INFLUENCE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS ON CRIME PREVENTION IN JUBA CITY, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN

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DECLARATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Declaration

This thesis is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for examination of any degree in any institution or university.

Signature……   Date: **24/7/2023.**

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Recommendation

This research thesis has been submitted for examination with our recommendations as university supervisors.

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DEDICATION

To my family members, friends and colleagues and to my children, may this work be an inspiration for you to reach greater heights in academics.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

The Republic of South Sudan has been facing various security challenges since its independence, including high levels of crime and violence in urban areas. In response, the government has implemented security sector reforms aimed at improving the country's security situation. However, it is unclear to what extent these reforms have influenced crime prevention in Juba City, the country's capital. Hence, the purpose of the study was to examine the influence of security sector reform on crime prevention in Juba City, South Sudan. Specifically, the study sought to achieve the following objectives; to establish perceptions of the Security Sector Reform Actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan; to assess the influence of Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions on prevention of crime, to determine the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime and to establish and the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence in crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. This study was grounded on three theories; legitimacy chain, three dimensions of governance, and control theories. The study used descriptive survey research design and Simple random sampling method in selecting respondents for the study. Key informants were selected by purposeful sampling. Questionnaires and interview schedules were used as the major data collection instruments. This study comprised of 162 main respondents and 20 Key informants respectively. The main method of data collection was the questionnaire. Key informant guides were used to collect data from K.I using interview method. The descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analysis quantitative data. The inferential statistics included correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis for objective 2 to 4. The findings were done in tables, charts and histograms. Qualitative data from the interview guide was analysed by content analysis and presented as verbatim reports and narratives. The major findings are, the study established a correlation between; functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan as a result of overlapping mandates and duplicity of roles with regard to security forces operations in Juba City-South Sudan. Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, and also donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study concluded that there are various obstacles facing Security sector reforms that significantly influences crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should ensure that the existing SSR policies and legal provisions are effectively enforced.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMDISS	-	Association for Media Development in South Sudan
CPA	-	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	-	Community Security and Arms Control
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
DDR	-	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	-	Department for International Development
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
GoSS	-	Government of South Sudan
NGOs	-	Non-Governmental Organizations
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
R-TGNU	-	Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity
SSPDF	-	Sudan Sudan Peoples Defence Force
SSLA	-	South Sudan Liberation Army
SSNPS	-	South Sudan National Police Service
SSR	-	Security Sector Reform
ToT	-	Training of Trainers
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNMIS	-	United Nations Missions in Sudan
UNPOL	-	United Nations Police
USA	-	United States of America

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal on the enhancement of effective accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law (UN, 2008). The goal is for the security system to be managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, which contributes to a well-functioning security framework thereby reducing crime. Security Sector Reform is considered as the fundamental base in establishing conditions necessary for sustainable peace and development in post conflict and fragile countries. It is also intended for rebuilding a security system that fails to protect citizens and their properties from crime and defending the state in general (Andy, 2008).

Security Sector Reform is of concern to different actors at the local, regional and international levels. It is an integral part of development cooperation approach used by donors dealing with fragile countries or those emerging from violent conflict to avoid relapse into violence and an increase in crimes (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). SSR is well reflected in circumstances where a successful broader Disarmament, targeted Demobilisation and non-discriminative Re-integration (DDR) programme has been implemented. Optimism on DDR does in its self depends on associated interventions in the form of international arms control effort and embargoes, selective amnesties combined with smart sanctions (Muggah, 2010). DDR programs gained its prominence in its established three stages process as drawn from the UN Secretary-General's definitions, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, pertaining conflicts in Africa, particularly civil wars, which usually result in the recruitment of large numbers of soldiers and irregular rebel militia. Security sector reforms have been established to be a significant component in efforts towards preventing crime across the globe. There is evidence to suggest that SSR can also contribute to crime prevention by

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improving the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, promoting better coordination between different security institutions, and enhancing public trust and confidence in the security sector (Conteh-Morgan & Dunn, 2013).

In Brazil, Security sector reform has been an ongoing process since the country's return to democracy in the 1980s. The security sector in Brazil includes a range of actors, such as the police, military, and intelligence agencies. In recent years, there have been a number of initiatives aimed at reforming the security sector in Brazil (Almeida, 2019). In 2012, Brazil passed a law creating the National Public Security System, which includes civilian oversight of the police and other security forces. This law established a national council to oversee public security policies and created a system for monitoring and evaluating police actions (Garcia, 2014). Many Brazilian cities have implemented community policing programs, which aim to build trust between police officers and the communities they serve. These programs involve police officers working closely with local residents to identify and address public safety concerns (Almeida, 2019). Moreover, France has undergone significant security sector reforms in recent years, particularly in response to a wave of terrorist attacks that began in 2015. The French government has increased funding and resources for its police and intelligence agencies, such as the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) and the Directorate-General of External Security (DGSE), in order to improve their ability to detect and prevent terrorist attacks (Besancenot, 2012).

In Africa, there have been numerous efforts to implement SSR, with varying degrees of success. In Nigeria, the security sector has been a topic of discussion and concern for many years due to issues such as corruption, inadequate funding, and insufficient training of security personnel. In 2019, the Nigerian government established the Nigerian Police Trust Fund to provide funding for the training and retraining of police officers, procurement of equipment, and infrastructure development for the police force (Aluko, 2015). South Africa has undergone significant security sector reforms since the end of apartheid in 1994. South Africa has also introduced legislation to promote accountability and transparency in the security sector. The Promotion of Access to Information Act and the Protection of Personal

Information Act are aimed at ensuring that the public has access to information about the activities of the security forces and that citizens' privacy is protected (Clarke, 2014).

The moment a conflict comes to an end, either through a peaceful settlement or as a result of military takeover, the war-torn country will always need to address the issue of surplus troops who may be discharged from military and rebel forces, which, for security purposes, are being disbanded. Since "ex-combatants have a potent ability to 'spoil' the peace process and undermine progress towards security and development, it is largely accepted that they need special attention" (Andy, 2008). According to the United Nations Rule of Law, Member States should fundamentally recognize the importance of strengthening justice and security institutions that are accessible and responsive to the needs and rights of all individuals and which build trust and promote social cohesion and economic prosperity. According to Faundez and Janse (2012), security sector reform (SSR) aims at improving safety through enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law.

Conflicts in Africa have also included the proliferation of lethal weapons, mostly small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Nte, 2011). This problem has become more acute and less controllable since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The manufacture and trade in small arms are lucrative businesses mostly controlled by mercenaries and private companies. According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) of South Africa, Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000 fatalities in the past 50 years due mostly to SALW. Estimates of the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation range from 100 to 500 million, with 50 to 80 million being AK-47 assault rifles (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). An increasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammunition either through indigenous or licensed production. Most of the weapons have found their way into the various conflict zones in Africa. A considerable amount has been traded through black market channels and through a growing network of semi-official and secret conduits. Having a large number of ex-combatants who are still in possession of

weapons can poses a threat to the security of a state and its civilian population (Andy, 2008).

