation for the failure of his socialist experiment is the fact that Nyerere was rather too ambitious and optimistic about what could be done within a short span. Both the nationalised industrial sector and the collectivised agricultural sector were expected to usher in almost immediate improvements. The high sounding aspirational rhetoric which ushered in the Arusha Declaration tended to create the impression that *ujamaa* was the long sought after panacea for the manifold economic problems of the post-colonial state. Little attempt was made to drive home the hard reality that *ujamaa*, like any other path to economic transformation, was fraught with a fair share of difficulties and limitations. This, coupled with the fact that the implementation of *ujamaa* was rather hasty, tended to create wide gaps between popular expectations and actual performance. The policy of nationalisation, for example, sought an immediate break in all dependent or neo-colonial links with Western capitalist interests. It took the clarion call of the dependency theorists for Third World countries to "delink" from the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1961; Frank, 1979; Amin, 1990).

Given the precarious state of the Tanzanian economy in 1967, this was a tall order and an ill-informed approach to the strategy of delinking. In a situation of fragile domestic resource base, an almost stagnant growth rate in domestic production and an international commodity pricing system over which it had no control, it made little sense for a country like Tanzania to abruptly sever crucial links with the "Western capitalist economies". Similarly, the villagisation scheme would perhaps have been more acceptable to rural dwellers if its pace had been more moderate.

Nyerere intertwines the *ujamaa* spirit with his understanding of hard work. He believes that "there is no human dignity in extreme poverty or debilitating disease — nor in the ignorance which buttresses these things" (15). Therefore, he encourages people to work hard in order to live well with one another. In other words, in order for the *ujamaa* spirit to bear fruit, people must work hard at the individual level. Nyerere was well-versed with African traditional socialism, and he had witnessed the colonialists dismantle it. He sought to use his placement to rebuild it. However, he

failed to consider the lost ground in terms of traditional orientation as a result of the colonial onslaught.

In another speech, “Policy for the Sisal Industry, 1965” (318-319), Nyerere talks of the importance of nationalisation and the way the Tanzanian government under him was committed to economic expansion at a rapid rate. But there were fundamental problems that became more evident as the nationalisation process progressed. State control of the economy did not exactly appear to guarantee a more effective restructuring of the national economy towards the envisaged self-reliant model. There were contradictions, especially within the industrial sector as demonstrated in Bolton’s (1985: 154) incisive study of the nationalisation of the sisal industry in Tanzania. Bolton concludes that “the concept of nationalisation as illustrated by the sisal industry played a dubious role in the transition program to socialism and self-reliance”. This was because the nationalised sisal industry did not have the capacity to dispose effectively and efficiently of “the means of production and its social product”. Structural changes like over-bureaucratisation and centralisation effected by nationalisation created opportunities for increased corruption, inefficiency and resource dissipation (Bolton, 1985: 156). Indeed by 1965, it was already clear to policy makers that a development policy that was primarily centred on nationalisation could neither solve the problems of underdevelopment nor offer expedient paths to economic self-reliance. In fact, as some scholars have postulated, what the policy of nationalisation so effectively achieved was to give rise to “state bureaucratic capitalism”, the use of state capital by a managerial elite in a manner which entirely conforms to the ethos, values and dynamics of private capital (Shivji, 1974: 85-90).

As we have seen, Nyerere’s *ujamaa* fails as a developmental project in Tanzania although in his speeches he presents it as the answer to all the economic evils ravaging the nation. Nyerere appears obsessed with the idea and would do anything to impose it.

Another issue Nyerere raises in his speeches, and which he aims to use in reaffirming his identity as a teacher, is education. Nyerere saw education as a sure way of decolonising people’s minds and imparting desired values that could enable them to be self-reliant. In the speeches “State Visit to the People’s Republic of China, 1965” (323-325), “State Visit to Mali, 1965” (326-328) and “Official Visit to the Netherlands, 1965” (329-332), Nyerere borrows success stories and delivers

them to his citizens in order to give them a blueprint for developing Tanzania. The borrowing of success stories from different countries provides him with privileged practical knowledge which he transmits to his citizens. He teaches his citizens about the best ways to emancipate their society, leaving no room for doubt that these ways must be seen as the best.

Nyerere seeks to cement his identity as a teacher. As such, Nyerere aims to preserve for himself the right to always guide the citizens. Nyerere envisioned a world in which nation-building is to be based on the pillar of education, whether formal or informal. In “First Speech in Legislative Council, 1954” (30-35), Nyerere aims to restore self-confidence among the Tanganyikan people as a way of curbing colonialism and its psychological effect through education. Nyerere became President at a time when colonialism had left African states with mass illiteracy and ignorance, and as a teacher he thought he was best-placed to rally the education agenda. In the same speech, Nyerere differentiates between “trouble-mongering and criticizing the government justifiably” (33). Nyerere teaches his government resilience by urging it to accept positive criticism. However, a close examination of his actions, as the President, indicates that Nyerere jailed scores of people who questioned his policies (Legum and Mmari, 1995: 2). He could not accept criticisms and was sliding in to dictatorship. He uses his speeches to camouflage dictating as teaching.

Nyerere’s decision to use speeches in constructing his identities is advantageous. Leaders’ speeches are supposed to make citizens conscious of their responsibility to participate in nation-building. The assumption which Nyerere makes here is that a careful examination of the values and priorities embodied in his speeches would teach the Tanzanian people to understand his dream and join him in realising it. But he defeats his own intention by denying these citizens the opportunity to interrogate this dream and thus internalise it. Nyerere’s teachings are more like what Freire (1970) calls the “banking” concept of education in which education becomes an act of depositing. The students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, Freire (1970) argues, the teacher issues statements and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorise, and repeat. The scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. This concept perceives knowledge as a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. Freire (1970)

argues that the teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. In his speeches, Nyerere perceives the Tanzanian nation as a classroom and the citizens as students. The reasons why he fails in his projects might therefore be attributed to his methods of teaching. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. Nyerere negates the concept of education as the practice of freedom and perceives it as the practice of domination.

Even as Nyerere persistently constructed his identity as *Mwalimu*, with its various aspects, his “lessons” largely failed to produce the desired results in terms of the prosperity of Tanzania because his rigidity as a *Mwalimu* did not allow him to revisit and revise his ideas even when there was glaring evidence that he needed to do so.

#### **2.4 *Sowing*: an Imagined Revolutionary Leader**

Museveni came to power in the mid-1980s, a period which seemed to have brought into being a “new breed” of African leadership. Leaders like Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isias Aferworki of Eritrea, and Paul Kagame of Rwanda, together with Museveni, gave the impression that they were generally dynamic, determined, development-minded, progressive, and willing to break discredited predecessors’ taboos (Mujaju, 1997). According to Mujaju (1997), the new breed had banished the archaic and exclusionary modes of governance, corruption and economic mismanagement, and the manifestly discriminatory and marginalising methods employed by leaders of the past. However, this description revealed only part of the truth.

Among this crop of leaders, it seemed that no personality better exemplified the “new breed” than Museveni. When the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) assumed power in the wake of Uganda’s second civil war in the 1980s, the leadership of the Movement quickly assumed an almost Che Guevaran revolutionary posture in the discourse on African democratisation and recovery (Leymarie, 1997: 2). A decade later, when Museveni was writing *Sowing*, he still dominated Uganda’s popular and intellectual imagination, but a closer examination revealed Museveni to be little more than a scion of the old breed. His autobiography in fact highlights the elements of continuity with past modes of governance that have been manifested and indeed

entrenched over the time he has been in power (from 1986 up to date). He began to be seen as a regional troublemaker and Bismarck-like expansionist (Mujaju, 1997).

To distance himself from these images, Museveni wrote *Sowing*, in which he portrays himself as a revolutionary leader who had forever broken the evil chain of misgovernance as exemplified by Uganda's former leaders.

Museveni wrote *Sowing* in his tenth year as Uganda's President, following his successful re-election. In the Preface to the book he makes the claim that he is not a professional politician and that he considers political leadership to be a service to his people (xiii). In saying that he is not a politician, Museveni aims to lure his readers into seeing him as a special type of a leader who is primarily concerned with the welfare of the people. He guides the reader to approach his autobiography, not as a scheme to glorify himself, but as an insight into true leadership. However, a close examination of the book reveals that Museveni is the quintessential politician determined to retain power using any means available to him.

The autobiography consists of fourteen chapters which detail Museveni's life from his childhood to the time he became Uganda's President. These chapters are chronologically arranged and collectively construct a coherent narrative of Museveni the nationalist leader. They project the image of a revolutionary leader who brought a new national order into being. In *Sowing*, Museveni carefully constructs his identity as a revolutionary leader who is also an intellectual and who, upon assumption of political power, pursues a transformative and development-oriented agenda.

However, questions arise as to whether Museveni actually changed the traditional modes of leadership and governance that he overthrew. It is important to consider how committed Museveni has been to the genuine and peaceful resolution of the conflicts that he confronted domestically, and of the regional conflicts that developed during the nearly two decades of his tenure in office.

In the autobiography, Museveni parades all the contributions that, in his view, he has made to Uganda's social, economic and political stability. *Sowing* is thus a form of life-construction, which involves Museveni's choice of certain events and subjects and the omission of others that obstruct his strategic goal of representing himself as different from former leaders. He uses the book to construct the identity of a revolutionary, a saviour whose words and deeds redeemed Ugandans.

The reason for the construction of such an identity may well be his intention to deconstruct perceptions of him as a leader who has practised sectarian politics and has not been concerned with the welfare of the masses (Mujaju, 1997; Rosenblum, 2002: 195; Cheru, 2002: 196-198).

*Sowing* starts by portraying Museveni as an ordinary peasant. A substantial part of the book (1-22) reconstructs Museveni's background as a poor boy who grew up in a family of peasants and who as an adult retained his peasant identity. Museveni declares that he is not a nobleman because the livelihood of his people revolves around keeping cattle. He underscores, on the one hand, his lowly position and origin and, on the other hand, his "inherent" ability to deliver his people from the bondage of underdevelopment.

Pursuing this connection with the peasants yet further, Museveni contends that, among his people even young children owned cattle and the prosperity of a child depended on the prosperity of his cattle. He too, like most peasant boys, had his own. As he writes, "mine have done very well, in spite of many vicissitudes they have suffered! At one time when our cows died, because of my father moving to a tsetse area, only one of my cows progeny remained; but then it multiplied again and now there are many of them" (2). Narrating about his cattle's life cycle is important not only for the cattle-minded Ugandan people but also for his own presumed identity. A peasant should not forget the history of his cattle; he should value them as part of his life. Museveni traces his origins in order to identify himself with the peasants who work in the farms. In so doing, he creates an identity of a unique peasant whom Ugandans can embrace as a leader who can understand their plight and travails. As an ordinary peasant who has passed through life just like many Ugandans do, he is one with the people.

After Museveni took power he faced several hurdles in his leadership. One of these challenges, according to Amaza (1998: 235-236), was that a section of citizens, especially from the northern region of the country, claimed that he was violent and relied on violent means to achieve his ends. McNulty (1999: 78) wonders whether it was merely coincidental that the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region began to erupt in the late 1980s, and particularly in the wake of Museveni's capture of state power in Uganda.

It should be recalled that the conflicts in Sudan and Burundi predated Museveni's ascendancy, and those in Rwanda and the DRC could be said to have been latent, though both countries have

experienced war in earlier periods. Thus, reasons endemic to each country can be offered to explain what appears to be a pattern. However, it is also clear that many of the conflicts are traceable to a combination of Museveni's vision for a closer integration of the region and a reliance on a militaristic method of achieving that integration (Cheru, 2002: 196-198; Khadiagala 1993: 244-245). Museveni has been a long-time pan-Africanist who curses the "foolish arbitrariness" of Africa's borders and urges for the development of larger markets (234). He often attacks the idea of an Africa divided in terms of the traditional linguistic anglophone, francophone, and lusophone categorisations, and urges the creation of what he has described as a Bantu or afrophone category.

To placate his critics, Museveni wrote *Sowing* to portray himself, not as a violent man, but as a leader who is intimately engaged in reforming African politics, economics, and social life. In the book he presents himself as a historic figure, who fought in the bush and overthrew "dark forces" that had to be done away with in order to transform Uganda. He emerges as a discerning leader who, upon his ascendancy to power in 1986, understood what ailed the country. He declares firmly that "the main political problem in Uganda ... was the army, which effectively prevented the country from attaining democracy" (40). Museveni understood, we are made to believe, what ailed the Ugandan nation and why he was out to solve the problem. He understood that although the army was important to the nation, it had to be controlled. *Sowing* anchors Museveni in Uganda's history as a leader whose revolutionary powers go beyond fighting in the bush. He instils the concept of revolution in governance by ensuring that the army is in his hands and that politics are militarised.

In *Sowing* Museveni criticises the first crop of African leaders, who dwelt on sectarian politics and were concerned with pampering their egos instead of helping their states fight poverty, disease and ignorance. Museveni is convinced that African states were misled by their postcolonial leaders. He argues that these leaders "completely failed to address the real African crisis or find solutions to the continent's problems" (140). Museveni blames his predecessors in Uganda (Milton Obote and Idi Amin) for the ills that beset the Ugandan state after independence. He avers that these Ugandan leaders were preoccupied not with the welfare of the Ugandan people but with their own extreme prosperity. He uses Uganda as a microcosm of African states that were plundered by their selfish first-generation postcolonial leaders. In this regard his ideas echo Fanon's (1968: 152), who

maintains that the goal of anti-colonial nationalism in Africa was to transfer into native hands the unfair advantages which were the legacy of colonialism. Upon attainment of independence, these advantages were appropriated by the small elite, and the peasantry was left to wallow in perpetual poverty. Museveni pieces facts and perceptions in such a way that his revolution is seen as bringing a new dawn. He draws a parallel between his leadership and that of others in his speech to the nation during his inauguration. He aims to be understood as a unique leader, different from the former leaders.

First, the change of the government was a fundamental revolution and not a mere change of guard: our thinking was radically different from previous regimes which had been sectarian and neo-colonial. Secondly, I assured the nation that henceforth the people of Uganda would be in charge of their country's governance and thirdly, I declared that the security of person and property was a basic right to citizens, and a favour given by the regime. (172)

Museveni insists that Africa cannot be emancipated from selfish leadership without a revolution. By justifying a revolution both outside and inside the government, *Sowing* portrays him as a king of revolution, a revolutionary leader who is called to face head-on the problems that face Uganda as a country.

Paradoxically, Museveni, like Obote before him, believes in the supremacy of his political organisation (the Uganda People's Congress) and his own ability to manoeuvre the political elite. Both men relied extensively on the military to resolve essentially political disputes. Both strongly believed in individual destiny (Ogot, 1999: 223), and they have demonstrated this – Obote in seeking the presidency for a second time, and Museveni in pursuing a war that appeared a futile and doomed endeavour (Ingham, 1994). Even as he repeats so many of Obote's political mistakes, he evokes Obote's image and persona in a futile support of the claim that he differs from him. But both these men's Achilles' heel, the deepest vulnerability they share, is a disdain for, and fear of, oppositional politics. Thus, in the 1960s, Obote moved against both the right and left-wings of his party – the UPC – in a bid to consolidate his power, just as Museveni did against the “traditionalists”, who were urging the restoration of a political monarchy in Buganda, and the reformists in the contemporary Movement (Ogot, 1999: 223). Central to Museveni's worldview is the primacy of security over virtually any other public good. On the first anniversary of the

NRA/M's assumption of power, Museveni gave a speech in which he attacked the incipient rebels, cattle-raiders and "tribalists" who were causing problems in various parts of the country. In that address, he provided his most succinct explanation for placing security concerns above all else:

We are, therefore, continuing to strengthen our defense forces: to neglect doing so would be like exposing meat when there are dangerous carnivores around. Remember the story of the boy who took a lump of meat out in the courtyard? A carnivorous bird (*kamunye*) swooped down on him and not only took the meat but left his fingers bleeding. The boy came crying to his father, who told him, "It was your fault: you should have carried a spear so when the *kamunye* came to grab the meat, it would have impaled itself on the spear." Uganda's riches are very tempting. There are many *kamunye*'s around. (122)

In certain respects, this viewpoint may be acceptable given Uganda's turbulent history and the problems of insecurity that continue to plague the country. Rebel groups, particularly in the north, have wreaked havoc on civilians, cattle rustling in the pastoral part of the northeast has disrupted everyday life there, and the upsurge in regional wars have all been given as justification for this approach to Uganda's security concerns (Ingham, 1994). Consequently, defense spending has grown to overshadow any other sector as a proportion of national expenditure. Even attempts by donor governments to cap military spending have been unsuccessful. As a consequence, Uganda under Museveni has built a formidable military machine, one that has insinuated itself into nearly all aspects of the national social and political life (*ibid.*). Museveni's belief in the military is demonstrated by not only his continued leadership of the army (as a lieutenant general), but also his recourse to the military in dealing with essentially political and economic affairs, such as elections, taxation, and smuggling.