Therefore, DDR programs are generally put in place to dispel threats to the security of a post-conflict society and a particular region by helping ex-combatants disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into communities of their choice (Andy, 2008). DDR programs should ultimately provide ex-combatants with the kind of skills necessary for them to become productive members in a peaceful society. DDR programs, combined with security sector reform (SSR), are designed, ideally, to forestall any return to violence. To this end, they consist of three principal components, or a three-stage process that involves weapon surrender, discharge of active combatants, and the reintegration of ex-combatants into their society (Andy, 2008).

The objective of the DDR process, according to UN's DDR Resource Centre, is "to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin (Aliff, 2014)." This entire process, connected to broader national recovery, is a multifaceted approach, "with political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions." One of the other major aims of DDR is to address the post-conflict security problems that arise when the excess of ex-combatants who are left without livelihoods or support networks during the transition from conflict to peace. By discharging combatants of weapons and by taking these individuals out of their military structures and routines, the DDR process can then facilitate integration of the ex-combatants into society and help them become active participants in the peace process. Paramilitaries usually find it easy to engage or resort to organized crime as a means of financing their operations, (Resptrepo & Muggah, 2009).

Like in Colombia where over 40,000 ex-combatants with hugs interest in narco-trafficking business presented a significant challenge to DDR policy, South Sudan is not exceptional in this case (Rabasa et al., 2017). Few paramilitary groups are already involved in illegal logging. It is therefore imperative that a specific policy that address specific group interest

must be in cooperated to make any DDR activity palatable and sustainable. In most cases, crime in a post conflict society comes as a result of surplus militia and other ex-combatants that didn't merge with a new national military force as part of security sector reform during the reintegration phase of DDR which has always been the case in South Sudan with others holding out after every circle of peace process. This is a critical factor in successful post-conflict peace building since no peace can be assured unless order is maintained, and, often, the best method of ensuring order may be to have a unified national army (Jacob, 2016).

According to Knight (2010), in any event, reintegration is sustained when indigenous capacity is enhanced, when ex-combatants and other war-affected individuals become productive members of their communities, and when post-conflict societies begin to learn how to address conflicts in nonviolent ways. This research will explore unique opportunities available for carrying out DDR process in post conflict South Sudan. Children especially in time of war are particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment when the objectives of war do not attract volunteers. They are trained to kill, disrupt peace and development in their countries and emerge as socially damaged and uneducated pariahs (Balttman & Annan, 2009). These groups inevitably acquire criminality to compensate for their loss by committing all manner of offenses in total violation of penal code provisions. In Liberia, rehabilitation component was introduced into the conventional DDR composition mandated by the Accra Peace Accord to become DDRR (Pugel, 2009).

According to Ansorg and Gordon (2019), the peace negotiators introduced this component in order to enhance SSR by targeting psychological wellbeing of those ex-combatants so that their integration back into the very society they have offended is measured and quantified. In Northern Uganda, stakeholders were faced with unique circumstances when the policy of DDR was rolled out in mid 2000s. They had to focus on reception, return of children and youth escaping from abduction, most of which were under the age of 18. Cantonment sites were largely avoided by ex-combatants, choosing to go directly to their villages instead without the knowledge of authorities involved (Balttman & Annan, 2009). DDR is a multilateral undertaking whereby all parties must principally consent and must

voluntarily accept terms and conditions therein. South Sudan is currently implementing R-TGNU which has a component of DDR that is supposed to persuade combatants from more than 10 different armed groups. Therefore, this research will help in the definition of suitable model of DDR in South Sudan for successful SSR, hence positively influencing security situation in Juba city (Balttman & Annan, 2009).

Crimes affect individuals at a personal level and also victimize large segments of society and create a climate of fear and insecurity. This impairs the quality of human life, impedes harmonious development and disrupts public peace and tranquillity (Anwar & Khan, 2015). In South Sudan, urban areas were particularly affected by crime and insecurity, for example, the 'Nigger' gangs were a serious problem in Juba (Rolandsen, 2009). Hence, SSR is placed at the centre-stage to legitimatize the state, create an open society and control crime (Schroeder, 2010). Security Sector Reform emerged as a priority in the late 1990s from international development dialogue for application in the international aid and security assistance arenas. It was not until 2007 that a systematic methodology was codified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and since then, major international donors like the UK, UN and US have applied this approach to development policy and strategies including crime prevention across Africa with mixed results (Mclean, 2018).

Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war can be a challenge as has been witnessed in South Sudan. Juba city, the capital of South Sudan continues to face a number of criminal cases of different nature from the prevalence and proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the hands of the civilians has compounded the insecurity situation to Juba city dwellers (Mlambo et al., 2019). The efforts to tackle or prevent crimes are still at the infancy stage. Security enforcement institutions and its structures in the country are weak and the protracted civil violence has contributed to marauding criminal activities which has contributed to killing, loss of property leading to insecurity to city dwellers. A successful Security Sector Reform positively contributes to crime prevention by improving the ability of security agents of States in enhancing coordination and professionalism. In

as much as there is no reliable, official statistics on crime in South Sudan, violent crime in form of murder, armed robbery, home invasion, cattle raiding, kidnapping, and harassment is rampant In Juba, the most frequently reported violent crimes include armed robbery, home invasion and carjacking (Annang, 2021).

South Sudan emerged from over 50 years of continuous civil war between its own warring movements in the South and the Khartoum government which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and independence in 2011 (Turyamureeba, 2014). At the time of independence, South Sudan had almost no civic infrastructure, few functional governing institutions and a persistent state of humanitarian crisis. The war had destroyed institutions, infrastructure, and livelihoods and destabilized the social fabric of society. It created cycles of poverty, violence, social and political exclusion in the absence of state institutions that could not guarantee justice, law and order leading to little or no administrative capacity (Turyamureeba, 2014). The country started building its institutions within a fragile post-conflict environment that is characterised by unresolved ethnic tensions, abuse of power, and military involvement in politics. Efforts were made to empower both the local and central governments to manage the recovery efforts and efficiently manage the reconstruction process including prevention of crime through SSR (Breitung et al., 2016).

Institutional weaknesses and deep-rooted governance concerns at different levels of government were blamed for insecurity and lawlessness experienced in some parts of South Sudan since December 2013. The power struggle within the SPLM over leadership further led to insecurity in the Capital City, Juba and increased hostilities in Juba and its environs leading to widespread brutalities and crime against civilians (Johnson, 2016). This was attributed to the inability to reconcile ethnic divisions within the military structure and lack of a politically impartial armed force (Johnson, 2016). SSR was intended to build an effective accountable security for the State and citizens in order to achieve sustainable peace, development and reduce crime. SSR in South Sudan had mostly targeted the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and to an extent, SSNPS comprising of wildlife and

prisons services and the fire brigade. SSR interventions increased the accountability and democratic control over the armed forces and increased its operational efficacy that extended to prevention of crime (Breitung et al., 2016).

The first component of SSR included developing a national security policy and legislation covering the armed forces. This included training on human rights, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society, building the capacity of the military justice system and increasing transparency over military expenditure. The other component was 'train and equip' or 'enhance and enable' programs. The programs were aimed at strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA to fight a foreign enemy (Breitung et al., 2016). As the SPLA was not sufficiently internally streamlined and reconciled, it made SSR and control of crime an incredibly difficult undertaking from the start. Past attempts at SSR's role in crime prevention in South Sudan have made no significant contribution to reforming the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and were unable to sustainably change South Sudan's security situation (Breitung et al., 2016). The South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) has been primarily stationed in urban areas with limited reach beyond country headquarters. Local security has been the mandate of SSNPS but due to lack of capacity and political backing, SSNPS has left most security challenges outside major towns to SPLA (Verjee, 2017). A steady increase in crime in population centres, both in frequency and in sophistication, adds to the complexity of the SSNPS task (Verjee, 2017). The situation points to the need of improving existing and developing new approaches in implementation of SSR in order to prevent crime in South Sudan.

Literature have shown that there is a link between security sector reforms and crime prevention. For instance, O'Reilly and Perez (2013) studied security sector reforms in Honduras and found that the reform process helped to improve access to justice, reduce corruption, and strengthen the rule of law. These reforms helped to create an environment that was more conducive to economic growth and development, which in turn reduced the incentives for criminal activity. Wood and Dupont (2016) on SSR in Liberia found that the reform process led to improved community policing, which helped to build trust and

cooperation between the police and the local population. The authors suggest that this trust-building process helped to reduce crime rates in the country, as citizens were more willing to report crimes and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Conteh-Morgan and Dunn (2013) found that the reform process resulted in significant improvements in the capacity of the police to investigate and prosecute crimes. Increased professionalism and accountability of the police, combined with the improved coordination between different security agencies, played a crucial role in reducing crime rates in the country. However, these studies were conducted outside South Sudan and hence could not be generalized to cover the case of South Sudan.

Further, despite the growing interest in Security Sector Reforms and crime prevention, there are several research gaps in this area. First, there is a need for more empirical research on the impact of security sector reforms on crime prevention. While there have been some studies that have examined the relationship between security sector reforms and crime prevention, the evidence base is still relatively limited. For instance, Muggah and De Boer (2019) looked at security sector reform and citizen security but failed to establish how security sector reforms affects crime prevention. Moreover, Portada et al. (2014) looked at security sector reform in South Sudan but failed to link the SSR to crime prevention in South Sudan. Hence, this study sought to bridge these gaps by looking at how security sector reforms affect crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Republic of South Sudan has been facing various security challenges since its independence, including high levels of crime and violence in urban areas. In response, the government has implemented security sector reforms aimed at improving the country's security situation. It is an undisputable fact that successful SSR remains the most reliable catalyst of crime prevention in a post-conflict environment as is the case of the Republic of South Sudan. SSR as a strategy it meant to conveniently helps in mitigating the relapse to insecurity and violent conflict. However, it is unclear to what extent these reforms have influenced crime prevention in Juba City, the country's capital. This is because despite the

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implementation of security sector reforms in the Republic of South Sudan, there is a continued high rate of crime in Juba City. The city has been plagued by various forms of crime, including armed robbery, carjacking, burglary, and theft. The country has a huge manpower in terms of numbers and structures within the security agencies namely SSNPS, NSS and SSPDF, among others. These agencies may be used to curb the rising pattern of criminality in the city of Juba and other crime hotspots in the country. However, most of the policies have been externally driven with limited meaningful local participations and ownership to prevent crime in Juba city. The security sector reform process is expected to address these challenges by improving the capacity of the security forces to prevent crime and maintain law and order. However, it is not clear whether the reforms have had any significant impact on crime prevention in Juba City. In addition, the existing literature have failed to establish whether security sector reforms have any effect in prevention of crime. In addition, the studies suffered from contextual and conceptual gaps as they were done in Kenya and focused on entirely different concepts. Hence, this study sought to bridge these gaps by establishing the assess the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

1.3 Study Objectives

The study was guided by both broad and specific objectives as follows;

1.3.1 Broad Objective

The broad objective of this current study was to assess the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study was guided by the following specific objectives;

i.   To establish the influence of perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

ii.   To assess the influence of security sector reform policies and legal provisions on prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan.

iii. To determine the influence of donor technical assistance for security sector reforms on prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan.

iv. To examine the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What are the security sector reform actors' perceptions of the functionality and influence of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan?

ii. How do security sector reform policies and legal provisions influence the prevention of crime in Juba City?

iii. How does donor technical assistance influence the prevention of crime in Juba City?

iv. Which obstacles are facing SSR in the prevention of crime in Juba City?

1.5 Justification of the Study

South Sudan is a post-conflict state that has faced significant challenges in establishing effective and accountable security institutions. The country has experienced decades of civil war, which has resulted in the proliferation of small arms, weakened rule of law, and a breakdown of social structures. As a result, crime rates have continued to increase which puts safety and security of citizens at risk. Therefore, understanding the effectiveness of Security Sector Reform in reducing crime rates in Juba City can contribute to addressing the larger security challenges facing the country. Moreover, Increased levels of insecurity and crime in Juba and its environs are matters of concern to both GoSS and the international community. This is in view of various governments and international development partners' attempts in SSR.

The study findings therefore hope to inform SSR programming, implementation, knowledge and experience. Furthermore, the study also sought to generate information that may be of interest to policy makers and other relevant stakeholders in SSR and crime prevention programming. Further, effective security institutions are necessary for establishing stability and ensuring citizens' safety and security. Therefore, understanding the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention can contribute to building a more stable and secure post-conflict society in South Sudan. The study would be of benefit to scholars in security management since it would give insights on how security sector reforms influence prevention of crime. The scholars would use the study as a foundation to conduct future studies in regard to influence of security sector reforms on crime prevention.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study focused on Security Sector Reform and its influence on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study was conducted in Juba City and involved respondents drawn from the government, relevant donor agents and non-governmental institutions within Juba. These categories of respondents are suitable for the study since they are knowledgeable on Security Sector Reform and its influence on crime prevention in Juba City. The major limitation of the study was inadequate domestic literature on Security Sector Reform and its influence on crime prevention in South Sudan. This limitation was addressed by the use of a wide range of relevant but current literature on the study topic. Issues of confidentiality are also expected to arise and were addressed by obtaining appropriate permissions and assuring respondents that any information obtained was treated with confidentiality. This contributed to the key respondents responding to an interview schedule, which supported and ensure the accuracy of the information obtained from the questionnaires. The study was conducted in 8 months.

1.7 Definition of Key Terms

Functionality of Security Institutions Roles: This term was used to mean Presence or absence of; ambiguity or duplicity of roles, or conflicting or overlapping mandates.

Security Sector Reform: Refers to the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people.