Yet there is no sufficient justification as to why Museveni depends so heavily on defence. Museveni seems to have a thirst for power. He believes intensely in violence as a means of governance and for holding power. Obote (1990) evaluates Museveni as a leader without ethic, moral values or law, which he would either discard, flout or bend in order for him to achieve his designs (23). Museveni uses the army to assist him retain power.

In *Sowing*, Museveni counters these arguments by portraying himself as an exceptional military commander, one who knows how to strategise and win over the enemy. Ogot (1996: 223) argues

that Museveni's autobiography portrays an almost messianic focus on his capture of political power and ascendancy to the helm of national politics in Uganda. Within the context of domestic Ugandan politics, Museveni proclaims a "fundamental change", one that clearly marks out the distinctive mode of leadership he heralded in 1986 (172). He describes the way he dealt with military issues and the way he applied the strategy to his administration through grassroots democracy, exemplified by a radical reformulation of the system of local government, providing for the demise of unelected chiefs and the diffusion of administrative power among ten elected officials, known as Resistance Committees and Councils, in popular parlance called RCs (Ddungu, 1989). Museveni is well-versed with the history of militarism in his country, and he uses military tactics to govern Uganda (Ogot, 1999: 222).

Museveni knows full well what kept his predecessors in power. For example, he is aware that Obote relied extensively on the military to resolve political disputes because he strongly believed in individual destiny (Ogot, 1999: 223). Although Museveni is very much against Obote's political tactics, Ingham (1994) argues that when Museveni looks in the mirror, he inevitably sees Obote. The argument is tenable, given that, in *Sowing*, Museveni claims power and defends it in a militarised political version thereby constructing the self-image of a practical and versatile military commander. Museveni's propensity for military power with respect to those he regards as his most implacable enemies (Amin and Obote) brings him close to them. In *Sowing*, it is clear that Museveni, like Obote, relies primarily on the supremacy of his military organisation and his own ability to manoeuvre the political elite. In fact, much of his identity is constructed around his military background and conquest over Obote.

In *Sowing*, Museveni's intellectual capability is constructed differently from that of an ideologue, an identity claimed by the first generation of leaders of post-independent African states. These leaders had a penchant for assuming the role of philosopher-kings and reducing the intellectual work of others to the level of incantation of the thought of the leader (Ogot, 1996: 223). They sought to acquire intellectual hegemony, whether by themselves or through advisors, thereby constructing intellectual frameworks that would guide national debates according to their own views.

To create the impression that he is different from the first generation of leaders, Museveni represents himself as intellectually predisposed leader but one who is also a man of action when he outlines the faults within the state and the measures he had taken to correct them. For example, he waged guerrilla warfare in which he abandoned the comfort zones of his family to save Ugandans from poverty, ignorance and disease (178). It is his conviction that one of the things that prevented the first African leaders from realising all-round development was sectarianism, which he defines as “a consequence of an incomplete social metamorphosis” (187). He contends that the problem with Africa is not only that it has not metamorphosed, but that it has actually regressed. By showing his understanding of the continent’s ills, Museveni presents himself as a leader with sharp intellectual capability, and yet not a rigid ideologue.

Museveni’s *Sowing* implies that true liberation comes from the peasantry, that true freedom is achieved through armed struggle, and that he is best suited to lead the armed struggle. Here, Museveni’s formulation further serves to portray his intelligence. He deduces that for true freedom to be achieved in a country the peasantry must be armed with knowledge. He derives his peasantry idea from the story of Jesus Christ, who was born in a peasant family. Museveni avers that Jesus’ background was the most fitted for a man who saved the world of its sins; and would become the most popular man in centuries. Museveni recalls how Uganda came to be 92 percent peasant through wiping out both the feudal and artisan classes in Uganda in the 1860s (188). Having grown up as a peasant, he is well-informed, through experience, that the peasants are stuck in poverty because they live from hand to mouth. As a leader who is knowledgeable about Karl Marx and Frantz Fanon (188), Museveni is aware that the peasants will need a leader who understands their plight. He uses this knowledge to appeal to them and portray himself as the leader they have always wished to have.

In *Sowing*, Museveni does not only outline problems, he also presents solutions to these problems. For example, he proposes to educate the masses in order to emancipate them from poverty. He emphasises that he understands that lack of education means lack of liberation. He is not only talking from the point of what he will do; he also narrates how after he assumed power, he united and armed the peasants with knowledge. In addition, he recalls how he restored peace in most parts of Uganda, when his National Resistance Movement united over forty different ethnic groups. *Sowing* insists on making the point that Museveni has set the tone for the new Ugandan

development. He is a military leader who came to power after leading a planned bush war and speaks with firm knowledge of international economics (Mazrui, 1987).

*Sowing* presents Museveni as a dynamic leader who understands gender rights, especially when he emphasises that a majority of Uganda's poor population are women and when he recalls how he brought women into the mainstream of the country's governance:

Women constitute half of the country's population and carry out most of the work in the major economic sector, which is agriculture. In spite of this, however, for a long time, they were relegated to the periphery of political activities. The NRM has created opportunities for women which were aimed at redressing this historical imbalance. (191)

Museveni seems to understand the demographics and the socio-economic landscape of his country and uses the long-standing gender divide to elevate himself as the eagerly awaited saviour. Through his comments on gender, he projects himself as the epitome of the change that women have desired for so long, as a revolutionary man who came with compassion for women, who had faced discrimination and oppression for centuries. Being different, he is prepared to do things differently compared to the earlier regimes, which supposedly discredited and disrespected women. To emphasise the point, he appointed a woman as his Vice President (172).

Another image that Museveni projects in *Sowing* is that of a sacrificial lamb for Uganda. It is popularly believed that liberation does not come without a price, and so Museveni takes the position of a leader who suffered in order to liberate his people. For example, he describes how he suffered under the "incompetence" of President Obote and his right-hand men. He paints an image of himself as a sacrificial lamb against wolves and unreasoning people, contending that Obote's men were "people with bankrupt and false ideas and ideologically bankrupt politicians" (39). The reader is made to "see" who paid the price for the liberation of the Ugandan people. He juxtaposes himself with Obote's men, presenting the figure of a man sacrificed by "the inefficiency of his friends" (39-48). He implies that for any leader to succeed in proving his capabilities, he must be a person who has suffered more than anyone else.

Leadership is sacrifice for the people, and in *Sowing*, Museveni enumerates several instances when he supposedly sacrificed for the Ugandan nation. He recalls an event when he fainted because of

acute dehydration fighting for liberation in the bush (162). These sacrifices bore fruit in 1986, when he became Uganda's President and promised the Ugandan people that his government would respect the rule of law. Although he had paid the full price, Museveni, in his inauguration, promised that "the people of Uganda would be in charge of their country's governance and would respect human rights and would not use a standing army as a tool for civilian intimidation and that his government would curtail corruption" (173-175). This is meant to suggest that his sacrifice was selfless and he does not expect any rewards and privileges in return.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter on Kenyatta's *Suffering*, Nyerere's *Freedom* and Museveni's *Sowing* has examined the authors' construction of their identities as nationalist leaders against the backdrop of widespread critical judgement of them. In each case, these identities are constructed with the aim of countering critical views and safeguarding certain interests of power on the part of the leader. The construction of these identities involves an overall manipulation of the writers'/ leaders' lives. There is a clear determination by the writers to project the desired identities – that of a father of the nation (Kenyatta), *Mwalimu* (Nyerere) and revolutionary (Museveni) – persuasively. Slippages and contradictions in the writings, as well as placing the speeches and autobiography in the context of historical realities, however, render the process of construction not entirely "successful" and questions emerge as to the authenticity of these identities. The next chapter will examine the literary strategies the three writers use to construct the said identities.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE USE OF LITERARY STRATEGIES TO DEFINE THE SELF

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the literary strategies used by Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Museveni in their writings to construct their identities. The chapter is founded on the understanding that while nationalist leaders' writings have mostly been mined for content, cultural and historical knowledge, their literariness, the manner in which they have been presented to audiences, has been neglected. Holden (2008) argues that there are significant reasons why we should attend to the literariness of these texts, to examine them not only as partial records of the past, but also as documents which use various literary techniques to mould the way readers understand this past. Literary studies have placed emphasis on how the way a story is narrated is integral to the meaning. This chapter examines the intricacies of narrative identity construction through the author's use of certain literary techniques.

Brockmeier and Donald (2001) contend that literary techniques refer to specific aspects of literature, in the sense of its universal function as an art form, which expresses ideas through language, which we can recognise, identify, interpret and/or analyse. Literary techniques collectively comprise the art form's components, the means by which authors create meaning through language, and by which readers gain understanding of and appreciation for their works. Literary techniques provide a conceptual framework for comparing literary works, both within and across genres. They refer to any specific, deliberate constructions or choices of language, which an author uses to convey meaning in a particular way.

In Kenyatta's *Suffering*, Nyerere's *Freedom* and Museveni's *Sowing*, as this chapter will show, these literary strategies aid the leader, who is also the author, to create a metaphor of self that will cause people to think of the leader as someone worthy of trust. The writings provide us with an intimate glimpse of how political leaders conceive of their roles, and rearrange the events of their lives so as to communicate those metaphors of self to those they lead. The formal structures of these writings, the connotations of the vocabulary, the choice of incidents emphasised all speak symbolically to create images that portray these leaders as nationalist leaders who are concerned about the welfare of their citizens.

The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one deals with the use of myth, biblical allusion, metaphor and paradox in constructing the identity of a father of the nation around the personality of Kenyatta in *Suffering*. Section two deals with the use of historical allusion, repetition, parallelism, and figurative language to construct the identity of *Mwalimu* in *Freedom*, and section three explores how Museveni uses the parable of the mustard seed, biblical allusion, figurative language and fictionalisation of history to construct the identity of a revolutionary in the personality of Museveni. The fourth part is the conclusion.

### **3.2 *Suffering*: Kenyatta Made through Myth**

In his book, Kenyatta uses myth as a strategy designed to construct his identity of the father of the Kenyan nation. He uses this strategy to dazzle the reader, to make him/her stand in awe of him. The expected effect of this is for Kenyatta to conceal his non-democratic, opportunistic, and oligarchic tendencies and his manipulation of ethnic sentiment in order to shield Kenya's leadership from non-Kikuyus (Mbato, 1969; Osolo, 1968).

The narration of Kenyatta's voyage to England in 1929 as the representative and spokesperson of the Kikuyu people in their fight against the colonial government, launches the use of myth to depict Kenyatta as the champion of the people of Kenya. As captured in the narrative part of *Suffering* (21-193), from overseas, Kenyatta carefully fed the myth of his political significance and achievements. Not surprisingly, as Muigai (2004: 202) notes, Kenyatta eventually became more important in Kikuyu politics than any of his Kenya Central Association (KCA) superiors, Jesse Kariuki and Joseph Kang'ethe, and even threatened to eclipse Harry Thuku, the leader of the East African Association (EAA), which transformed itself to KCA in 1923, who was still in detention (Kinyatti, 2008: 54). As Throup (1987: 33) notes, it is myth-creation that propelled Kenyatta to ascend to the position of the chief propagandist of KCA, the position that he was able to use so skilfully to create a Kikuyu sub-nationalist ideology that legitimised the accumulation of land and capital by the proto-capitalists of KCA within the framework of a revitalised traditional mythology. In the narrative part of *Suffering*, the narrator creates Kenyatta's life as a myth because of the inherent power of myth to captivate the imagination of the masses, and hence as a strategy for assuming and maintaining power.

For most of the colonial period, Kenyatta was an absentee hero of Kenyan nationalism. In the narrative part of *Suffering*, it appears that his absence from Kenya's political scene had been the most outstanding feature of Kenyatta's political career until 1961. From 1931 to 1946, he lived in England, and from 1952 to 1961, he was in detention. This reality cushioned him from close interaction with the nationalists in Kenya and enhanced his stature as a hero, sparing him close scrutiny. All through the colonial era, other nationalists sacrificed for his sake, stepped down to let him take leadership and even postponed crucial political developments awaiting his release.

As Muigai (2004: 213) argues, James Gichuru stepped down for Kenyatta twice, first in 1947 from the leadership of Kenya African Union (KAU), when he returned from Britain, and fifteen years later, when he stepped down for him from the presidency of the newly formed KANU. Similarly, Odinga was urged by the colonial administration to form the government in 1961 but declined and capitalised on his move in fighting for the release of Jomo Kenyatta from prison (Odinga, 1967: 34).

In the narrative part of *Suffering*, the narrator presents an exaggerated picture of Kenyatta's popularity, and admits that, at independence Kenyatta became the "object of an official campaign of adulation" (54). Further, a form of worship engulfed the personality of Kenyatta such that even when in 1952, he denounced and condemned the Mau Mau as having "spoiled the country", this did not have a lasting negative effect on him (Throup, 1987: 32). Evidence seems to point to the fact that Kenyatta may not have been the radical Pan-Africanist he was made out to be. For instance, studies of Kenyatta's Moscow years indicate that he shunned revolutionary ideas and was never convinced of the correctness of revolutionary struggle (Pegushev, 1996). He seemed to have had more respect for bourgeois habits and to have looked at the Soviet Union with cynicism. His comrades in London, George Padmore, a radical West Indian, and C.L.R. James, a Caribbean intellectual, had negative perceptions of him, as far as the ideals of Pan-African unity were concerned (Throup, 1987: 33). As such, the Kenyatta of the colonial era was a mythical creation, and his true self only began to emerge later on in the post-colonial period. His undemocratic and dictatorial tendencies started to unveil in 1961, and on becoming the first head of state of independent Kenya in 1963, he instituted a personalised regime that rotated around him and his inner cabinet. The speeches he delivered and the publication of *Suffering* are thus efforts to revive a mythical image that would appeal to the citizens in that regard.

Kenyatta's Foreword, the narrative part, and the speeches in *Suffering* all help to create the mythical image of a hero. As a typical figure in a heroic myth, he was at one point abducted, tried and convicted. He is presented as having struggled against the dark forces in the dry areas at Kapenguria, conquered all, and come back home to spearhead the cause of liberation of his people to be welcomed with untold adoration and ululations. The events follow one another in the way they would in a heroic myth. Kenyatta's life is created as mythical through the narration of his separation from the Kenyan people, the isolation at Lodwar, and the hard labour in Kapenguria. The mythical circumstances surrounding Kenyatta's arrest are exemplified in the following passage:

Profound shock is too ordinary a phrase. It was as though a cold, souging wind from the deep blue ice of Arctic despair blew through the city streets and the townships out into the villages, over the shambas, into the huts of the people. They were numbed by the cold and the cruelty which tore their roots away, and their shelter, and their hope of any future, and left them as orphans, bereft ... Kenyatta is gone ... they have seized Kenyatta ... Kenyatta is lost to us ... (55)

The quotation illustrates the general mood that supposedly gripped the country when Kenyatta was arrested in 1952 after the state of emergency was declared by the then colonial Governor of Kenya Evelyn Baring. This mood is evoked by the images and the choice of vocabulary. The phrase "cold, souging wind from the deep blue ice of the Arctic blew through the streets" creates images of bitterness because of the loss of the people's leader. The loss is brought out so strongly that the reader is made to perceive Kenyatta as the only leader in Kenya at the time. The loss was felt everywhere in the country: city streets, townships and the villages. This emphasis by enumeration is a strategy to create a myth that portrays Kenyatta as the father of the Kenyan nation whose absence meant that Kenyans had been left as "orphans, bereft" (65).