Crime Prevention: This is an attempt to reduce and deter crime and criminals. It is measured by number of crimes reduced, frequency of crimes reduced, extent of social reorganization and number of violations against citizens prevented.

Security sector: This refers to individuals, groups and institutions that are responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for people and the state. It includes defence, law enforcement agencies, corrections, intelligence services and border management, customs and civil emergencies institutions. It also includes criminal divisions in the judicial sector, relevant ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups, customary or informal authorities and private security services.

Policies: Policy is a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party, business or individual

Crime: Refers to offences and misdemeanours committed or omitted contrary to the law. These include murder, armed robbery, home invasion, cattle raiding, kidnapping and carjacking.

Security governance:	Security Sector Governance refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation
Actors:	Refers to state security agents and stakeholders of the South Sudan at the local level, the security system at regional and international levels.
Technical Assistance:	Technical Assistance is spending by donors on consultants, training and research.
Social Organisation:	Social organization means basically our patterns of interaction with other people in the society
Violation:	The act of going against or refusing to obey a law or an agreement
Legal provisions:	Refer to the rules, regulations, and guidelines established by law to govern security sector reforms.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a critical review of literature that has been undertaken on the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in the region and also in South Sudan. It is organized along the thematic areas namely: actors in SSR and their roles, policies and legal provisions of SSR, and obstacles that affect security sector reform. The chapter also presents the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for the study that explain the causal relationship between independent and dependent variables.

2.2 Perceptions of the Security Sector Reform Actors on Functionality of Security Institutions Roles in Crime Prevention

The security sector reforms in South Sudan involves international, regional and local stakeholders including United Nations Police under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and the Government of South Sudan. Donor governments and development partners offer reform programs or projects to support SSR. These include the United Kingdom, United Nations and United States while agencies include USAID and DFID on the international front (Sebit et al., 2009). The above stakeholders collaborated to offer election security training for Southern Sudan Police Service (CIGI, 2011). The various courses were basic police training, crowd control, training of trainers, defence techniques and conflict and post-traumatic management. The government of South Sudan through the Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control have undertaken to deal with weapon proliferation. In addition, UNDP supports the GoSS through CSAC programming while the GoSS ensures that SPLA carries out civilian disarmament (Sebit et al., 2009). The study by Sebit et al. (2009) identified actors involved in SSR but failed to look into the influence of SSR on crime prevention.

The concept of local ownership suggests the advancement of locally generated ideas, resources and capabilities to resolve challenges experienced by society. There is consensus among development practitioners as to the importance of the local ownership in the

development processes, however definitional issues still remain contentious. Local ownership can be viewed as the removal of external actors from domestic processes (Reich, 2006). Emancipatory participation of local populations and local stewardship in peace-building and development processes is however difficult to fully achieve (Richmond, 2009; Shinoda, 2008; Wilen, 2009). In the absence of local participation and ownership, this sustainability of security reform efforts can be undermined (OECD, 2011). The importance of the principle local ownership cannot be underestimated, and development partners working in post conflict and fragile states have incorporated it in their post conflict programs including SSR and crime control (DFID, 2004). Reich (2006), Richmond (2009), Shinoda (2008) and Wilen (2009) touched on the mechanisms of local participation but did not discuss influence of SSR on crime prevention. This study highlights how security sector reform policies and legal provisions and donor technical assistance for security sector reforms have contributed to prevention of crime.

Local ownership of peace building and reconciliation processes has been suggested as one of the contributing factors to South Africa's successful transition from Apartheid rule to democracy in the early 1990s. This notion has however been undermined by external actors in most post conflict states because of a number of reasons like existence of weak institutions, weak civil society and lack of legitimacy for some governments leading to weak SSR influence of crime prevention. SSR according to Nathan (2007) involves '*the reform of security policies, institutions and activities whereby the reforms are designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors*.' Accordingly, Nathan argues that the notion should not be mistaken to mean the existence of high level of domestic support for donor reform programs or projects, but rather highlighting the importance of adequate external financial support channelled through locally designed DDR mechanism for states undertaking SSR such as South Sudan. Nathan (2007) therefore described the benefits of SSR but failed to go further and discuss influence of SSR on crime prevention in South Sudan.

Before the 2010 election, stakeholders such as the GoNU, the Government of Southern Sudan and the United Nations Mission in Sudan engaged in training police forces in election security (CIGI, 2011). United Nations Police (UNPOL) also conducted election security training courses for members of the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS), given the legacy of violence and insecurity during elections in Southern Sudan. The courses included the training of trainers (ToT), basic police training, conflict and post-traumatic management, defence techniques and crowd control, among other topics. However, threats of insecurity were associated with the SPLA due to disregarding of the military's role (CIGI, 2011). According to Hill (2010), rather than attempting whole scale political and social engineering, what is needed is tactical support to operational forces. This includes giving equipment and technical training to manage and resolve conflict in a less brutal and abusive fashion. This leads to improvement of the physical security of citizens and reduction of crime. Hill (2010) also described components of SSR but did not discuss how it influences crime prevention. This study highlights how security sector reform policies and legal provisions and donor technical assistance for security sector reforms have contributed to prevention of crime.

Due to the legacy of more than 20 years of civil war, there is a vast surplus of firearms and ammunition across Southern Sudan (Sebit et al., 2009). The proliferation of firearms and ammunition among the civilian population has been exacerbated by the limited capacity of law enforcement organs. To deal with the problem of weapons proliferation among civilians which increases crime, a number of devices have been created by national and international bodies. In January 2007, the GoSS established a Bureau of Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC). Currently CSAC is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of internal Affairs with a mandate to lead and coordinate government action on community security and arms control issues (Sebit et al., 2009). UNDP has provided support to the GoSS through CSAC programing, however, despite the establishment of the CSAC and other mechanisms, the concept of civilian disarmament is besieged by confusion and the overlapping mandates of different GoSS institutions coupled with weak institutional arrangements. As a result, the GoSS has mandated SPLA to carry out the task

of civilian disarmament, an approach that has proved to be largely ineffective and sometimes counter-productive with negative impacts on crime reduction (Sebit et al., 2009).

A study was conducted by Nsiah-Poku and Agyarko (2017) on the influence of police and community perceptions on crime prevention based on implications for security sector reform in developing countries. The study sought to examine the role of police and community perceptions in shaping crime prevention strategies and the implications for security sector reform in developing countries. The study established that the perceptions of both the police and the community are important in determining the success of crime prevention efforts. The study further established that perceptions are central to the success of security sector reform efforts, and that reform programs need to take into account the perceptions of both the security sector actors and the population they serve (Nsiah-Poku & Agyarko, 2017). Though this study has looked at perceptions of security sector actors like communities, it failed to show how perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles affect crime prevention.