After this loss of hope, the narrator presents Kenyatta's trial and later detention in Kapenguria, which is portrayed as a travesty of justice: "a calculated enterprise to stifle Kenyatta" (65). Then the narrator invokes the suffering and neglect that Kenyatta went through in Kapenguria and Lodwar:

A place with floggings and tortures and wanton neglect [where Kenyatta] suffered from eczema brought on first by deficiencies in diet, then aggravated by the flies. At one stage he ripped off some bandages and applied a mud pack made from black-cotton soil, which afforded a little relief. (67)

The narrator underscores Kenyatta's suffering as a tool for resisting colonialism. His suffering was for the sake of the freedom that the Kenyan nation now enjoyed.

However, a close examination of this narrative part unearths aspects of fictionalisation. The narrator presents Kenyatta as a protagonist in a fictional world. The protagonist, who in this case is Kenyatta, undergoes torture for the common good. In a heroic myth, powers above the protagonist must torture him in order for him to free himself and his comrades. The convictions of the protagonist must sustain him so that he can defeat these dark powers. An example is the titan Prometheus in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, who triumphs over the suffering he undergoes on the rock in the Caucasus and overwhelms the god Jupiter on behalf of humanity (Shelley, 1820). As the protagonist, Kenyatta is driven by the belief that the world should be a better place to live in for every citizen. In the Foreword, for example, he argues:

This world has been made for human beings to live happily, to enjoy the good things and the produce of the country equally and to enjoy the opportunities this country has to offer ... what we have done, and what we shall continue to do, is to demand the rights of the African people as human beings. (64)

In heroic myth, after wrestling and defeating dark forces, the protagonist usually comes home to bestow some good on his people and is welcomed by a happy sea of humanity praising him for his valour and for a battle well fought. In Act IV of *Prometheus Unbound*, Prometheus, after his years of suffering, is freed and welcomed home as a champion of humans. Kenyatta's return to his home in Gatundu, as portrayed in the narrative part of *Suffering*, resembles the reunion between the titan and the humans. It is portrayed as a return of a mythical hero:

At 0922 hours, a further huge crowd, full of jubilation and waving wildly, poured over the top of a ridge and a final corner towards the waiting house. In the midst of this concourse, a Land Rover Station Wagon could faintly be seen, with escorting vehicles... Jomo Kenyatta

alighted, and for two or three full minutes, he was surrounded by such a huddle of people: politicians, journalists, well-wishers, relatives and friends. (140)

Here, Kenyatta comes out as a mythical hero who goes into exile — in this case prison, and who wrestles with powerful opponents before returning home to cheers from the people. The narrator is exuberant:

For an hour before the arrival, more and more masses of people came streaming from over the hills and from far away. The area was jammed tight, broad smiles on all faces ... Jomo Kenyatta alighted, and for two or three full minutes he was surrounded by such a huddle of people ... and in a brown leather jacket and corduroy trousers, flywhisk waving ceaselessly to the people ... (140)

This excerpt creates an image of a larger-than-life hero arriving home from exile where he had to wrestle with malevolent forces of nature and had to succeed for him to bring victory back home. The narrator here uses myth to create this imaginary individual as part of an effort to deconstruct prevailing representations of Kenyatta as an opportunist and a budding dictator. The construction of this image was crucial for helping Kenyatta emerge as the embodiment of the qualities of a leader who had sacrificed much for the nation and therefore deserved to be in power for as long as he lived. The crowd along the road welcoming Kenyatta in his Gatundu home and the many who slept at his doorsteps in Gatundu animates him, driving him forward on a quest to free the nation from the shackles of colonialism. This is the image that the Kenyan people were thirsting for, and the purpose of the narrative part of Kenyatta's *Suffering* endeavours to project it to them.

The creation of the heroic myth about Kenyatta is enhanced through the use of Biblical allusion. In his speeches Kenyatta equates himself with the Biblical Moses, who defeated the gerontocratic Pharaoh of Egypt and led God's people to the Promised Land:

We ourselves can save us, but nobody else. When the children of Israel were crying, saying: 'God, why did you bring us to this wilderness, where there is no water or sustenance?' God said he would bring something called manna. This cannot happen again. He said he had closed the door, and anyone who wanted manna had to work for it. These are not the words of Kenyatta. God himself said he had closed the door with a lock, and

had thrown the key into the ocean; that the door would never open again and there would be no more manna in the world. (216)

Kenyatta exploits the sacred nature of myth, making the decisions that he made look unquestionable. Myths get their strength from their sanctity. Kenyatta's immersion of his life in mythology authenticates his position as the founding father of the Kenyan nation.

While acknowledging that poverty, disease and ignorance were the enemies which beset Kenyans after independence in the speech "Independence Day, 1963" (212-217), Kenyatta urged them to work hard because manna cannot pour down from Heaven: "We ourselves can save us, but nobody else. When the children of Israel were crying, saying: 'God, why did you bring us to this wilderness ... God said he would bring them something called manna'" (216). Here, Kenyatta borrows from the Biblical story of the Israelites in the wilderness after being saved from the Egyptian Pharaoh. God saved them from starvation by sending them manna from Heaven. Kenyatta contrasts the biblical story with Kenya's present situation, contending that, unlike Israelites, Kenyans had to work in order to save themselves from poverty, disease and ignorance. Drawing illustrations from the Bible makes Kenyatta's words acquire profound meaning due to the sanctity of the Bible. Kenyatta hopes that by giving this illustration, Kenyans would be bound by the authority in the Bible to obey him. This is possible because of the knowledge that Kenyatta and his audience share about the inherent spiritual power found in the Bible.

When addressing the opposition in the speech "Kenyatta Day, 1967" (340-348), Kenyatta several times alludes to the Bible to urge the KPU leaders to join KANU in building the nation. After judging KPU leaders as "cowards who used to hide under beds while others were struggling" (343), he alludes to the Bible by urging them to return to the then ruling party KANU: "Return to KANU before it is too late, or else the door will be closed, and when we close the door, it is final ..." (343). The concept of closing the door is repeatedly used in the Bible, especially in the New Testament, to urge sinners to enter Heaven, through accepting Jesus as their saviour, before Heaven's door is closed. By warning the opposition about what will befall them if they do not return to KANU, Kenyatta portrays himself as their patron, their leader and at the same time, their father who can judge his children according to their deeds. This line of argument can be advanced in respect to how, in the same speech, Kenyatta repeatedly urges his audience to hearken to what

he is saying. He alludes to the Bible by using the words “whoever has ears let him hear” (344, 345,348). This, again, is a warning, and in the Bible, it is used to draw attention to the judgement that supposedly will befall sinners after “the door has been closed”. As already argued, Kenyatta uses references to the Bible to portray himself as a leader who can judge the opposition and decide their punishment. He is their father, and as such he is allowed by divine law to punish them. True to his word, after this speech, Kenyatta jailed the leaders of KPU and banned the party (Mbato, 1969; Ogot, 1996: 95).

Another strategy used to portray Kenyatta is metaphor. In the speech “Independence Day-1963,” he compares the Kenyan nation to a resourceful mother who is able to feed the population (the family) if it is protected from aggression:

If we achieve unity, the whole world will respect us. We shall be the foundation and the shield of mother Africa. Our Africa has been milked until she is almost dry. Now we want to restore and sustain mother Africa, so we can enjoy the little milk that is left. (215)

Given that the Kenyan state is a productive mother, according to Kenyatta, the citizens should be aware of the significance of sustaining it and protecting it from external aggression. Furthermore, the Kenyan citizens should work hard to safeguard what remains in Kenya, because much of the resources in the country had been already destroyed by the colonisers.

The narrative part of *Suffering* advances this metaphor of the Kenyan nation as a cow which has been milked dry and needs protection. The narrator portrays Kenyatta as a leader who has always offered this protection. The narrator presents events that happened in the early 1920s, and which he thinks would help the reader understand why Kenyatta was arrested and put in detention. The narrator here strives to impress on the reader that Kenyatta was imprisoned for protecting the Kenyan nation from aggression. The metaphor of a person punished because of a just cause creates an image of a leader who loves his people and who is ready to protect the interests of his citizens – a true father of the nation. By presenting this metaphor, the narrator hopes that the reader would be his ally in approving all of Kenyatta’s actions.

The narrative part of *Suffering* presents a protagonist whose whole life has been dedicated to the service of his people. This part thus presents the protagonist’s life as a chain of struggles for the

freedom of his people in Kenya. This explains the shock experienced by those who had rested under his wing when Kenyatta was arrested.

This scene of people “numbed by the cold and the cruelty which tore their roots away...” (55), is meant to show that people had placed all their hopes on Kenyatta, and he was the only person who could save the Kenyan nation from the evil of colonialism. This is emphasised by the narrator’s contention that Kenyatta was “their roots, their shelter...their hopes of any future” and that without him, the Kenyan people were “orphans” (55). These events prepare the reader for the climax of the narration.

The events, narrated before the capture and the arrest of Kenyatta in this excerpt, are romanticised and allude to the capture of Jesus Christ at the garden of Gethsemane. The narrator uses this literary strategy to create the image of a leader persecuted for the benefit of the Kenyan people. As argued in chapter two, the narrator’s endeavour to create Kenyatta as an indispensable leader in the founding of the Kenyan nation is inspired by Kenyatta himself, who strategically makes the biographical sketch part of his book. However, it is worth noting here that after independence the leader who supposedly protected the Kenyan people began oppressing them, throwing his opponents in jail (Pegushev, 1996; Kinyatti, 2008: 54; Muigai, 2004: 202).

The metaphorisation of a solitary individual in the Kenyan desert districts of Kapenguria, Lodwar and Maralal, creates an identity of Kenyatta as a person who is patriotic and who has suffered more than anyone else and has not lost hope. In the narrative part of *Suffering*, Kenyatta is portrayed as a character tormented by the forces of colonialism. He is exposed to hard labour and deficient diet until he suffers bounds of eczema (67). The essence of this is that he suffers for the sake of the country. In the speeches, Kenyatta himself uses the metaphor of a sufferer to appeal to his readers. However, he emphasises this suffering in order to legitimise his rule, in all its manifestations, and make any opposition to it be seen as anomalous. He uses his suffering as a tool to extol his leadership, which with time becomes despotic.

Another literary strategy used by Kenyatta is paradox. The greatest of the paradoxes is that he seems to thrive in the thick of suffering. When he was captured, people thought that their “roots” were torn “away, and their shelter, and their hopes of any future”, and they were “left as orphans” because “Kenyatta is gone ... they have seized Kenyatta ... Kenyatta is lost to us” (55). In prison,

the reader expects Kenyatta to be “lost” but surprisingly he seems to find solace, peace, and tranquillity. The narrator presents him as turning prison into a place for meditation and contemplation. Kenyatta was jailed for nine years, between 1952 and 1961. During the first six years, he was jailed at Lokitaung, or Devil’s Island. Regarding his time in the island, the narrator reasons that “only passionate conviction that his cause was just, and that justice would one day become manifest, kept him serene” (68). It is here, in prison, that Kenyatta developed the skills of reading philosophical works and religious texts, like the Quran and the Bible. As a place where one’s personal narrative is suspended, prison provides the opportunity for meditation on the place of the individual within the larger narrative of history that continues outside the prison walls.

Kenyatta’s attempt in the use of these literary strategies is to be seen as the father of the Kenyan nation. However, questions arise as to the very purpose of their use, making their effectiveness uncertain.

### **3.3 Freedom: The Literary in the Service of the Didactic**

As argued in chapter two of this study, Nyerere conceptualises the Tanzanian nation as a classroom and himself as a teacher. In his speeches, Nyerere employs a number of literary strategies whose primary objective is to project him as *Mwalimu*. These strategies are: repetition, historical allusion, parallelism, and figurative language.

Time and again in his speeches Nyerere repeats the call for unity. Unity was one of the dominant themes in the struggle for independence in most African countries (Mkandawire, 2005:13; Achebe, 1984: 23). Unity was an important issue even after independence, when divisive politics threatened the very existence of emergent nation-states. Nyerere made the call for unity a cornerstone of his platform as a nationalist leader.

In the speeches “Independence Message to the UN” (144-156), “Groping Forward” (119-124), and “*Ujamaa – the Basis of African Socialism*” (162-171), Nyerere repeatedly urges people to unite, both in Tanganyika and Africa at large. In fact, as he contends in the speech “*Ujamaa – the Basis of African Socialism*”, he uses the spirit of *ujamaa* to help restore the cooperative spirit that the African people supposedly had before the colonisers introduced the idea of individualism. The concept of *ujamaa* was based on the idea of unity of people for a common purpose. But although Nyerere methodically offers lessons on unity to his citizens and Africans at large, studies have

pointed to the fact he was discriminating in his rule. Thus Nyerere was favouring Christians and alienating Muslims (Mwakikagile, 2010: 3). He favoured whites in resource allocation (Sivalon, 1992: 4). In his speeches he emerges as a leader who believed that unity must be achieved at whatever cost, that it must be embraced by all no matter what reservations people may have about the ideas around which they were expected to be united. This unity was therefore not something to be achieved gradually and through negotiation, but a condition to be accepted on his own terms.

In all the above speeches, Nyerere repeatedly urges the people to help the government fight the three big enemies of development. The phrase “we are at war with disease, poverty and ignorance” is repeatedly used in the speeches. Nyerere emphasises the presence of the trio to rally the nation against these evils and fill them with the urge to rise up and fight them. As a teacher, Nyerere hopes that by repeating his clarion call for fighting disease, ignorance and poverty, the nation would indeed focus on them to the exclusion of any other concerns or whatever sense of dissatisfaction they may have. By using the style of repetition, Nyerere presents himself to the Tanzanian citizens, his putative students, as their natural teacher. This repeating what he wants them to know is justified owing to his status as a teacher.

Freire’s (1970: 5) banking concept of education regards men as adaptable, manageable beings. The more students work at storing the deposits bestowed on them, the less they develop critical consciousness, which would result in their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more frequently they are told something, the higher the chances of their learning what they are being taught and the greater the chances of their accepting the passive role imposed on them. Freire (1970: 7) goes on to argue that the capability of banking education to minimise the students’ creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. This by itself is oppression. Nyerere’s use of repetition as a teaching method amounts to a form of oppression.

To strengthen his point, Nyerere uses personification to portray the ugliness of poverty, disease and ignorance. By arguing, “We are at war with poverty, disease and ignorance,” Nyerere makes the reader/listener view these three as live enemies which must be fought and destroyed with vigour. In the speech “Corruption as an Enemy of the People” (81-84), he adds another enemy to the above list. Fighting corruption is compared to going to a battle well-armed and prepared to

smash an enemy. Portraying corruption as such an enemy, Nyerere seemingly persuades his people to hate corruption and anyone who practises it. At face value, the fight against corruption is a worthy cause. But because of the imposing, oppressive manner in which Nyerere sets the agenda for his people, the battle against corruption is largely lost from the very beginning. The entrenchment of corruption in Tanzania, as Stapenhurst (1999: 1) argues, can be traced back to Nyerere's introduction of *ujamaa*, which ushered in a system of permits (*vibali*), making it possible for officials to collect huge bribes in exchange for issuing them. If Nyerere was an open-minded and mind-opening teacher, he would have probed into the concept of *ujamaa* deeper and would have probably seen the pitfalls, finding ways of sidestepping them. His failure to realise that corruption was creeping in because of shortcomings in his approach as a leader portrays him as myopic. Although he uses repetitions, coercions and persuasions, he is not able to stamp out corruption from his regime.

In the speech on corruption, Nyerere repeats the verb *add*, thereby pushing what he wants to say further and in so doing amplifies it. He writes:

I would like to *add*, sir, – and I don't want to elaborate on this, there is no point in elaborating – I want to *add* there is another enemy which we must *add* on the list of these three enemies poverty, disease and ignorance, I think we must *add* another enemy..." (82)

The word "add" is repeated four times in one sentence. Nyerere aims to amplify the idea he wants to present through pushing it further, creating suspense in the mind of the listener. He aims to be effective through keeping the audience in suspense until he delivers his message. He takes time to mention this other enemy; he immerses himself in the use of rhetorical questions: "What is the enemy of that [justice]? What is the enemy of this expectation? We can do something about poverty. We can do something about disease. Ignorance, we know that enemy too, we know we do not want people who are ignorant" (82). He only satisfies the people's curiosity two paragraphs later. This suspense enables people to feel the intensity of his message. Rhetorical strategies are techniques that an author or speaker uses to evoke an emotional response in the audience – the reader(s) or listener(s). These emotional responses are central to grasping the meaning of the work or speech, and should get the audience's attention. Nyerere here impresses on the audience to think about what they are willing to do for their country and at the same time seems to be pushing them

to do more by fighting corruption. But, in all this, there is no room for dialogue; it is him, Nyerere, talking at the silent people.