The perceptions of security sector reform actors on the functionality of security institutions' roles in crime prevention can vary depending on their individual perspectives and experiences. Baker (2009) assessed the role of perceptions of police and security sector reform in post-conflict societies. The main purpose of the article was to examine the role of perceptions in police and security sector reform in post-conflict societies. The study found that perceptions are critical in shaping the effectiveness of security sector reform programs and that reform efforts need to take into account the perceptions of all stakeholders, including the police, military, and civilian population. Some security sector reform actors may view the primary role of security institutions as maintaining law and order and preventing crime through traditional law enforcement measures, such as investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. They may believe that the effectiveness of security institutions in preventing crime depends on their capacity to carry out these functions efficiently and effectively (Baker, 2009). Despite examining how security sector

actors such as communities perceive security, this study did not demonstrate the impact of the views of security sector reform actors on the effectiveness of security institutions in preventing crime.

According to Schnabel (2015), security sector actors may take a broader view of security institutions' roles in crime prevention, emphasizing the importance of community policing, crime prevention through environmental design, and other prevention-oriented strategies. These actors may believe that security institutions can be most effective in preventing crime by working collaboratively with other actors in the community, including community groups, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders. Moreover, security sector reform actors may also be aware of the challenges that security institutions face in preventing crime, including limited resources, inadequate training and equipment, corruption, and other institutional weaknesses. This will ensure that they advocate for reforms aimed at addressing these challenges and improving the effectiveness of security institutions in preventing crime (Tjønneland et al., 2009). The study highlights the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

It has been established that if the actors involved in SSR have positive perceptions of the reform process and the institutions being reformed, this can contribute to the effectiveness of the security institutions in preventing crime. Positive perceptions can lead to greater trust in the institutions, increased cooperation between security institutions and communities, and better performance by security personnel (McLean, 2018). On the other hand, if the actors involved in SSR have negative perceptions of the reform process or the institutions being reformed, this can undermine the functionality of security institutions and their roles in crime prevention. Negative perceptions can lead to mistrust of the institutions, decreased cooperation between security institutions and communities, and lower performance by security personnel (McLean, 2018). The study could not be generalized to cover the case of Juba City-South Sudan and examine influence of perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention.

2.3 Policies and Legal Provisions of Security Sector Reform

South Sudan is a country that has been plagued by conflict and insecurity for many years. The government has implemented several security sector reform policies and legal provisions in an attempt to address these issues. The security sector reform (SSR) policies and legal provisions in South Sudan aim to address these challenges by building strong and effective security institutions, enhancing the rule of law, and promoting good governance (Vhumbunu, 2021). One of the key security sector reform policies in South Sudan is the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. This program aims to disarm all armed groups in the country and reintegrate former combatants into society. It is a critical component of the country's peace process. The DDR program is complemented by the establishment of the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS), which is responsible for maintaining law and order within the country. The SSNPS was created in 2011 as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the country's long-standing civil war. It is currently being reformed to improve its effectiveness (Ansorg, 2017).

Another critical legal provision in South Sudan is the Security Act of 2012. This act establishes the legal framework for the country's security sector and outlines the roles and responsibilities of the various security institutions. The act also provides for the establishment of oversight mechanisms to ensure that these institutions operate within the law. South Sudan also has a National Security Service (NSS), which is responsible for gathering intelligence and providing security to the government (Yakovenko, 2014). The NSS has been criticized for its lack of transparency and accountability, and there have been calls to reform or abolish the agency. Additionally, the country has a Transitional Constitution that provides for the protection of human rights and freedoms. However, there have been concerns about the government's adherence to these provisions, particularly with regard to freedom of expression and the media (Vhumbunu, 2021). The government of South Sudan has adopted several policies to reform the security sector, including the Security Sector Transformation Strategy (SSTS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The SSTS was launched in 2012 and is aimed at creating a professional, accountable, and efficient security sector that can meet the needs of the country. The SDSR,

on the other hand, was launched in 2014 and is aimed at reviewing the country's defence and security policies to align them with the changing security environment (Yakovenko, 2014).

According to Bryden and Chappuis (2016), political and legal provisions are important in security sector reform. Free and fair democratic communities require more effective and accountable security provision. New legal architecture is one of the examples that make valuable progress in security governance. Moreover, progress can materialise in unexpected and intangible forms; thus, some of the most catalytic changes in people's experiences of security have flowed from apparently subjective shifts in attitudes towards things like more inclusive security policymaking, greater sensitivity to human rights in security provision, or a strengthened resolve among overseers to make the most of their legal authority (Bryden & Chappuis, 2016). For example, Guinea made a promising step forward when authorities refrained from using the armed forces for public order in Conakry which ended the use of lethal weapons by police and gendarmeries though there was still abuse of civil and political rights by the security forces. Similarly, in 2015, Cote d'ivoire saw progress when new legislation which replaced the country's 1961 defense law (Bryden & Chappuis, 2016). Bryden and Chappuis (2016) discussed implementation of SSR in Guinea and not South Sudan.

Harmonized conditions for general mobilization, recognition of the key role of the National Security Council on defense matters, the establishment of a defence coordination committee, and regulation of the conditions for military intervention in law enforcement and rescue operations all notably improved the effectiveness and governance of the defence sector. Yet such progress is tempered by continuing political tension over elections and a security situation that remains fragile. Good SSR describes how the principles of good governance apply to security provision, management, oversight and crime prevention by state and non- state actors (CIGI, 2010). The principles of good governance are accountability, transparency, and rule of law, participation, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. It further means that the security sector provides state and human security,

effectively and accountably, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights. It is a specific type of security governance based on a normative standard for how the state security sector should work in a democracy (CIGI, 2010). The study by CIGI (2010) was only a theoretical description of how SSR benefits security provision, management, oversight and crime prevention. This study failed to show how policies and legal provisions of SSR significantly influences crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

Exposing or coercing leaders into change particularly through public demonstration weakens their position and they may react negatively and with greater force against dissenters. Therefore, the political 'way of life' despite being undemocratic, violent and distasteful to the Western world, may have an inherent stability of its own. On the other hand, international development programmes advocating significant political or bureaucratic change can actually be detrimental to human security and thereby fail to control crime (Hill, 2010).

Failure in sufficient internal streamlining and reconciling of security forces makes security sector reform a difficult undertaking in South Sudan (Breitung et al., 2016). Structural international support for the security services mostly targeted the SPLA and SSNPS while interventions followed the two traditional approaches to SSR of increasing the accountability of, and democratic control over the armed forces and increasing its operational efficacy. The first segment was developing a national security policy and legislation covering the armed forces (Breitung et al., 2016). This included training on human rights, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society, building the capacity of the military justice system and increasing transparency over military expenditure. The other segment comprises of internationally supported SSR enhanced and enabled programmes that included control of crime. The programmes were aimed at strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA to prevent violence and crime among other duties (Breitung et al., 2016). Breitung et al. (2016) described how SSR is implemented in South Sudan but did not look into its influence on crime prevention.