By using these strategies, Nyerere aims to portray attributes of a good teacher, one who understands his subject matter well. But in his view, the educator's role is to regulate the way the world "enters into" the students (Freire, 1970). The teacher's task, in this understanding, is to organise a process, which already occurs spontaneously, to "fill" the students by making deposits of information, which he considers to constitute true knowledge. Nyerere selects carefully what he wants his Tanzanian citizens to learn and how he wants them to learn it. Since the Tanzanian people receive his ideas as passive entities, this education makes them more passive still. To him, therefore, an educated person is the one who adapts well in the world that the teacher creates and who questions it as little as possible.

Another literary strategy Nyerere uses in his speeches to portray himself as *Mwalimu* is historical allusion. This technique involves a speaker alluding to historical phenomena and bringing them to the present in order to use the historical example to amplify the present predicament. It is a device which casts its user as an informed person. He knows things which happened long ago and which could be of value to the present situation. In the speech "The African and Democracy" (103-107), for example, he contends that dialogue was the African traditional way of solving a problem. Elders discussed matters affecting them until they agreed: "Elders talked until they arrived at a common ground" (104). Here, Nyerere seemingly urges the citizens to embrace discussion as the way of solving their grievances. He dissuades them from using violence as a way of handling disputes.

In the same speech, Nyerere alludes to Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address in 1863 to place the current Tanzanian independence agitation in a position of prominence. He also refers to the Emancipation Proclamation, signed by Lincoln in 1863, which declared that all slaves in states still at war with the Union were free (Striner, 2006: 192). He underscores the centrality of the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which were also the basis of Lincoln's speech. These allusions are effective because of their direct relevance to the conditions of the oppressed people, and their importance in laying the foundation of a new nation. Lincoln's speech on democracy as practised by Americans was cherished and became familiar to all American citizens (Kolchin,

1994: 82). In this respect, Nyerere borrows from history the concept of democracy and emphasises that this is an old concept, which has served well such great nations of the world as the U.S.A. But over and above the appropriateness of the allusion, he makes use of it in order to “charm” his listeners, to show them that, in his mind, he has “travelled” far and wide, and that he knows the world and its history. In so doing, he places himself above everyone else – as a person who is exceptionally wise. He assumes the role of a teacher in a conservative sense of the word and of the Tanzanian people as his students. This relationship is made possible because he is more knowledgeable than any of his students. However, his teaching methods are questionable because he seems obsessed with his wisdom and presumes the absence of the same in his students, the citizens.

In “Democracy and the Party System” (195-203), Nyerere utilises historical allusions as a rhetorical strategy, with similar results. He argues that people should not force their views on others, because if they did so they would be inviting wars. Instead, he argues, they should follow the example of African traditional societies whereby “Elders sit under a big tree, and talk until they agree...” (195). Even in this case, and somewhat paradoxically, Nyerere’s thoughts lead us to Freire’s (1970) banking concept of education in which knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. By consistently educating the Tanzanians on democracy, as if they knew nothing about it, Nyerere presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite. He is the one who has the brains to think on their behalf, and they, the citizens, have to consume what he teaches them. In so doing, he considers himself as the only person who is knowledgeable enough to teach the Tanzanian nation. This kind of thinking inevitably leads to dictatorship and oppression, vices that Nyerere has been accused of.

Not only has Lane (1999: 16) accused Nyerere of dictatorship but also of oppressing the citizens that he was bound by the constitution to protect from internal and external aggression. He argues that Nyerere was single-handedly responsible for the economic destruction of what was then a potentially wealthy nation. Lane (1999: 16) gives an example of how Nyerere forcefully shoved the *ujamaa* idea to the citizens without following proper channels of implementing government programmes.

Similarly, Stoger-Eising (2000: 134-135) notes that Nyerere's concept of *ujamaa* was influenced by and anchored on Catholic social teachings, thus alienating Muslims. She thus accuses Nyerere of being an anti-Islamic dictator. The forceful villagisation of people, without considering their religious orientations, into *ujamaa* villages made Muslims become increasingly reluctant to join them. In these *ujamaa* villages, Muslims were forced to learn Christian values. This, coupled with the rising cost of material incentives for the villages, led to forceful movement of people into collective villages – a method that the regime had earlier condemned and resolved not to employ (Lofchie, 1978: 452).

The same strategy of historical allusion is present in “The Principles of Citizenship” (126-129), where Nyerere once again alludes to Abraham Lincoln, this time round on the theme of liberty and equality. He quotes him as having said: “I shall prefer immigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty, where despotism can be taken pure, without the base alloy of hypocrisy” (127). Here Nyerere rebukes people whom he thought were hypocritical on the issue of human liberty. Borrowing from Lincoln again places Nyerere as a leader who understands the value of human dignity and who could be trusted with leadership. But Nyerere, after independence seems to have fallen into the same abhorrent practices Lincoln warns against. His imposition of the idea of *ujamaa* is a major example that points to Nyerere's indifference to liberty, his lip service to it. He forced people to accept his idea – which was of foundational value – without giving them the chance to express their views on it. Nyerere seems to have taken education as an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Freire (1970) argues that such a teacher, instead of communicating, issues statements and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorise, and repeat. The scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. But in the final analysis, it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this misguided system. True knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry that human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other.

So far we have examined how Nyerere uses the strategies of repetition and historical allusions to portray himself as *Mwalimu* in *Freedom*. He also employs the use of parallelism. For example, he draws parallels between his critics and the German Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, to suggest how

dangerous these men were to the development of the nation. It will be recalled that Hitler was, and still remains, one of the most horrid dictators and perverted racists that the world has ever known. His aggressive foreign policy is considered to be the primary cause of the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe (Kershaw, 2000: 23). His regime was responsible for the genocide of at least 5.5 million Jews, and millions of other victims whom he and his followers deemed racially inferior (Kershaw, 1999: 4).

Referring to those who criticised him for seemingly favouring the whites in his government in respect to job allocation, he reasons: “They are preaching discrimination, colour discrimination as a religion to us. In addition, they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. We glorify human beings, sir, not colour” (128). He darkly cautions: “You know what happens when people begin to get drunk with power and glorify their race, the Hitlers, that is what they do. You know where they lead the human race...” (128). This parallelism pits true Tanzanians against the people whom Nyerere perceives to be his critics. It is a warning that he is a leader concerned about the welfare of his people and that the sole aim of his critics is to destroy the nation and its citizens. One cannot, however, fail to notice the propagandist qualities of this strategy.

It will be recalled that one primary objective for the zeal among the African leaders for self-rule was to realise an all-round development by eradicating the unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease (Anderson, 1991; Davidson, 1992). These evils thwarted development in Africa, and the leaders who came to power as the founding Presidents of their states were forced by the situations of their countries to come up with policies on how they were going to deal with these issues. Nyerere was aware of the need to confront these problems. He therefore uses parallelism in *Freedom* with the aim of amplifying the damage caused by poverty, disease and ignorance. One of the instances of parallelism in the book occurs when he equates the struggle against these evils to the Maji Maji Rebellion against the German colonial rule in Tanganyika. He draws parallels between the deaths caused by disease, poverty and ignorance with those witnessed during the Rebellion.

The Maji Maji Rebellion was sparked off by German’s harsh colonial rule in Tanganyika. The people of Tanganyika were heavily taxed, and the methods of the tax collections were harsh and brutal, including torture, imprisonment and property confiscation. The uprising lasted between

1905 – 1907 and left an estimated 75,000 Maji Maji warriors dead (Iliffe, 1967; Pakenham, 1992; Gellately and Kiernan, 2003; Asante, 2007). This parallelism is meant to evoke emotion and lead the people to follow Nyerere's bidding in fighting the three "enemies" fervently. Almost threateningly, he adds: "and anybody who refuses to take part in this war, or who hinders the efforts of his neighbours, is guilty of helping a far more deadly foe than is he who helps an armed invader" (177). Again and again, the teacher is a dominating and harsh one, leaving no room for anyone's voice but his own.

Figurative language is yet another strategy Nyerere uses to construct his identity. This is the use of a literary device which creates a special effect or feeling, often by making comparison. The purpose of using figurative language is to appeal to the aesthetic sensibilities by explaining an obscure subject by comparing it with something that is generally understood, which thus gains a clearness that could be given in no other way. Figurative language also adds to the persuasiveness of style, enabling the author to add freshness and vivacity to the work. Nyerere uses similes to draw comparisons.

For instance, in "Independence Message to TANU" (138-141), he says that independence "is like obtaining land on which to build a house" (138). The simile emphasises the vital significance of independence. According to Nyerere, freedom is the bedrock on which development is laid.

Similarly, in "The African and Democracy" (103-106), Nyerere compares democracy in Africa to Africa's tropical sun: "[democracy] is the one thing that is as African as the tropical sun" (103). This comparison emphasises the fact Africans are democratic people, dispelling the notion that Africans do not understand the concept of democracy. In drawing this comparison, Nyerere presents himself as both a natural, spontaneous democrat and the champion of democracy in Africa. However, as already argued, the teacher who teaches democracy imposes his ideas on the citizens without leaving room for argument.

The use of figurative language can also be seen in the speech "State visit to Mali" (326-329) where Nyerere compares sticks joined together to the unity of African states and urges Africans to unite:

Thirty-six sticks of wood might each break under the weight of a heavy burden; but what if those thirty-six sticks of wood are bound together? Then the burden can be carried safely

and every single stick remain whole. These things we know; our people know them in their everyday lives. The leaders of Africa know them too. (327)

This metaphor is effective because it is drawn from the daily life of the ordinary Tanzanian person. Explaining things in this colourful and methodical manner serves to enhance Nyerere's identity as *Mwalimu*. It is also a strategy of persuasion. Through the metaphor, Nyerere aims to capture the imagination of the people and bring them his way.

While addressing the university students in the speech "Opening of the University College Campus" (305-316) Nyerere also uses an extended simile. He uses the simile to show the students that they are privileged to be in the university and that they owe a debt to their people. This debt has to be paid back to the society through being of service to the people when they graduated:

[Students] are like the man who has been given all the food available in a starving village in order that he may have strength to bring supplies back from a distant place. If he takes this food and does not bring help to his brothers, he is a traitor. Similarly, if any of the young men and women who are given education by the people of this Republic adopt attitudes of superiority, or fail to use their knowledge to help the development of this country, then they are betraying our Union. (310)

This figurative language enables his audience/ readers form images in their minds and thus clearly understand the message. Nyerere, in a teacher-like manner, aims to give direction to the young Tanzanian scholars on the values of socialism.

Although Nyerere aims to be understood as a teacher, he does not succeed in communicating since he stifles active participation in the communication process. The teacher's thinking is authenticated only by the authenticity of the students' thinking. The teacher cannot think for his students, nor can he impose his thoughts on them. Genuine thinking is realised through communication. Since thought has meaning only when generated by action upon the world, the subordination of students to teachers is retrogressive.

Nyerere's use of figurative language is also seen in his utilisation of imagery. Essentially, imagery is the use of words that create mental pictures. Such images can be created by using figures of speech such as similes, metaphors or personification. As a teacher, Nyerere coins up terminologies

and phrases that evoke some images in the mind of Tanzanians. The Kiswahili phrases that Nyerere employed became widely popular. The statement *Uhuru bado kidogo* (not yet freedom) is coined by Nyerere to ridicule the colonialists who emphasised gradual transfer of power to Africans. In reality the colonialists never wanted to hand over the reins of power to the natives (Davidson, 1992). Nyerere uses the phrase to expose the deceptive nature of the colonialists. Such statements aim to dichotomise the world in such a way that Africans viewed the whites as enemies who were dominating them and denying them their rights and freedoms. He further builds on this phrase, coining a noun out of it, to accuse his critics of being imperial stooges: “If we want to look for stooges and tribalists we must look into the camp of the *bados*” (93).

While emphasising the need for unity in Africa, Nyerere says *binadamu wote ni ndugu zangu, na afrika ni moja* (I believe in human brotherhood and the unity of Africa), making unity in Africa a mandatory enterprise. Proverbs like *Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe* (treat your guest as a guest for the first two days; on the third day give him a hoe!) strongly borrow from the culture of the people. The Kiswahili proverb *Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe* reformulates the concept of freedom. The idea is that to experience freedom, one must work. Nyerere seems to urge every citizen to work hard and emancipate himself from the shackles of dependency. He discourages loitering and compares it to modern-day parasitism:

Not only was the capitalist unknown to Africa but we did not have that other form of modern-day parasite — the loiterer, or idler who accepts the hospitality of society as his right but gives nothing in return! Those of us who talk about the African way of life, and, quite rightly, take pride in maintaining the tradition of hospitality which is so great a part of it, might do well to remember the Swahili saying: ‘*Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe*’. (165)

Nyerere here invokes the tradition of the African people and calls for re-examination of the concept of African hospitality. He reasons that lazy people can misuse this concept to exploit others. They have to work in order for them to have something to eat. He buttresses the point with his ideograph *uhuru na kazi* (freedom and work).

But questions arise as to whether Nyerere was truly committed to the message engraved in the popular wisdom he was using. Phrases like *binadamu wote ni ndugu zangu, na afrika ni moja*,

*Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe* and *uhuru na kazi* carry strong messages to the local people. A leader who uses these phrases establishes a relationship with the people – he is one of them and with them. Nyerere uses these phrases as ideographs to urge people to work together and liberate themselves. For instance, he drafted up a new constitution that gave him sweeping powers, a fact that divorced him from his people (Sadleir, 1999: 257). According to the constitution, he would be both the head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, would have full executive authority, and would not be bound to accept his cabinet’s advice (Sadleir, 1999: 257). This suggests that he was “hungry” for power. Although he aimed to establish a close relationship with the Tanzanian citizens, by coining terminologies and phrases that left an imprint in the minds of the citizens, giving himself excessive powers and the right to neglect the advice of the cabinet amounted to dictatorship. If Nyerere was not prepared to accept advice from his cabinet, there is a great possibility that his executive authority lost trust in him, and this may have led to his inefficiency and the subsequent failure of the nation to realise all-round development. After the fall-out between Nyerere and the elite, the Tanzanian elite adopted the capitalist ideas of individualism and of survival of the fittest. Those in positions of power began to abuse their powers in order to enrich themselves. They wanted to live the “Western” life like their colonisers (Sadleir, 1999: 257).

According to Sadleir (1999: 290), Nyerere became “disillusioned by the increasing capitalist tendencies of many of the national leaders, who sought to increase their personal wealth through corruption”. Those in power built big houses, bought expensive cars, etc. and did not welcome Nyerere’s idea of socialism. The gap between the rich and the poor widened. These privileged groups were not interested in sharing their wealth. Thus, although Nyerere thought he had given all the right lessons to his people/ students, his political and economic myopism thwarted his vision.

Regardless of his endeavour to use various literary strategies to portray himself convincingly as *Mwalimu*, one can see the inconsistencies in the methods that Nyerere uses to “teach” the nation. Although he comes up with great ideas, his pedagogical strategies fail to acknowledge the Tanzanian citizens as human beings, a scenario which helped to drag the country backwards.

### **3.4 Sowing: Biblical Parables and Imagery in the Making of Museveni**

The title of Museveni's autobiography, *Sowing the Mustard Seed*, has its origin in a parable. A mustard seed is small, but it is alive and growing. Almost invisible at first, it will begin to spread, first under the ground and then visibly. Museveni conceptualises democracy in Uganda through the parable of the mustard seed. The concept is drawn from the Bible, in the Book of Luke 17: 6, where the disciples of Jesus request him to increase their faith. In response to their request, Jesus says, "If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye might say unto this sycamore tree, be thou plucked up by the root, and be thou planted in the sea; and it should obey you". Thus, the mustard seed represents a small quantity of something that is able to do great works. In the autobiography, Museveni uses several devices that build on this parable, including biblical allusion, figurative language, and fictionalisation of Uganda's history. He uses these devices to portray himself as a revolutionary and a saviour of the Ugandan nation.

By anchoring the title of his autobiography on the Bible, Museveni hopes to create an intellectual space whereby the readers may view him as the sower who sows the seed of democracy in Uganda. He portrays himself as a saviour whose aim is to change the course of history in Uganda through sowing the seed of democracy.

To construct his identity of a saviour, Museveni contends that for the mustard seed to grow, the country must be prepared; before the mustard seed of democracy can be sown in Uganda, the land has to be cleared of the rocks and weeds of the corrupt system, which have given rise to sectarian dictatorship and violence. Thus he states, "I believe that through our struggle in the 1980s the seed was finally sown and that it has fallen on fertile ground" (67). The onset of his leadership attests to the coming of age of this seed. He portrays a country that has been impoverished by two decades of brutal dictatorship and is on the verge of economic collapse. For too long, he maintains, preceding leaders hoodwinked the common people, manipulating tribal sentiments to stay in power and stealing millions of dollars in foreign aid and taxes. He likens them to weeds, which should be destroyed for the good seed to germinate and thrive.

In addition, Museveni alludes to the parable of the sower in the book of Luke 8: 4-8, where Jesus discusses how a farmer went out to plant some seeds. Some fell on thorns and weeds shot up and choked out the tender blades. These thorns and weeds must be removed so that the seed may fall

on good and fertile soil to grow and produce one hundred times as much as had been planted. Here again Museveni is the farmer who prepares the land before planting his seeds. He must do so through bringing down the bad leaders, whom he likens to the weeds that might entangle democracy and make it unachievable. Museveni again likens himself to Jesus, the saviour of the world, to construct his identity.

However, the continuity of the old is manifest if one examines the military conflicts in the northern and western parts of the country – conflicts that have subsisted for a considerable period of time and throughout the Museveni era. Virtually since the Museveni regime came to power, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) have wreaked havoc in northern Uganda (Onyango-Oloka, 1997). Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, has waged an uprising against Museveni's government for more than two decades. Kony's forces, linked to many atrocities, have faulted Museveni's leadership for marginalisation and discrimination (Onyango-Oloka, 1997). While their roots and causes vary from the purely opportunistic to serious questions of ethnic marginalisation and discrimination (Cheru, 2002: 196-198; Khadiagala, 1993: 244-245; Obote, 1990: 23), the mode of approaching their resolution, which has largely been to rely on military methods of suppression, has yet to produce enduring results. Neither in handling domestic politics, nor in resolving internal conflict, has Museveni demonstrated that he is the Messiah that he projects of himself in *Sowing*, a leader of a fundamentally different calibre than that of his predecessors.

Museveni also employs the use of imagery to portray himself as a revolutionary leader. He uses figures of speech to put his points across through images, particularly the point of the crucial role he was supposedly called upon to play in the history of Uganda. One of this is the use of similes. In *Sowing*, Museveni uses similes to justify the ouster of his predecessors. For example, he reasons, "We knew that dictators had to be actively opposed and that they would not just fall off by themselves like ripe mangoes..." (19). This simile advances the idea of using violence to defeat bad leadership. He portrays himself as a leader who does not sit back when the country is being misled by dictators. He takes an active role in removing bad leadership. However, as discussed in chapter two of this study, critical examination of Museveni's leadership shows that he did not bring about a new type of leadership but that he has advanced a leadership similar to the one that he claimed to have overthrown.

To create mental images in the minds of his readers, Museveni also employs the use of symbolism which is a literary device where an object represents an idea. For example, he uses the image of the cow as a symbol of the Ugandan nation. Museveni points out that cows were central to his people's culture. *Sowing* presents cows that have names. Museveni adds that the name identifies the cow and its mother and that his family's cows were like appendages of the family:

They are like members of our families and we treat them very intimately. For instance, we have a brush called *enkuyo*, which we use to clean and massage the cow, a process we call *okuragaza*. This is done for most of the milking cows, but also for favourites among them. It is a form of communicating with them and they enjoy it very much ... the cows are like cousins and sisters to me. (3)

The way his cattle are portrayed brings out the image of tranquillity and calm – the image of an ideal Ugandan nation. By presenting cows which have human feelings, which can be made happy by human actions, Museveni evokes a picture of a peaceful Ugandan nation and of himself as its herds boy/ leader. As cows were supposed to be guarded from beasts of prey, so the Ugandan nation had to be protected from bad leadership.

It can be argued that Museveni followed this line of thought to turn Uganda into something akin to his personal property, controlling every sphere of the state just the way the owner of a cow can control his herd. At the beginning of 2003, in far-reaching proposals on constitutional reform, Museveni recommended lifting the constitutional provision that stipulates that a president can stand for election for only two terms. Museveni recommended that term limits be removed altogether (Onyango-Oloka, 2011). He seems to have felt that Uganda, his inalienable property, should be under his “protection” forever.

The nation, like the cows, can be productive if the leaders can have its interests at heart. Museveni draws attention to the vulnerability of cows as follows: “For clothing, I wore the skin of a premature calf and this would often invite one of our cows to chase me round and round mistaking me for a wild animal” (4). The cows were afraid of wild animals and had to be protected from them. Likewise, Uganda had to be protected from bad leaders. Elsewhere he compares these bad leaders to a carnivorous bird called *kamunye* and advises people to guard their riches jealously from it:

We are, therefore, continuing to strengthen our defense forces: to neglect doing so would be like exposing meat when there are dangerous carnivores around. Remember the story of the boy who took a lump of meat out in the courtyard? A carnivorous bird (*kamunye*) swooped down on him and not only took the meat but left his fingers bleeding. The boy came crying to his father, who told him, “It was your fault: you should have carried a spear so when the *kamunye* came to grab the meat, it would have impaled itself on the spear.” Uganda’s riches are very tempting. There are many *kamunye*’s around. (122)

The comparison, which Museveni draws between his predecessors and this carnivorous bird, depicts the images of greed, plunder, murderousness and ineptitude. The leaders that Museveni overthrows are depicted as such a cruel lot that when Museveni becomes a leader people can see him as a saviour come to redeem their lives.

To qualify himself as a saviour, Museveni also creates images of a larger-than-life character, whose supernatural powers supersede those of all his contemporaries. This is seen in the way he fictionalises Uganda’s history in his autobiography. The reader is left to imagine a leader with exceptional instincts, who survives even in situations that claim the lives of everyone else.

Freeman (1993: 45) argues that a text that recounts a person’s life is a mere recollection of experiences that places us as readers yet another step removed from the life we wish to understand. In his view, these recollections are subject to countless distortions and falsifications. One remembers selectively and perhaps conferring meanings on experiences that did not possess these meanings at the time of their occurrence. Indeed, Museveni fictionalises events in his autobiography and ends up presenting a history of Uganda with a slant. Suffice it to examine one such distortion.

From *Sowing* we learn that some of Museveni’s best boyhood school friends were Mwesiga, Mwesigwa, and Rwaheru. Museveni’s record of how they perished and how he escaped death under the same trying circumstances portrays him as an exceptional leader. Although not present at the scenes of their deaths, he explains in considerable detail how each one of them died.

Mwesiga and Rwaheru, we are informed, died shortly after Museveni says he re-entered Uganda in December 1972. According to Museveni, Mwesiga was killed in the Eastern Ugandan town of

Mbale. Judging by the flow of events he outlines in the book, Mwesiga died in either December 1972 or January 1973. Museveni recalls:

Martin Mwesiga, [Wukwu Mpima] Kazimoto and I travelled to Mbale to join the group, without knowing that its presence had been detected...we saw a contingent of about 15 military policemen coming through the estate...They surrounded the house in an unprofessional manner, without cocking their guns. I had the car keys and one of the soldiers, poking a rifle into my side, told me to open and enter the car. Taking them by surprise I jumped over the hedge. (78)

Museveni then narrates how he escaped from the soldiers pursuing him while his unfortunate colleagues were killed. Museveni fictionalises his escape from the tense and fear-filled atmosphere of the siege. He explains how all 15 military policemen had “in a very unprofessional manner” not bothered to cock their guns (78-80). These are the same soldiers of Idi Amin whom Museveni in another context would have been sure to describe as trigger-happy, willing to shoot innocent civilians, presumably suggesting that they went about with their guns cocked. Museveni also tells of how “taking them by surprise”, he jumped over the hedge (82). If these were violent soldiers who, as Museveni would have us believe, shot innocent civilians on sight without provocation, how much more alert would they have been in or around a house that they suspected to have been a den of rebels. As such, Museveni could not have taken them by surprise. They had come to arrest or kill the suspected guerrillas, and there could have been no surprise whether in the overall sense of knowing what they had come to achieve or in the sense of somehow relaxing once they got to the house. He makes his escape heroic, and in so doing, he presents himself as the protagonist who must not die till the Ugandan nation is liberated.

All through the first pages of *Sowing*, Museveni is at pains to elaborate on his exceptional instincts, his quick sense of judgement in all sorts of situations and how these qualities have helped him survive endless danger. He portrays himself as a saviour with a great calling, who could not be killed, like the rest of his friends, because he had a mission to accomplish.

Museveni also fictionalises Rwaheru's death, which took place shortly after Mwesiga's. He would have us believe the following:

[W]hile Rwaheru was at Kyambogo with Karuhanga, a platoon of Amin's soldiers surrounded the house. Karuhanga, who was in the sitting-room, was arrested and told to show the security men around. Meanwhile, Rwaheru had locked himself in the bedroom ... Rwaheru climbed onto a bed, cut the ventilator netting over the door and lobbed a stick-grenade into the midst of the soldiers who were crowded into the corridor of the house ... Karuhanga fled into the toilet and locked the door. The grenade exploded, killing all the men in the corridor. Rwaheru then opened the bedroom door and lobbed another grenade into the sitting-room, killing more of the enemy. In all he killed eleven of them. Unfortunately, when he was preparing to throw a third grenade, it exploded in his hands and killed him. (84)

What Museveni does not say is how he, who was nowhere near the scene, came to know all these details about what happened that day. All the guerrillas in the house that day – Karuhanga, Rwaheru, and Birihanze – died without speaking to him or their relatives. Had Karuhanga, the sole survivor, told anyone the story of what happened that day, it could only have been to the army or the intelligence officers who had been interrogating him. It seems that Museveni imagines what happens to his friend and recreates it as a fictional writer would do.

Karuhanga would not have known what was going on in the locked bedroom where Rwaheru was hiding. Nor would Karuhanga, who was locked up in the toilet, have seen how the grenade killed Rwaheru. There is no way Museveni could have learned of what happened in enough detail to describe what happened to Rwaheru, who had locked himself inside a bedroom and climbed “onto a bed”. Certainly, under the circumstances of complete destruction by grenades, Museveni would have had no way of knowing how it was that a third grenade exploded in Rwaheru's hands. None at the scene escaped alive to tell the story. Yet Museveni gives the sort of detail that only an eyewitness could have. Clearly, Museveni is fictionalising his narration of the death of his friends. Museveni uses fiction in order to portray a leader who is larger than life, always escaping from dangerous forces, which destroyed his friends. He is the lucky one who cannot simply die before saving the nation from *kamunyes*.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has unveiled literary strategies that Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni use to construct their respective identities in *Suffering*, *Freedom* and *Sowing*. In their writings, they create a space whereby they are entitled to govern because they were manifestly better equipped than anyone else for the task –they knew more, and were capable of wisely carrying out the trust their simpler brethren had placed in them. They use various literary strategies to get their message sink and be believed.

In *Suffering*, Kenyatta uses myth to construct his identity as the father of a nation. He shrewdly recasts his life into a myth that portrays him as a person who embodied the nation's pride and its aspirations. He strengthens this myth through the use of Biblical allusion, metaphor and paradox.

In *Freedom*, Nyerere uses repetition to present himself as a teacher par excellence. He makes use of historical allusion in order to captivate his listeners, to show them that, in his mind, he has been to places and seen things and knows the world and history. He places himself above everyone else – as a person who is exceptionally wise. To authenticate his image of a teacher, he illustrates his points using figurative language.

Finally, in *Sowing*, Museveni borrows Biblical parables to make his actions messianic. The parable of the mustard seed, which he uses, portrays Museveni as the sower, destroying the weeds, which beset the Ugandan state. He strengthens this parable by making further allusions to the Bible. Museveni also employs the use of figurative language, which is realised in form of similes and symbols. Lastly, Museveni fictionalises some of the events in his life, which allows him to recreate history and appear as the leader that the people of Uganda have been waiting for – a new breed of a leader who is a saviour. The next chapter will show how the audiences that Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni target in their writings influence the construction of their identities.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **AUDIENCE AS A FACTOR IN SHAPING THE IDENTITY OF A NATIONALIST LEADER**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter is concerned with one major way in which the authors of *Suffering, Freedom* and *Sowing* construct their identities as nationalist leaders, i.e. by considering the wide spectrum of their audiences. Although their main, acknowledged and direct audiences were the people as a whole, these writers were keenly aware of the presence of particular listeners/ readers who stood out from the general mass of people on account of their sceptical or critical attitude to their rule. The writers perceive the views of these segments of their audiences as potentially destructive to the projection of their (the leaders') desired identities. Because of this, the process of identity construction incorporates an undercurrent of work which consists in implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – responding to reserved or critical views of them by subtle placation, reassurance or outright dismissal or counter-accusation.

Essentially, every word or phrase nationalist leaders use is influenced by what they want their intended listeners/ readers to make of them. Allen (2000) argues that authorship is a mental process that involves active planning, progressing through iterative stages, in order to respond effectively to a particular audience. For Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni, it is essential to consider whom they were directing their authorial statements to and what it is they wanted their works to accomplish in terms of projecting certain identities of themselves. This is because, as Zamel (1987: 42) and Flower (1979: 123) have shown, the process of writing a speech or an autobiography is a dialogue between authors and specific (present or absent) audiences.

#### **4.2 *Suffering*: Kenyatta's Rhetorical Engagement with His Audience**

On the eve of independence, Kenyans had high expectations regarding the benefits they would reap from their new state of freedom and newly available opportunities. Kenyatta, as President, was seen as the one who would make the realisation of these opportunities possible. Indeed he made promises to that effect. But no quick reversal of fortunes was forthcoming, and Kenyans started expressing disillusionment and dissatisfaction with his government. The opposition that

emerged regarded him as a veritable heir to the colonisers. It was felt that the only difference between him and the former colonial masters was the colour of his skin (Muigai, 2004: 189).

The most ferocious among Kenyatta's critics and the leader of the opposition in the early post-independence years was Oginga Odinga, who wrote a book, *Not Yet Uhuru*, whose title implied that there was no freedom yet under Kenyatta. In his speeches in *Suffering*, Kenyatta is compelled to discard these accusations by constructing the identity of a father of the nation, an identity which, in its very essence, makes any negative view of him as President illogical, unthinkable and absurd. Kenyatta's aim is to ensure Kenyans' early adoration of him remained alive, and to undo the damage that criticisms of his leadership were doing to his image.

But Odinga was only one of a larger Kenyan audience, constituting members of the opposition, scholars and other Kenyatta government critics, who saw Kenyatta as entrenching ethnicity in Kenya given that he favoured his tribesmen, especially on the issue of land issuance (Muigai, 2004: 190; Ogot, 1996: 56). Kikuyu cronies and Kenyatta's followers from other tribes, whom he held a grip on, dominated the only ruling party KANU. It was during the time of Kenyatta that tribal fawning started in Kenya and evolved into ethnisation of the politics of the country. But it is that very trend that Kenyatta wants to camouflage in his speeches, posing as the champion of unification.

In other words, as he constructs his identity as the father of the Kenyan nation, one who wants to see his family/ nation united, Kenyatta is driven not only by an abstract ideal of a nationalist leader, whose embodiment he wants to be seen to be, but also by his awareness that part of his audience – whether physically present during the deliverance of his speeches or not – is accusing him of dividing the nation on ethnic basis.