According to Sebit et al. (2009), under international law, military authorities typically are not supposed to interfere with criminal justice administration. The Southern Sudan laws are consistent with this, giving the civilian police the primary authority for law enforcement. In practice, however, the SPLA continues to interfere in the administration of civilian justice. In many instances, even though judicial authorities ask the police to enforce the law against SPLA offenders, the police feel powerless to act (Sebit et al., 2009). Moreover, the Southern Sudan legal structure is characterized by overlapping legal frameworks and gaps in legislation, which makes it difficult for the police to know which laws to enforce, when and where. Although the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly adopted new criminal laws in 2008, police in many states have yet to receive copies of the documents, and continue to operate on the basis of the 2003 laws passed by the SPLA and the 1991 criminal procedure act passed in Khartoum. At the same time, a majority of the judges and lawyers practicing in Southern Sudan are Khartoum-trained, speak Arabic, and have expertise in sharia law which poses a challenge to SSR and crime control (Sebit et al., 2009).

The Sudan People's Liberation Army Bill, 2008, which spells out the constitution, mission, structures, exercise of power, functions and duties of the army. However, neither the CPA nor subsequent legislation has addressed the peacetime role, training, equipment, or activities of the police (Sebit et al., 2009). Article 162 of the CPA provided for the establishment of a police service, but made little reference to how the service would operate. As a result, the police continue to operate under Presidential Decree with no law or operating procedures governing their activities or structures. The specific jurisdictions of the police at the national, Southern Sudan and state levels remain undetermined. For example, the relationship between the Ministry of interior and the state police forces is unclear. There are no definite answers as to where the ministry's powers begin and, more importantly, end in the states which poses a challenge to SSR and crime prevention efforts (Sebit et al., 2009).

According to Billerbeck and Schnabel (2012) who looked at security sector reform and the prevention of violent conflict, established security sector reform policies and legal provisions play a crucial role in the prevention of crime. When implemented effectively, they can help to create a secure environment that discourages criminal activity and promotes social order. It was concluded that Security sector reform policies and legal provisions can help to strengthen law enforcement agencies, ensuring that they are properly equipped, trained, and resourced to prevent and respond to crime. This includes ensuring that police officers are well-trained in the use of force, have access to modern technology, and are held accountable for their actions (Billerbeck & Schnabel, 2012). Though this study focused on security sector reform policies and legal provisions, the study did not explicitly show how they could affect crime prevention in Juba city, South Sudan.

Holmqvist and Themnér (2013) looked at the security sector reform and the prevention of terrorism. The study established that security sector reforms, which involves restructuring and strengthening the security sector of a country, can be an effective tool for preventing terrorism. It was established that a well-functioning security sector can prevent the emergence and growth of terrorist groups, as well as respond effectively to terrorist threats. The key components of effective SSR, including the creation of transparent and accountable security institutions, the establishment of effective oversight mechanisms, and the promotion of civilian control over the security sector. Successful SSR requires sustained international support, as well as a focus on long-term institutional capacity-building rather than short-term solutions (Holmqvist & Themnér, 2013). Though the study elaborated on security sector reforms, it failed to show how security sector reform policies and legal provisions affect crime prevention.

Another study by Bagayoko and Hutchful (2022) looked at the peacebuilding through security sector reform and governance in West Africa. It was established that effective security sector reform policies and legal provisions can help to improve intelligence gathering and sharing, which is critical in preventing crime. This includes enhancing

information sharing between law enforcement agencies, promoting community engagement, and developing effective crime reporting systems. The study also found that security sector reform policies can also help to address the root causes of crime by promoting social and economic development. This includes improving education and job opportunities, addressing poverty, and promoting social inclusion and equality (Bagayoko & Hutchful, 2022). Though the study elaborated on importance of security sector reforms, it failed to show how security sector reform policies and legal provisions can effectively prevent crimes in South Sudan.

According to Muthondeki (2017), security sector reforms significantly influencing Transformation of National Police Service in their efforts to prevent crime in Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya. It was established that legal provisions can also enhance the judicial system by providing for fair trials, impartial judges, and an effective system of punishment for offenders. This can help to deter potential criminals and prevent re-offending. Security sector reform policies and legal provisions can also promote international cooperation in preventing and combating crime. This includes sharing best practices, coordinating efforts to combat transnational organized crime, and promoting regional and global security partnerships (Muthondeki, 2017). Despite the study's discussion on the significance of security sector reforms, it did not demonstrate how policies and laws related to security sector reform can successfully deter crimes in South Sudan.

2.4 Obstacles affecting Security Sector Reform

This section presents literature on obstacles affecting Security Sector Reforms in different parts of the world and in South Sudan in particular. The sub-sections are as presented below:

2.4.1 Failures of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Force Integration

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is a process that aims to facilitate the transition of former combatants to civilian life. Force integration, on the other hand, seeks to integrate former combatants into the regular military or police forces. While these programs have been successful in some cases, there have been failures as well (Giustozzi, 2016). One of the major challenges faced by DDR programs is the lack of political will and funding. Without adequate resources, it becomes difficult to implement and sustain the necessary components of DDR, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Dzinesa, 2017). Additionally, political instability and conflict can create challenges for DDR programs, as they often rely on the cooperation of all parties involved in the conflict. Another challenge is the lack of coordination between different actors involved in DDR. For example, different international organizations and government agencies may have different approaches to DDR, which can lead to confusion and inefficiencies. Furthermore, the lack of trust between former combatants and the government or other groups can hinder the success of DDR programs (Subedi, 2014). The reviewed literature has not showed how obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

The difficulties of operationalizing the SSR concept and adapting it to local contexts were recognized almost as soon as the idea was born. According to Chanaa (2014), the challenge lies in the conceptual-contextual divide whereby the conceptualization of SSR had outpaced any understanding of how the concept might adapt to the exigencies of specific reform contexts. In some specific context, DDR failures are numerous and interconnected while in other countries inadequate funding and underestimation of the task left some combatants out of the process. Similarly, the planned demobilisation periods and

reintegration training were shortened beyond usefulness or cut entirely. In some cases, assistance was delayed to the extent that combatants gave up and resumed low-level attacks against rivals. Worryingly in many states, DDR which was largely externally funded seems to have become an expected part of combat cycle (Chanaa, 2014). These SSR efforts therefore failed to result in crime prevention. Chanaa (2014) sought to conceptualize SSR through only DDR thus excluding other components. The reviewed literature has not showed how obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

Many African countries have hosted multiple DDR efforts in quick succession, to little or even negative effect. In other states, the promise of an eventual DDR package has been a recruiting tool. Recent Sudanese and South Sudanese efforts were so heavily corrupted as to be largely patronage programmes for various commanders. When government and antagonist forces are combined to form a single military, in many instances, they are combined only on paper and serve under separate, non-integrated chains of command. Therefore, given a true buy-in to a peace by warring parties and the population, DDR and force integration processes can be quite flawed and still not fatally destabilizing while absence of such a buy-in will mean that all technical solutions will seem futile (Jackson, 2016). The effect of this is that SSR programmes will have no influence on crime control. Jackson (2016) also only sought to explain the role that DDR plays within SSR on crime prevention. The reviewed literature has not showed how obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

2.4.2 Failure of Coordination of Strategy for SSR/DDR

Despite multiple references to the political nature of SSR in both the literature and policy discourses, Peake et al. (2015) point out that SSR programs tend to be designed in technocratic and non-specific terms at the expense of political context. As a result, after more than a decade of convergence in concept and policy, relatively little is understood about how SSR is implemented in practice, and with what effect for local-level security governance and ownership. Donors largely agree that an imperfect but coordinated DDR/SSR strategy is superior to even the best-designed sub-sectorial programs operating in isolation. However, in practice, African efforts have resulted in several prominent

coordination failures. In the DRC and Guinea-Bissau, multiple donors have been played off against one another, enabling host governments to postpone reform progress significantly (Peake et al., 2015). The reviewed literature has not showed how obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan as the studies focused on other countries.

In Liberia, the major donor (the US) took responsibility for the military, but left the police and other institutions to the UN and other donors, with predictably lopsided results. In Somalia, failures to coordinate within the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have led each troop-contributing country to train and equip its own Somali security force according to its own needs and norms, raising serious concerns about the ability of the Somali National Armed Forces to eventually act jointly. Therefore, failure to coordinate efforts can affect security sector reform in a country resulting in prevalence of crime (Peake et al., 2015). This study was a general description of SSR in several countries and identified its weaknesses but failed to address the link between obstacles of SSR and crime prevention in South Sudan.

According to Vhumbunu (2021), there are various challenges that security sector reforms have faced in South Sudan. Some of the challenges include lack of political will and Corruption which undermines the effectiveness of security institutions and erodes public trust. Other challenges identified include weak institutions which are often characterized by a lack of resources, inadequate training, and insufficient oversight and inadequate legal framework which can make it difficult to hold security institutions accountable for their actions, and it can also make it difficult to implement necessary reforms. The study established that lack of political will, corruption, weak institutions, lack of coordination, and inadequate legal framework can all contribute to an increase in crime (Vhumbunu, 2021). However, this study did not comprehensively show ways in which obstacles of SSR influence crime prevention in South Sudan.

2.5 Knowledge Gaps

Many of the studies reviewed in the literature on SSR and related topics have done little to improve the state of knowledge. Most studies have remained largely decoupled from current debates about state building and liberal peacebuilding, while the more fundamental questions of whether and how Weberian-style models of security sector governance can or should travel to areas of limited statehood are almost never raised in South Sudan's context of the SSR debates. There is also the issue of few states having productively engaged the non-state actors who provide security services in SSR. This is a particular concern because conflicts originating in neglected peripheries are common and have been highlighted as a major factor in most African countries in conflict or emerging from conflict. This includes South Sudan which is so large, unevenly settled and unpoliceable by conventional means without an unrealistic expansion of policing budgets.

To ensure that crime control efforts are attempted through SSR, engaging non-state actors is one of feasible options (Jackson, 2016). Hence, conclusions from the above limited studies cannot be stated to be representative for the study area. Moreover, the existing literature such as Muthondeki et al. (2017) who looked at the influence of security sector reforms on job performance by the national police service in Kenya and Mutegi and Muna (2021) who examined the effect of security meetings on crime control in Machakos county, Kenya have failed to establish whether security sector reforms have any effect in prevention of crime. In addition, the studies suffered from contextual and conceptual gaps as they were done in Kenya and focused on entirely different concepts. Hence, this study sought to bridge these gaps by establishing the assess the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

This study was informed by the Legitimacy Chain Theory (Toft, 2018), the Three Dimensions of Governance Theory (Debiel & Terlinden, 2005) and Control Theory (Hirshi, 1969) to explore and understand the governance terrain of South Sudan's security sector reform in relation to crime prevention. These three theories draw out the argument of security as a cornerstone for post conflict states' path to crime prevention and development and also to enhance explanatory power concerning reform efforts and numerous actors that need to be involved so as to promote local ownership.

2.6.1 Legitimacy Chain Theory

The major proponent of the Legitimacy Chain Theory was Toft (2018) who maintained that there are different actors in the security sector and explores how they relate with each other so as to guarantee that the security sector is effective enough to secure the state from external threats, state collapse and or relapse into civil war. The theory contends that there is interconnection between key institutions and actors, and thus calls for a holistic approach to security sector reform projects and activities; how these various actors relate and interact with each other is considered the legitimacy chain. Reforms in the security sector had initially focused on the transformation of the core actors in the sector like the military, guerrillas and rebel groups with major emphasis on demilitarization, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

This theory identifies different actors in the legitimacy chain in South Sudan which include; the military, police force, judiciary, legislature, militias, ex-combatants, intelligence services, CSOs, academia, NGOs, religious and traditional authorities, private security companies, and the media. All these actors ought to be involved in the different reform programs if the security sector is to be effective and legitimate. The legitimacy theory also identifies three types of security sectors and how they determine the level of legitimacy and effectiveness of Security Sector Reform. These are, integrated or unified security sectors, ethnically or territorially fragmented security sectors and personality or loyalty-based security sectors. These help to understand different paths taken by different post conflict states in their implementation of SSR.

In explaining the interconnection between key institutions and actors in South Sudan, the Legitimacy Chain Theory reveals how SSR policies and legal provisions influence the prevention of crime in Juba City. The theory also identifies actors in SSR and obstacles facing SSR influence the prevention of crime in Juba City. However, reliance by the theory on the relation between different actors in the security sector to explain security sector reform and crime is inadequate. This is because the theory fails to consider prevention of crime through control of low-level crime or by using a dimensional theory which may lead to positive results in other dimensions. The Three-Dimensional Theory places emphasis on the security governance dimension as a prerequisite for achieving rewarding results.

Some of the major weaknesses of legitimacy chain theory include that, it is unlikely to be secured in loyalty-based security sector for reasons that it is disproportionate in terms of priorities of financial resources utilization in that, expenses are based on buying and maintaining loyalty rather than on transforming the security sector into something that can protect the livelihoods of citizens, that, there is quite a little in terms of civilian oversight, there are substantial evidence that indicate high level of corruption and impunity in the judicial system and partiality in the police. For instance, in the case of South Sudan where police are taking sides in cattle disputes.

2.6.2 The Three-Dimensional of Governance Theory

The major proponents of the Three Dimensions of Governance Theory were Debiel and Terlinden (2005) who argued that the security governance dimension is a very important foundation for rebuilding post conflict states. Failure within the security governance dimension is usually reflected in poor civil-military relations, inefficient institutions, susceptibility to generalised low-level violence and political instability and poor investment environment. The assumption is that reconstruction processes and capabilities are influenced by security considerations within the context of multiple actors in a fragile environment. Accordingly, proper management of the security dimension is a pre-condition for achieving rewarding results in other dimensions. Enduring violence and

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insecurity undermine effective governance, enforcement of laws and justifies the continued de facto power of the military to participate in politics (Walraet, 2008).