In the speech “Constitutional Conference, 1963” (209-212), which he delivered as a prime minister, Kenyatta pleads with communities to unite:

At the same time, the government understands the fears and anxieties of some communities, and hopes that – by its example during these few months in office – such fears will be seen to be unfounded. The KANU government is concerned with the welfare

of all the people, regardless of their race or tribe, and will be the policy of the government in the future. (219)

In this quotation, Kenyatta demonstrates that he can talk boldly about a sensitive issue – the tribal division in the country. By his very choice of topic, by the very fact that he addresses deep-rooted fears on the part of the people, he dissociates himself from tribal inclinations. Thus, by speaking about unity of the nation, he both absolves himself from any blame with respect to tribalism – of which his critics accuse him - and responds to the people’s fears as well as aspirations.

In the same speech, Kenyatta warns the citizens that “there is no room for autonomy or secession” (211). He urges them to embrace nationalism. Although nationalism is a lofty ideal and a worthy cause for a nationalist leader to espouse, it can be argued that Kenyatta’s call for it is opportunistic. He knows that nationalism was successfully used in the past (in Kenya) to advance the goals of leadership, when these goals were sincere and coincided with the people’s aspirations for independence. Nationalism could thus take the form of allegiance to the leader, above religion, class or tribe, to the extent that some people could be prepared to sacrifice their lives in defence of it. Kenyatta sees how he can now revive the nationalist sentiments of the people, but this time to serve his new agenda – to entrench Kikuyu ethno-nationalist ideology in the country.

Similarly, in the Foreword to *Suffering*, Kenyatta foregrounds certain values as his highest principles. He writes: “I would say that I have always stood for the purposes of human dignity in freedom and for the values of tolerance and peace” (5). This assertion is again not an attempt to formulate some moral and political axioms, but is directed to the opposition’s accusations of him for violating these very values. It will be recalled that, and as argued in chapter two, although Kenyatta’s government continued to talk of Kenya as one nation, and to extol fairness in its policies on land, in service delivery and jobs allocation, the high-minded rhetoric concealed a less palatable truth. As Muigai (2004: 192), Kinyatti (2008: 54), Attwood (1967), Osolo (1968) and Ogot (1996: 96) observe, Kenyatta’s government spearheaded the entrenchment of Kikuyu power via a web of both formal and informal networks. As observed in chapter two of this study, as was the case with respect to the security forces, the senior civil service was increasingly Kikuyu-dominated. The crucial posts of provincial commissioners, for example, were held by a small group of conservative insiders, more than half of whom were Kikuyu (Muigai, 2004: 192).

To counter these criticisms and to make people blind, as it were, to reality itself, Kenyatta urges the Kenyan citizens to embrace nationalism, insisting that he believes in nationalism “rooted in loyalty to Kenya” as a unified state instead of a fragmented one. In his elevated rhetoric, “defending Kenya from both aggression and subversion” (9) had to be the credo of every citizen regardless of their tribe of origin. What Kenyatta means by aggression and subversion is the existing opposition. In other words, his gospel of protecting his citizens is to be understood as protecting them from the opposition. He presents himself as a leader endeavouring to safeguard the rights of Kenyan citizens precisely because he possesses the power to detect and counter adversarial policies being championed by the opposition. His narrative of suffering for the sake of all Kenyans is meant to be seen as both his crowning glory as a nationalist and as the indisputable refutation of all criticisms against him.

Kenyatta’s critics were unsparing. Among these were Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Oginga Odinga who argued that Kenyatta had gone through a political metamorphosis (Wa Thiong’o, 1986: 4; Ogot, 1996: 95). Kenyatta the nationalist had become Kenyatta the dictator and a neo-colonial comprador (Wright, 1978). To them, he was not the man who had inspired people to stand against colonialism. His post-independence dictatorial tendencies were discerned in his amendment of the constitution to fit his presidential desires and in his banning of Odinga’s KPU and detaining his critics in 1969.

Another way in which Kenyatta builds up his identity as a father of the nation, against the background of severe criticism against him, is by turning the tables on the opposition and portraying them as betrayers of *uhuru*. For example, in the speech “Kenyatta Day, 1967” (340-348), he literary insults the opposition. He tells his audience that whenever they see “a KPU man ... know that you have seen a snake hiding in the grass ... What do you do when you see a snake? [We kill it]” (343). In addition, he cautions: “KPU should beware! The fighting for our *Uhuru* is on. Whoever has ears to hear, let him heed this. We say we are ready to fight for our *Uhuru*.” (344). By character-assassinating members of the opposition, by issuing threats against them, and by implication against those of his audience who were inclined to side with them, Kenyatta believes he is clearing the ground for constructing his identity as the ideal nationalist leader – the father of the nation.

Another segment of audience Kenyatta had in mind as he prepared his speeches consisted of the former colonisers. The reason for this is that he most likely felt he was not done with them. The economic realities of independent Kenya created the need for Kenyatta to jumpstart the country's economy. According to him, this could only be solved through strengthening the ties between the local economy and that of the former colonisers. As it will be recalled, when Kenyatta went to London in 1931 to present a written petition to the British parliament he ended up enrolling in Woodbrooke Quaker College in Birmingham (Muigai, 2004: 190). Discouraged by the lack of official response to the land claims he was putting forward, he began an association with British communists, who published articles he wrote in their media outlets. After giving evidence before the Morris Carter Commission, he proceeded to Moscow to study Economics briefly at the Comintern School, KUTVU (University of the Toilers of the East) at the invitation of George Padmore, a radical West Indian. In 1934, Kenyatta enrolled at the University College London and from 1935 to 1938 studied social anthropology under Bronisław Malinowski at the London School of Economics (LSE). But it is noteworthy that, although Kenyatta associated himself at some points with communists, his "heart" was with the capitalistic Western tradition. In fact Mutiga (2014: 17) unwittingly acknowledges this when he argues that of all the people whom Kenyatta interacted with during the fifteen years he was attending the schools mentioned above, only Malinowski (a Westerner) impressed him. Mutiga (2014) contends that Kenyatta always "worked hard to sit at the table with Britons as an equal" (17). This shows that Kenyatta's disposition was always towards the West. His actions since independence were proof of this. So although Kenyatta wanted to be seen as deeply committed to his people, as their father, he could not extricate himself from his mental allegiance to Western capitalism, and particularly to the British.

In the "Independence Day, 1963" speech (209-211), this allegiance found an almost direct expression. Thus, he addressed the audience in English, a language belonging to the British, before he turned to Kiswahili. Osolo (1968), an eyewitness of this momentous occasion, notes that the Africans in these celebrations outnumbered both the Europeans and the Asians together by 100:1. Yet Kenyatta chose to open his remarks in a language foreign to his people. Besides giving preference to non-Africans, this act had the further implication that Kenyatta disparaged the local language and African culture.

It is noteworthy that the disproportionate use of English, during and after colonialism, in Kenya is an indication of the feeling among the elite that there is prestige in using that language (Gatheru, 2005; Gal, 1989: 353; Thomas, 2003; Anderson, 2006). The political elites favoured the development of English without due attention to Kenyan languages (Elkins, 2006; Fishman, 1991). English was perceived as an instrument of power. Fanon's (1967) treatise on language and power relations points to the fact that the subdued person aspires to master the language and culture of the conqueror. To achieve this, the oppressed person denigrates his own culture and historical experience and adopts the oppressor's perspective as his new point of reference (Fanon, 1967: 137). Within this convoluted logic, the oppressed person is contended when he "speaks like a white man". This logic evokes a powerful psychological dilemma. The oppressed has internalised the image of the oppressor as his only reference. This means that once the oppressor exits, the oppressed person looks around for someone to oppress in turn.

Kenyatta aspired to master English as a way of modelling himself within the frame of reference of the British colonialists. This kind of inferiority complex foisted on or subliminally assumed by him vis-à-vis the British found expression in the inordinate use of the English language on this historical occasion.

A further examination of the "Independence Day, 1963" speech shows another intriguing phenomenon, which reflects significantly on the allegations by Fanon (1967: 132-39), Mbato (1969: 12), and Turnbull (1962: 3) that Kenyatta was a neo-colonial comprador. For example, Kenyatta began his speech as follows: "Your Royal Highness, Your Excellency, distinguished guests and gentlemen..." (212-213). In the entire opening address, there is absolutely no indication that Kenyatta was concerned to elevate his sovereign people. Kenyatta was more bound by his desire to please his European audience than to reassure his own people about their future. The European audience would have wished Kenyatta to advance their capitalist interests in post-independent Kenya. They had in fact assisted and funded him to enable him to appeal to the Kenyan masses more strongly than KADU members. Kenyatta felt duty bound to advance their interests in return. It is this expectation on the part of the former colonisers, who constitute one of Kenyatta's audiences, that motivates Kenyatta to speak in a manner that would not disappoint and alienate them. As far as the construction of his identity is concerned, this leaning towards the former colonisers is counterproductive because it contradicts the identity of a father of the nation.

Kenyatta, however, cannot help it in this speech. But in other speeches he will work to “re-dedicate” himself to his people, re-ascertain his position – and his identity – as their father.

A further examination of the “Independence Day Speech, 1963” (212-217), unearths additional interesting phenomena. Kenyatta’s speech focused primarily on the Queen’s husband as though the latter was the primary political figure at the occasion. Thus, he was convinced that the first dignitary to address was the same colonial master who had adorned him with the Fanonian “white mask.” The Kiswahili version of the speech began:

We are grateful for the greetings from Her Majesty the Queen which the Duke of Edinburg has read to us today. We ask him – when he returns to Britain – to convey our greetings to the Queen: tell her that, although we have become independent, we shall remain her friends. (214)

Of course, in Kenyatta’s view, it is African culture to be polite to a guest, both friend and enemy (Kenyatta, 1938). For Kenyatta, it was equally significant to show that, in spite of the hardships Kenya had been subjected to by the British colonialists, Kenya had no intention to seek revenge. Still, the fact that Kenyatta’s focal point in both the English and the Kiswahili versions of his “Independence Day, 1963” speech were the Queen and her husband was objectionable to his critics (Osolo, 1968; Mbato, 1969). It is clear that Kenyatta wanted to show the European audience that he was not “a leader unto death” but a leader who was ready to forget the past injustices and that he was not a communist as the British government feared (as discussed in chapter two). The issue of communism becomes problematic for him later as the Kenyan audience were in favour of socialist ideals, and not the capitalist ideals upon which colonialism was founded. If the purpose of the Kenyan independence celebration was to mark the restoration of African sovereignty and dignity, Kenyatta’s preference for the former oppressor over his own people was problematic. So, although Kenyatta’s deliberate intention in the speech is to construct his identity as a father of the nation, of his African people, there is hollowness to this identity which he cannot always guard against.

As a result of his approach to land division and wealth acquisition, Kenyatta has been referred to as a capitalist who posed as a socialist (Ogot, 1996: 46). Socialism was a popular ideology in Africa because it emphasised the principle of members of the society contributing willingly and

without stint to the development of the nation (Mboya, 1963: 3). It was appealing because it discouraged personal accumulation of property at the expense of other members of the society (Odinga, 1967; Kaggia, 1975; Ogot, 1996). African socialism, which Kenyatta had argued his government would embrace, proposed that the nation's productive assets must be used in the interest of the society and its members. The sharp class divisions that once existed in Europe had no place in African socialism.

Since capitalism was an unpopular worldview in Africa, Kenyatta typically invoked the capitalist ideals with hatred, but his actions and overall rule was largely capitalistic. Kenyatta seems to have revised his ideological orientation after ascending to power and became a capitalist par excellence. It should be noted here that by the late 1950s Britain had seemingly concluded that an independent Kenya better served its long-term defence interests than a colony wracked by open rebellion and inter-ethnic conflict (Branch, 2011). By supporting Kenyatta, the British Government would be assured of a moderate government (as opposed to what it considered to be a more radical and Soviet-friendly Odinga government) (Osolo, 1968), that would facilitate Western interests. It is in this context that Kenyatta delivered his "Independence Day Speech, 1963" at Uhuru Park in Nairobi, in which, even as he works to construct his identity of father of the nation, he cannot avoid contradicting this identity by reaching out to the British to convince them that he is ready to enter into a new pact with them. True to his word, Kenyatta fully evolved into a capitalist whose leadership revolved around advancing British interests in East Africa (Osolo, 1968; Mbato, 1969; Ogot, 1996). The speech marked the end of colonial rule, but it did not mark the end of colonial influence. The speech declared independence, but it did not create a discursive space for the autonomy and self-determination of Kenya's populace. It also revealed the holes Kenyatta himself was punching in his identity of father of the nation, in spite of himself.

### **4.3 Freedom: Reassurance and Subtle Dismissal of Audiences**

Tanzania achieved independence in a spirit of heady expectancy. Nyerere's promises for the realisation of an all-round development were received with adoration, with the citizens holding firmly onto Nyerere's image of *Mwalimu* which he had earned in the early 1950s during the struggle for independence. The attainment of this hoped-for social and economic freedom for the people remained elusive and gradually hopelessness set in. To keep his image as *Mwalimu* alive, Nyerere composes speeches whose purpose is to reassure the nation about his keenness on

emancipating the nation through showing them the way to attain an all-round development. Nyerere's identity as *Mwalimu* is thus largely shaped by his determination to reassure Tanzanians that he would continue showing them the right direction towards self-determination and freedom. As argued in chapters two and three of this study, Nyerere considers the Tanzanian nation as a classroom and his citizens as his students. These citizens, according to Nyerere, knew very little and had to be set free by being taught new values.

But Nyerere was aware that not all Tanzanian citizens were obedient or pliable students. Some of his "students" had become critically minded. He had to isolate and focus on these as a special category. One such category were the Muslims.

Muslims accused Nyerere of being the most Islamophobic leader in post-colonial Africa (Abdullah, 2009: 1). Nyerere was a devout Catholic who carried his Bible everywhere he went, and eight years after his death, the Catholic Church in Tanzania arranged to beatify him as a saint (Abdullah, 2009: 3). There is also an accusation that, apart from his Christian orientation, his political party, TANU, was highly funded by Western Christian interests and that this was the reason why it pushed other (largely Muslim-led) political parties out of the way. Abdullah (2009: 2) also argues that Nyerere's image as *Mwalimu* was promoted in the 1950s and 1960s by Christian-dominated former colonial masters, such as Britain.

Muslims argued that Nyerere launched a concept of *ujamaa* that was based on Christian values, and which led to the relocation of at least 70 percent of Tanzania's Muslims into state-run villages, which were Islam-free secular zones. The argument is that the environment created by the state in the villages distanced Muslims from their history, tradition and culture because there were no mosques, adhans, madrassahs and proper burial grounds. Also, the Muslims argued that, in these *ujamaa* villages, the missionary-led secondary schools converted young people, including those born of Muslim parents, to Christianity. Muslims now felt that Nyerere was adding insult to injuries by his policies.

It, therefore, becomes necessary for Nyerere to take into consideration the hostility Muslims were beginning to feel towards him. He does this largely by allaying their fears of suppression, without actually addressing their concrete concerns. In this, he relies on his strategy of projecting his

identity as *Mwalimu*. Being a *Mwalimu*, one who is conversant with all matters, he expects the Muslims to trust him to take care of their interests in a knowing manner.

In the speech “President’s Inaugural Address” (176-188), Nyerere fervently reassures his Muslim audience that he understood what was ailing the nation – division along religious lines. He urges Muslims not to allow themselves to be pitted against Christians by enemies of development:

This sort of enmity could be stirred up by evil-minded people between Muslims and Christians; for, as we all know, the colonial government did not concern itself very much with African education and therefore the majority of those who managed to acquire any education did so in the mission schools, and therefore [are] mostly Christians. Here again, then, we have a division which by its very existence constitutes a potential threat to unity. (179)

Nyerere, in this quotation, poses as a leader who understands the pitfalls on the path of a young nation – one of them being division along religious lines. He subtly reassures Muslims that he is in control and will avoid these pitfalls.

This reassurance was given, in part, because Muslims accused Nyerere’s leadership of sidelining them in state jobs allocation. To back their claims they listed various incidents where Muslim leaders and institutions were left out by Nyerere, seriously compromising the progress of Muslims in Tanzania. Chief among them was the expulsion of Tanganyikan Muslims from the executive leadership of TANU (Mwakikagile, 2004). Also, the incarceration of Muslim political, religious and community figures at various times in Tanzania’s political history evidenced an uncomfortable relationship between Nyerere and Muslims. Thus, Nyerere’s aim in the above speech was to refute or preempt such criticisms. Rather than directly addressing them, he prefers to take cover in his identity as *Mwalimu*, the easier to dismiss them.

Similarly, Nyerere takes his audience on a historical journey to “explain” – and thus dismiss criticism – the predominance of Christians in various spheres of the economy and social life. He says: “Majority of educated Africans today are likely to be Christians. So those who would strike at our unity could equally well exploit this situation to stir up animosity between Religions” (179). This assertion is made to pacify the Muslim audience, which was blaming Nyerere for

marginalising them on the basis of their supposed lack of academic acumen. By posing as *Mwalimu*, who can offer an explanation for what Muslims have mistakenly seen as unfair, he both absolves himself of any blame and makes sure the status quo would remain.

But with all these placations and reassurances, an anti-Islam agenda can still be imputed to Nyerere. Bergen (1992: 45) argues that Nyerere established in TANU a department of political education in which he deliberately appointed a Christian minister, Reverend Mushendwa, to head it not because he was a strong politician but because of his Catholic faith. Also, while Nyerere was well aware of disparities between Muslims and Christians in areas of education, executive appointments and social organisations, he did very little to bring about structural transformation such that the disparities not only persisted but also forty years after independence continued to be explained as part of the country's historical legacy.

Jumbe (1994), the second President of Zanzibar, who fell out with Nyerere in 1984, strongly criticizes Nyerere's religious policies. He asserts that "Muslims were deliberately under-represented in education", and provides statistics to back up his assertion. He predicts that this "could be a source of future conflict between Muslims and Christians" (120).

The same argument is raised by Marisi (1995), who notes that an increasing number of Tanzanians are excluded from mainstream political and economic life, a section of which, i.e. Muslims, perceive its exclusion on the basis of its social and religious identity. The voicing of such concerns indicates continued vestiges of religious divisions even after over two decades of the rule of a regime propounding a people-centred socialist ideology. So, although Nyerere, in his speeches, aims to reassure the nation that he is the unerring *Mwalimu*, his actions demonstrate otherwise.

The second type of critics whom Nyerere had in mind when preparing his speeches were the academicians. This audience tended to support a move towards closer scrutiny of Nyerere's policies and deeds, possibly to better appreciate the complexity he represented as a political leader. This was born out of the feeling that although Nyerere was popular for his pan-Africanist vision, his imposition of the one-party system marked him as a benevolent dictator (Johnson, 2000: 3; Ergas, 1980: 1). The argument was that a leader who was one of the most vociferous supporters of the one-party state and who never accepted a free and popular plebiscite, could not pass the test of

a democrat. Abdullah (2009: 1) has portrayed him as one of the most dictatorial, autocratic and intolerant leaders of Africa.

According to Barber (2006: 21), Nyerere's dictatorship and shortcomings were ignored because of the romanticism that came with independence and the general illiteracy of the people. Nyerere was seen as a saviour and commanded a lot of respect from the citizens. The West, on the other hand, backed him because they entertained the notion that "liberated blacks were ... incorrigibly stupid and thus in need of firm control, not to mention a spot of detention, torture and arbitrary execution, by their own elite" (ibid.).

The academic critics accused Nyerere for what they saw as political intolerance on his part. Nyerere's *ujamaa* policy and practice exposed him as a socialist dictator who forced a system that never worked for the citizens of Tanzania. The imposition of *ujamaa* was merciless, and anyone who went against it was subjected to torture, murder or unwavering suffering until they gave up (Boesen et al., 1977; Freyhold, 1979; Ergas, 1980: 387-410).

Nyerere's speeches aim to undermine this view. He focuses on certain aspects of the accusations and attempts to reveal their supposedly fallacious nature. Here again the posture of a patiently explaining *Mwalimu* comes to his aid. In the speech "The Principles of Citizenship" (127-129), Nyerere pushes for a definition of the ideal Tanzanian citizen as someone living in Tanzania. He thus dismisses the view of those who argued that citizenship should be based on colour. His trump card in this is to accuse them of racism:

Discrimination against human beings because of their colour, is exactly what we have been fighting against. This is what we have formed TANU for. Some of my friends have forgotten it. Now they are preaching discrimination, colour discrimination as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. (128)

Nyerere here draws on his identity as *Mwalimu* – the one who can easily see where the student goes wrong. This approach obviates the necessity to engage his critics, to probe into their argument; it is enough to label their position as wrong. In writing and delivering this speech, Nyerere aims to defend his actions by emptying the criticism of them of any meaning. He

represents himself as a leader of unquestionable wisdom, a leader who knows what is best for his citizens.

Nyerere's academic critics also accused him of narcissism. To be narcissistic is to be a person who pursues self-gratification, with egoistic admiration of personal attributes, which are born of pride and arrogance (Campbell et al., 2000). Nyerere's egoistic tendencies might have been the result of the praise and admiration that was lavished on him nationally and internationally for a considerable period of time. He developed the conviction that he was always right, and therefore he never checked his deeds and thoughts against the opinions of others. His philosophies, as I have argued in chapters two and three of this study, were clear-cut and implemented without question. But the result of this was that his experiment with African socialism left Tanzania poorer and hungrier than when he came to power (Boesen et al., 1977).

In the speech "Pomposity" (223-226), Nyerere tries to counter the image of a narcissist by portraying himself as a "mere" *Mwalimu*, and a servant. He does this by ostensibly deconstructing the myth of the Presidency as a site of might. He mocks the reverence shown to him and his officials as "a disease ... sheer pomposity" (223). He points to such examples of the "disease" as when roads are cleared to allow him and his officials to pass without caring for the ordinary motorist. He rules that "this rude abruptness and sublime disregard for [the ordinary motorist's] convenience should stop!" (225). His aim here is to reassure his citizens that he is not obsessed with himself as his critics would have it, he is just like any ordinary citizen. He tries hard to assure his audience that his main preoccupation is the welfare of his citizens. But he is always playing a subtle balancing act: he is like, and unlike, his people, because his essential self as *Mwalimu* places him – in spite of himself – on a permanent pedestal in relation to them.

#### **4.4 Sowing: Museveni's Determination to Defend His Revolutionary Stature**

Uganda has had a turbulent political history. It is associated with a post-colonial legacy of extensive internal conflicts, a collapsed economy and a failed state (Cheru, 2002: 2). However, when Yoweri Museveni came to power, the citizens had the expectation that this legacy would be overcome. They expected their new leader to rebuild Uganda as a democratic state that respects human rights. However, as studies show, Museveni's leadership did not bring about the desired transformation (Kasfir, 2000: 3; Khadiagala, 1993: 240; McKinley, 1997). As a result,

dissatisfaction with his leadership emerged. The main focus of this dissatisfaction was the lack of democracy in Museveni's rule. It is noteworthy that Museveni's autobiography, *Sowing*, written ten years after his ascendancy to power, in many ways aims to refute the view that he was undemocratic. The autobiography's purpose is to portray him as a revolutionary saviour who instilled democracy in Uganda. Museveni is at pains to reclaim his earlier image of a revolutionary saviour. At the core of the book is the author's determination to show how his leadership differs from that of his predecessors, Amin and Obote. This is meant to answer back those in his audience, who had become critical of his leadership.

The book's title illuminates Museveni's desire to respond to his critical audience. "Sowing the Mustard Seed" basically denotes the beginning of democracy in Uganda. Museveni uses this parable, authenticating it with the parable of the sower, as recounted by Christ in the New Testament of the Bible, to show how he reconstructed a fractured state. The book is a detailed account of how Museveni was actively and physically involved in the actual liberation of the nation and of his eventual restructuring of a dilapidated country after he was sworn in as Uganda's President.

In *Sowing* Museveni revisits the promises he had made to the nation ten years back:

I explained to the nation that this change of government was a fundamental revolution and not a 'mere change of guard': our thinking was radically different from previous regimes which had been sectarian and neo-colonial, presiding over an economy which was not properly integrated. Secondly, I assured the nation that henceforth the people of Uganda would be in charge of their country's governance; and thirdly, I declared that the security of person and property was a basic right for citizens, and not a favour given by a regime. (172)

Museveni reminds the citizens of these promises to make it look obvious to his critics that he was a different breed of a leader. He had not governed and was not going to govern the nation the same way his predecessors had done. He was their saviour. However, as already argued in chapters two and three of this study, the country remains a hostage of its past history of hegemonic rule (Kasfir, 2000: 3). To claim democratic credentials, Museveni's regime has organised periodic elections

since 1990s (Khadiagala, 1993: 240). But the quality of these elections has remained a subject of debate, in terms of their processes and outcomes.

Museveni's critics have termed him a dictator whose tyranny rides on the legacies of his predecessor Amin and Obote. They have accused him of metamorphosing from a benevolent to a malevolent dictator, who has allowed pluralism nominally but has kept his grip on power through suppression, executions and use of the military to silence his would-be challengers (Khadiagala, 1993: 240). At the time of coming to power, Museveni appears to have already had the agenda to cling onto it as long as possible.

Museveni's critics have classified him as the most power hungry President in East Africa (Mamdani, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; McKinley, 1997). His love for power is not only shown by his violent removal of Obote but also by his (Museveni's) relentless effort to maintain it. He achieved supremacy through a military coup, promising, as already noted, "a fundamental change... a different [leadership] from previous regimes which had been sectarian and neo-colonial" and vowing "that the people of Uganda would be in charge of their country's governance" (172). But he has not delivered on this promise. His assertions in his autobiography are influenced by his awareness of the views of his critical audience. Thus, for Museveni the autobiography becomes a pretext to revisit the promises that his leadership was "to do away with the old colonial-style army which had been recruited along sectarian lines and manipulated by unscrupulous politicians and dictators" (174). These assertions are made to sound as re-dedications or as an immutable reality. They thus intent to reassure the audience that they are in safe hands – Museveni's hands.

As discussed in chapter two, there was considerable euphoria among commentators on African politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s about the arrival of what looked like a New Breed of African leaders. Optimism about the new wave of democratisation that was believed to have swept the continent and that witnessed the crumbling of several single-party states and military dictatorships abounded (Osaghae, 1999). Accounts written at the time show that observers believed a nirvana in African leadership had truly arrived. According to those accounts, whose themes continue in contemporary discourse on Africa, the New Breed had forever banished the archaic and exclusionary modes of governance, corruption and economic mismanagement, and the manifestly discriminatory and marginalising methods employed by leaders of the past. Onyango-

Oloka (1997: 2) contends that no leader exemplified the essence of this New Breedism better than Museveni. Museveni's aim in writing *Sowing* is to revive this image for the sake of his critical audience. He writes to keep his image as a New Breed of leader alive.

According to Museveni, politicians who could do nothing towards emancipating the citizens had hijacked Ugandan independence. In *Sowing*, he depicts himself as the Biblical David who struck down gerontocratic Goliath. Compared with the first generation leaders, he is young, dynamic, determined, development-minded, and progressive. He strives to give full substance to the image his audience harboured of him as one of the New Breed of African leaders. He presents himself as the saviour of a dilapidated country and wishes the Ugandan citizenry to understand him as such. According to him, the first generation of African leaders, out of their inefficiency and myopism, could not realise an all-round development, which the countries needed after independence.

The critique of Ugandan society and politics that emerges from Museveni's *Sowing* holds that Uganda became "backward" as a result of the underdevelopment created by the control of Africa by the first generation of Ugandan leaders (34-35). Rather than concentrating on development to achieve the substantive interests of the people, the post-independence politicians and military officers maintained power by exacerbating sectarian divisions on the basis of religion, region and ethnicity (36-43). The post-independence audience expected an end to these evils. This audience is, therefore, particularly alert to their possible re-emergence. Aware of this, Museveni's mantra in his autobiography is that he is different.

Museveni's creation of his identity as a democratic leader is shaped by the expectations of his entire Ugandan audience, who expected him to preside over a democratic government which does not practice sectarian politics. This audience had witnessed coups and counter coups; their country had undergone more than two decades of civil strife. As Byrnes (1992: 3) notes, after Museveni was sworn in as Uganda's President, the citizens were still trying to recover from more than two decades of instability and civil war. For the majority of the population born after Amin seized power in 1971, a peaceful and prosperous Uganda was difficult to imagine. Byrnes (1992) argues that many Ugandans saw promising signs of economic and political reform when Museveni came to power (1). Thus, this audience expected him to be different from his predecessors, and Museveni tries to persuade them that he is indeed different.

Museveni emerges from the pages of the book as a leader who had saved Uganda and pulled it out of the doldrums into which it had been plunged in the 1970s and 1980s by successive civilian and military dictatorships. This is evidenced by his zeal to accuse Obote and Amin of sectarianism and marginalisation: “Obote’s group did not want to recruit from the ‘wrong’ tribes who lived in that part of the country” (103).

Another segment of Museveni’s audience that influences him in the construction of his identity as a revolutionary saviour is the Western audience. This particular audience, as McKinley (1997: 3) argues, has accused Museveni of self-centredness. McKinley contends that much of Museveni’s action is born of selfish tendencies and personality. He has, on the basis of the Western critics’ views on Museveni, argued that Museveni behaves more like a territorial chief who can treat anyone going against him harshly (Khadiagala, 1993: 34). McKinley (1997: 3) contends that Museveni’s claim to be a democrat cannot stand. He is a self-preoccupied leader, who evokes the images of his predecessors whenever he speaks against dictatorship and about democracy in Africa. Against this background, Museveni has no choice but to confront this audience. He says:

Western democracies criticise our system of governance, but we ignore them. Their opinion is not our concern and they themselves are not perfect. They do not even research the Ugandan situation properly, but would just have their own system imposed on Uganda. I consider it arrogance. (195)

In this quotation Museveni dismisses his Western critics as both ignorant and arrogant. By telling his Western audience that he does not want to be told how to lead his people, Museveni appears arrogant but he levels the criticism of arrogance against them. Arguing that he understands the Ugandan situation, Museveni pits himself against the West, portraying himself as the perfect fit of a leader for Uganda, and at the same time leaves no room for criticism of his rule because the critics have been branded irrelevant.

The determination to dismiss the Western audience as non-consequential can also be discerned in Museveni’s stand on gay rights. Museveni has been accused of being a fundamentalist Christian (Mamdani, 2002). He has always insisted that gay relationships are against God’s will. He has instituted harsh anti-gay laws in Uganda that have criminalised homosexuality in the country. The

implication of this stand is that Western and Ugandan nature and morality are incompatible and the West should steer clear of Ugandan affairs.

Lastly, Museveni is at pains to placate the Marxist audience, who felt betrayed by his supposed departure from Marxist ideals (Onyango-Oloka, 1997: 12). In *Sowing*, Museveni recalls that he was a leader who believed that bad leadership had to be removed from power inevitably by force in line with Fanon's proposition in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1968). His Marxist audience needed a leader who would not sit back as the nation was being led astray by bad leadership. Museveni thus aims to portray to the Marxist audience the identity of a pragmatic leader, fervent protector of people's ideals, lives and country. Fanon described the colonialist system as a Manichean world built by the colonialist, where all that is white is good and all that is black is bad – and where the colonised has been rendered helpless to counter this non-sensical argument. Instead, to throw off the shackles of colonialism, Fanon argued, colonised peoples have no other choice but to meet the colonialists' physical and emotional acts of violence with a violence of the same magnitude, until "the last become first" (Fanon, 1968: 10). Fanon further believed that violent rebellion had the capacity to cure the ailments of oppression while unifying a people as a basis for a new nation (1968: 12). Museveni both adopts Fanon's ideas on violence, and takes them further. He thus postulates that not all violence is the same. His warfare was different from Obote's because, it was revolutionary in nature, a war for the common good of many, while Obote was pursuing narrow personal interests.

The above conceptualisation is meant to signify Museveni's continued belief in Marxist ideology. Marxism is a worldview and method of societal analysis that focuses on class relations and societal conflict, that uses a materialist interpretation of historical development, and a dialectical view of social transformation (O'Hara, 2003: 107). One pillar of Marxist ideology is a revolutionary view of social change (Lenin, 1967; Shlomo, 1968).

From his overall organisation of the liberation struggle and his use of violence as a means of liberation, as described by him, Museveni means to be seen as a Marxist. That is why, in Makerere, as he contends in *Sowing*, Marxist scholars' ideas, for instance, Walter Rodney's, thrilled him (23).

However, upon ascending to power, Museveni seems to have revised his ideological orientation from Marxism to capitalism. That is why Marxist scholars have accused him of betrayal. Rosenblum (2002: 195) argues that Western powers, and the international financial institutions, like the World Bank and the IMF, have given Museveni support because of his capitalist orientation (closing their eyes to his dictatorial rule, which other, more critically minded in the West, criticise). Museveni has seen significantly increased aid-flows to Uganda, accompanied by much praise for his economic management skills. In particular, Rosenblum (2002) argues, Uganda's adoption of free-market reforms encompassing economic liberalisation, privatisation, and the reform of public enterprise, has earned accolades from many in the West. Long favoured by Western powers, Museveni thus gets away with actions that would not be tolerated were they to be committed by a Marxist (Onyango-Oloka, 1997: 2). This shows that Museveni practically is a capitalist. But in *Sowing* he brings out only his Marxist past with the aim of basking in its glory and reassuring his former Marxist friends that he had not diverted from Marxism. Museveni's autobiography therefore is partly meant to mend the bridges connecting him to his Marxist audience.

In Museveni's view the first-generation leaders could not control the army, they polarised their states along tribal lines, and even tribal chieftains infiltrated the army itself: "The main political problem in Uganda at that time, therefore, was the army, which effectively prevented the country from attaining democracy" (40). These leaders surrounded themselves with advisers who commonly misled them. According to Museveni, these advisers were chosen from particular tribes, which were allied to the President, and they could do nothing except flattering him: "[They] were busily flattering him at the Uganda club singing *tukutendereza* to him" (praises) (48). These assertions are full of revolutionary nuances. The aim is to sound as Marxist as possible to appeal to his Marxist critics. He aims to show them that he has not changed.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

In this chapter, it has been argued that, in their writings, the nationalist leaders – Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni – as they construct their desired identities, take into consideration the entire spectrum of the audiences that they are addressing directly, or that are likely to become recipients of their texts. In these texts, they frame their pronouncements in such a way as to respond to these audiences: either to re-affirm or revive the audiences' positive view of them, or to undermine the

views of those who have taken a critical stance with respect to them. Kenyatta's speeches in *Suffering* portray him as the father of the Kenyan "family"/ nation by appealing to the nationalist aspirations of his people, dismissing, counter-accusing and character assassinating his opponents, and placating the former coloniser. Nyerere aims to maintain his identity as *Mwalimu* through his reassurances of his faithful people and subtle dismissal of his critics. Museveni's *Sowing* is a determined effort to defend his revolutionary stature, which he had earned during his struggle for the liberation of Uganda. As he tries to consolidate his identity as a revolutionary saviour, he both rekindles the enthusiasm of the masses by demonstrating a re-dedication to his promises in their favour, and discards the views of his critics by portraying them as variously irrelevant. The "dialogue" with audience thus becomes crucial in the authors' construction of their identities.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusion

This study was propelled, to begin with, by one broad, seemingly extra-literary, intellectual impulse, i.e. to account – in yet another way, besides ways that have already been offered – for the stubborn reality of largely unfulfilled aspirations of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa, and East Africa in particular; to explain from a possible new perspective East Africa's deficient post-independence. I considered that unravelling the minds of key nationalist leaders of the region may well offer insights into that in-between space of hope and despair in which people continue to find themselves a lifetime after official independence. This supposition was based on the understanding that it is these minds that spearheaded the process of nation-building in the three states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. But thus motivated, the idea of the study soon gravitated towards the literary. It is in the realm of the literary, that is, in the writings that the leaders have produced, that one is bound to find a reflection of the workings of their minds. Among such writings, it is especially in speeches and autobiographies that one encounters, as part of the mental process at work, an attempt on the part of these authors cum leaders to construct their identities, that is, an attempt on their part to reveal certain images of themselves to readers/ listeners in a deliberate manner. This is how, in the end, this study concerned itself with the representation by East African nationalist leaders of their identities in their writings. It focused on Jomo Kenyatta's *Suffering Without Bitterness*, Julius Nyerere's *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja*, and Yoweri Museveni's *Sowing the Mustard Seed*.

By examining the three texts, and setting them against the background of the leaders' performance, ideological disposition, stands taken, and decisions made, as documented and commented upon in various sources, the study was able to conclude that identity representation for the three leaders became a complex process of projecting selves that were at marked variance with their true inner core. A dichotomy was created between the leaders' desires of how they wanted to be perceived by the masses – a desire based on an abstract notion of an ideal leader – and the deviations from this ideal that they gradually became, shaped by personal ambitions for power before all else. This was a dichotomy the leaders never tried to overcome; instead they focused their energy and attention on concealing their ambition-deformed personalities behind the masks of the positive self-identities

they constructed. In the resultant hide-and-see game with their peoples, the opportunity for genuine leadership and genuine service to nation-building was lost.

In the preceding chapters of the study, it has been argued that *Suffering, Freedom* and *Sowing* are texts involved in constructing the identities of Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni; and that in the context of the problematic unfolding of the nationalist project they serve to mask negative aspects of their personalities. There is a clear determination by the writers to persuasively project the desired identities – that of the father of the nation (Kenyatta), *Mwalimu* (Nyerere) and revolutionary saviour (Museveni). The texts present discursive contradictions between their authors' leadership as theorised and actualised by them, thus constructing identities that are strategically engineered to aid these leaders safeguard interests they have developed with respect to their paramount political positions and power.

The theme of nation-building permeates the three texts. One common way in which the three leaders want to be seen is as champions of this cause of nation-building. Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni in *Suffering, Freedom* and *Sowing* respectively, contend that when they assumed power, there was need to mould a unified nation out of the multiplicities of ethnicities, races and religions that formed their nations. Mkandawire (2005) reminds us that this call for unity was perceived as a homogenising discourse that would fulfil valuable unifying functions, but that it did not take full cognizance of the diverse composition of most African nations (20). It tended to ride roughshod over other social identities such as class, gender and ethnicity. The resulting blind spot with respect to each of these has had an enormous impact on nation-building and development, in most cases leading to fatal errors and social injustices. Kenyatta and Nyerere repeatedly stated that ethnic identities and social pluralism were barriers to development. If they could bedazzle those mired in their tribal world views with a more nationalist outlook, development would begin. The leaders could use their charisma to symbolise the new nations. Their writings, it has been argued in the foregoing chapters, construct identities whose primary objective was to replace the retrograde and anti-developmental myths of the tribe. They create images of themselves as tribeless figures who aspire to be understood as unifiers. But Kenyatta himself, as evidence shows, had put Kikuyu ethno-nationalism before Kenyan nationalism, and Nyerere's nationalism was compromised in other ways so that oneness of the nation was still not achieved.

The identities of a father of the nation (Kenyatta) and *Mwalimu* (Nyerere) are of necessity multifaceted. To portray himself as the father of the Kenyan nation, Kenyatta poses as a unifier, a patriot and a strong protector of people's interests. The same urge to be understood as a unifier is seen in *Freedom*, where Nyerere projects it as an attribute to a *Mwalimu*. This was, of course, necessitated by the travails of tribalism, ethnicity, religious bigotry and other divisive social ills. There was largely a lack of a sense of unity when the ethnic/ religious calculus was employed in the use of national assets and opportunities, and those not included opted for sectional identification as a source of strength and safety. These leaders were unable to transcend some of the divisive tendencies themselves. They thus had to put on a garment of a leader who aspired for unification and one who hated tribalism, disunity and other divisive policies. *Suffering* and *Freedom* are thus an effort to ward off accusations of divisiveness on tribal or religious grounds which were being made by discerning observers.

A close examination of the speeches delivered by Kenyatta and Nyerere in relation to the prevailing circumstances has revealed that they were part of the leaders' strategy to disguise their actual qualities and intentions. The study has argued that Kenyatta constructs an identity of the father of the nation, to suppress the visibility of his capitalist disposition, despotic and oligarchic tendencies and to present himself as a nationalist leader whose primary interest was in the advancement of the interests of the people in general. He uses the book to obscure core aspects of his personality and thus retain power.

Nyerere sees himself as *Mwalimu*, one who has the whole Tanzanian nation as his disciples. Although he was hailed as a wise and gentle leader, gradually he became imposing, willing the citizens and party leaders to understand the issue in the post-independent state from his own perspective. He found it difficult to accept contrary opinion. He came up with the concept of *ujamaa* which was largely tyrannical. In *Freedom*, he portrays himself as a liberator, seemingly challenging the imperial narrative with the intention of liberating the mind of Tanzanians from the shackles of colonialism and social evils, such as poverty, disease and ignorance. These formulations, however, as it has been argued in chapter two of this study, sound as axioms, they do not open up possibilities for interrogation and preclude thought.

Kenyatta's *Suffering* and Nyerere's *Freedom* serve the purpose of calculated self-explication, clarification, and justification. They enable the leaders to subvert critical assessments of them and at the same time present fictitious reasons as to why East African countries could not quickly realise an all-round development.

It may have been expected that Museveni's *Sowing* would be different from Kenyatta's *Suffering* and Nyerere's *Freedom*, but as the study has established, Museveni uses his autobiography to construct the identity of a revolutionary saviour whose actions redeemed Ugandans. Although he came to power in what Mkandawire (2005) calls "the era of adjustment" in Africa, which was said to be free from the burden of nationalism which had blamed everything on colonialism, the study has found that the premise in *Sowing* is the same as in *Suffering* and *Freedom* – to undermine perceptions of Museveni as a leader who has practised sectarian politics and has not been concerned with the welfare of the masses.

In *Sowing* Museveni criticises the first crop of African leaders, who dwelt on sectarian politics and pampering their egos instead of helping their states fight poverty, disease and ignorance. Museveni is convinced that African states were misled by their post-colonial leaders because they "completely failed to address the real African crisis or find solutions to the continent's problems" (140). He, thus, presents himself as a peasant and as such, as someone who knows, through experience, that the peasants are stuck in poverty, living from hand to mouth. Museveni stands out in the autobiography as a leader who offers solutions to the problems he has identified, i.e. a dynamic and a pragmatic leader. His projection of these aspects of his identity implies an inherent ability to deliver the people from the bondage of underdevelopment. To create the impression that he is different from the first generation of leaders, he represents himself as an intellectually predisposed leader but who is also a man of action when he outlines the faults within the state and the measures he had taken to correct them. He postulates that one of the things that prevented the first generation leaders from realising all-round development was sectarianism, presenting himself as a leader with sharp intellectual capability, and yet not a rigid ideologue.

Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni have produced texts that are distinctly literary. In other words, the manner in which these writings have been written is integral to the construction of the authors' desired identities. The study posits that the literary strategies used aid the leaders to create what

Gusdorf (1980) calls a “metaphor of self” that will cause people to think of them as worthy of trust. The formal structures of these writings, the connotations of the vocabulary, the choice of incidents to be emphasised all speak symbolically to create images that portray these personalities as true nationalist leaders who are concerned about the welfare of their citizens.

The study has identified and discussed how Kenyatta utilises myth as a powerful literary strategy to dazzle the reader, to make him/her stand in owe of him. The expected effect of this is for Kenyatta to conceal the negative aspects of his leadership. Kenyatta’s use of myth is significant in his construction of the identity of the father of the nation because of the inherent power of myth to captivate the imagination of the masses. The mythologisation of his figure thus served as a strategy for Kenyatta to assume and maintain power. The publication of *Suffering* was an effort to revive a mythical image that would offer a fresh appeal to the citizens. This myth is enhanced through Biblical allusions, which Kenyatta uses to urge Kenyans to work hard because “manna” cannot fall from Heaven, in the process suggesting that one need not look for solutions elsewhere, nor imagine that there is any obstacle outside the people themselves which stands on the way to Kenya’s progress. Kenyatta metaphorises the Kenyan nation as a productive mother who should be protected from aggression. He also uses the metaphor of a sufferer to appeal to his readers, legitimising his rule and making any opposition to it be seen as anomalous. This metaphor of a sufferer is part of a paradox since Kenyatta seems to thrive in suffering.

Nyerere, in a bid to be understood as *Mwalimu*, makes use of repetition in his call for unity and in his urge to Tanzanians to fight poverty, disease and ignorance. He uses personification to portray the ugliness of poverty, disease and ignorance. By personifying these, Nyerere strives to persuade his people to hate corruption and those who practise it. By use of these strategies, Nyerere aims to portray attributes of a good teacher. Another strategy Nyerere uses in his speeches to portray himself as a *Mwalimu* is historical allusion. The writer aims to be understood as a knowledgeable teacher by alluding to historical figures like Abraham Lincoln. Figurative language is also used to construct Nyerere’s identity as *Mwalimu* which creates a special effect often by making comparisons. Nyerere coins terminologies and phrases that evoke some appealing images of a knowledgeable, unifying and liberating leader in the mind of Tanzanians.

To construct the identity of a revolutionary saviour, Museveni utilises Biblical parables and imageries that create mental pictures whereby the readers are meant to view him as the sower who sows the seed of democracy in Uganda, and hence liken him to Jesus Christ. He compares the Ugandan state to a cow which had to be protected from bad herdship. The study has argued that it is this line of thought that Museveni followed to turn Uganda into something akin to his personal property, controlling every sphere of the state just the way the owner of cattle will take care of his herd.

As argued in the foregoing chapters, in their writings, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni, as they construct their desired identities, take into consideration the entire spectrum of the audiences that they are addressing directly, or that are likely to become recipients of their texts. In these texts, they frame their pronouncements in such a way as to respond to these audiences: either to re-affirm or revive the audiences' positive view of them, or to undermine the views of those who have taken a critical stance with respect to them. Kenyatta's speeches in *Suffering* portray him as the father of the Kenyan "family"/ nation by appealing to the nationalist aspirations of his people, dismissing, counter-accusing and character assassinating his opponents, who saw him as entrenching ethnicity in Kenya given that he favoured his tribesmen, especially on the issue of land distribution (Muigai, 2004: 190; Ogot, 1996: 56). In other words, as he constructs his identity as the father of the Kenyan nation, one who wants to see his "family"/ nation united, Kenyatta is driven not only by an abstract ideal of a nationalist leader, whose embodiment he wants to be seen to be, but also by his awareness that part of his audience – whether physically present during the deliverance of his speeches or not – is accusing him of dividing the nation on ethnic basis. He also uses his speeches to please and reassure the former coloniser, through his call to "forgive and forget".

Nyerere aims to maintain his identity as *Mwalimu* through his reassurances of his followers and subtle dismissal of his critics. In producing *Freedom*, he was aware that not all Tanzanian citizens were obedient or pliable students. Some of his "students" had become critically minded. He had to isolate and focus on these as a special category to retain his acquired identity of *Mwalimu*.

Museveni's *Sowing* is a determined effort to defend his revolutionary stature, which he had earned during his struggle for the liberation of Uganda. As he tries to consolidate his identity as a revolutionary saviour, he both rekindles the enthusiasm of the masses by demonstrating a re-

dedication of his promises in their favour, and discards the views of his critics by portraying them as variously irrelevant. The “dialogue” with audience thus becomes crucial in the authors’ construction of their identities.

All in all, using the potential of literary production to the full, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Museveni created texts meant to serve their self-centred purposes, even as on the surface they address topical issues, raise relevant concerns, and provide sound caution. In their hands, literature becomes “fiction” in a most unfortunate sense of the term, i.e. a departure from reality in order to conceal one’s actual being in that reality, so as to continue with that profitable way of being and to obviate the need to account for it.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

While this study has interrogated how East African nationalist leaders use their writings, especially speeches and autobiographies, as sites for the representation of their identities, a significant new dimension of the current research would be to undertake an investigation of the biographies of these same leaders. There are a number of them, and new ones continue coming out. The focus of that prospective study would still be identity representation, but this time representation/construction by someone outside the self. Such a study would offer an interesting comparative perspective on the nationalist leaders and lead to a more comprehensive understanding of them. It would also expand – in terms of emphasis and nuance – our understanding of identity representation in literature.

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