In South Sudan, security governance has failed to stem crime and low-level violence leading to political instability and poor investment environment. Strengthening the security dimension is expected to improve civil-military relations, improve institutional efficiency and eradicate low-level violence and crime. This theory explains the study's objectives by showing how security governance influences reconstruction processes and capabilities. This relationship can be assured through implementation of SSR policies and legal provisions, identifying actors in SSR and addressing obstacles facing SSR in order to prevent crime in Juba City. Apart from failing to identify how different actors in the security sector are related in South Sudan, the Three-Dimensional Theory does not explain how control of low-level crime can improve security. Control Theory focuses on limiting low-level crimes in order to maintain order and reduce serious crimes in South Sudan.

2.6.3 Control Theory

A major proponent of Control Theory is Travis Hirshi (1969). The theory starts with the assumption that humans are neither naturally wicked nor prone to crime nor are they naturally virtuous and prone to conformity. Instead, humans are essentially rational and they will turn to crime when the advantages are seen to outweigh disadvantages and are more appealing than the likely rewards of conformity (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008). Many official theories to crime prevention in recent years have focused on limiting the opportunities for crimes to occur such as the idea of target hardening. This theory served the basis of zero-tolerance policing or approach that emphasizes the process of maintaining order by reducing serious crimes in targeting petty crime and forms of disruptive conduct such as vandalism and loitering.

Crackdowns in low-level crime by security forces in Juba City South Sudan are therefore thought to produce a positive effect in reducing more serious forms of crime. Control theory clarifies the study's objectives by showing the importance of controlling crime in Juba City through preventive efforts that include SSR policies and legal provisions,

identification of actors in SSR and overcoming obstacles facing SSR. One of the major weaknesses of Control Theory is that, it does not either identify how different actors in the security sector are related nor how crime prevention through a dimensional theory can be achieved.

2.6.4 Justification for Using Three Theories (Synthesis of Theories)

Legitimacy Chain Theory, Three Dimensions of Governance Theory and Control Theory all seek to explain the relation between security sector reform and crime prevention in South Sudan. The three approaches view the security sector as an important ingredient to crime prevention but each fall short in this attempt. Legitimacy Chain Theory explains how different actors in security sector reform and crime prevention are related but fails to consider prevention of crime through control of low-level crime or using a dimensional approach to lead to positive results in other dimensions. The Three-Dimensional Theory lacks the descriptions of the Legitimacy Chain Theory and the Control theory while similarly; the Control theory falls short in the values explained by the other two theories. It is therefore appropriate to use all the three theories since they supplement each other.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

This section presents a conceptual framework for the study that outlines the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Juba City. Both the independent and dependent variables are shown in conceptual framework in order to explain the study. This study conceptualizes Security Sector Reform and its influence on crime prevention in Juba City, South Sudan. The independent variable is security sector reform while the dependent variable is crime prevention in Juba City as shown in Figure 2.1 below.

Independent Variables	Intervening Variable	Dependent Variable

Security Sector Reforms

- Functionality of Security Institutions Roles
- Policies and legal provisions on SSR
- Donor technical assistance for crime prevention
- Obstacles facing SSR

Intervening Variables
- DDR processes
- Purposive legislation
- Funding
- Donor and actor interventions
- Political will
- Women empowerment in security role
- Human rights watch agitation
- Police role in law and order

Crime Prevention in Juba City
- No. of crimes reduced
- Frequency of crimes reduced
- Extent of Social reorganization
- Number of violations against citizens prevented
- Arrests made
- Human rights watch

Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework showing influence of SSR on crime in Juba City

The conceptual framework in Figure 2.1, shows that independent variables represented by aspects of security sector reform such as SSR policies and legal provisions, actors in SSR and their specific roles, donor technical assistance and obstacles facing SSR are linearly related to crime prevention which is the dependent variables. The indicators of crime prevention are types of crimes prevented, frequency of crimes reduced, and extent of social reorganization as a result of SSR, number of violations prevented and number of arrests. In this case, literature have shown that security sector reforms can have a significant impact on crime prevention by addressing systemic weaknesses and enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies to effectively prevent, investigate, and prosecute crimes. For instance, policies and legal provisions on Security sector reforms can lead to the creation of more effective law enforcement agencies with better training, resources, and equipment. This can result in improved response times, better investigation techniques, and a higher likelihood of arresting and prosecuting criminals. Moreover, reforms can also lead to the establishment of better intelligence gathering and analysis systems, which can help law enforcement agencies to identify criminal networks and prevent crimes before they occur.

Further, the relationship between independent variables (security sector reforms) and dependent (crime prevention) is affected by intervening variables such as DDR processes, purposive legislation, funding and donor and actor interventions. For instance, DDR processes that is initiated as a result of security sector reforms crime prevention through the reintegration of former combatants into society. If former combatants are not provided with adequate support for their reintegration, they may struggle to find employment and may turn to criminal activities as a means of survival. In this case, DDR may indirectly contribute to an increase in crime rates. Moreover, political which is another intervening variable is critical in ensuring that security sector reforms are implemented effectively, and that crime prevention measures are prioritized and given the necessary resources to succeed.

CHAPTER THREE

## METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the study area, research design, and sample design, methods of data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations. These aspects of the study explain how the study was designed and executed.

3.2 Research Design

This study utilized mixed method research design to obtain information from a cross section of respondents. Mixed methods research is a research design that combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study. The design is preferred as it allows researchers to gather both numerical and narrative data to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the research question or problem (Orodho, 2002).

3.3 Study Area

The study area was conducted in Juba City the capital of South Sudan. The study covered all institutions that are involved in Security Sector Reform initiatives including the Ministry of Interior which is located in Juba city. Other institutions that are involved in Security Sector Reform initiatives are SPLA, police, wildlife, prisons services and the fire brigade situated in Juba City. There are 8 police stations, 3 prison facilities and 2fire brigade stations. There are a total of 160 units or stations under SPLA, police, wildlife, prisons services and the fire brigade (Overseas Security Advisory Council, [OSAC], 2019). The study area shown in Figure 3.1 was ideal due to presence of relevant respondents with knowledge on the influence of SSR on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. Additionally, Juba city continues to be affected by crime and insecurity partly due to the prevalence and proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons among civilians. This has worsened levels of insecurity affecting city dwellers. As the capital city, it was significant to determine whether improvement of existing and use of new approaches within SSR can succeed in preventing crime in South Sudan.

Figure 3.1: Map of Juba City-South Sudan (Overseas Security Advisory Council, OSAC, 2019)

3.4 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was the personnel working in the institutions relevant to security sector reform in South Sudan, selected citizen and political leaders. This also included all personnel possessing relevant information based on the study objectives. They include Ministry of Interior. SPLA, police, wildlife, prisons services and the fire brigade situated in Juba City. They also include key informants from international donor organizations involved in SSR.

3.5 Target Population

According to OSAC (2019) there are about 700 Security sector employees working in Juba South Sudan and Selected citizens as well as Political leaders who comprised the target population for this study. These included; personnel in the Ministry of Interior, South Sudan People Defence Forces, South Sudan Law Review Commission, South Sudan Constitutional Amendment Committee, Joint Defence Board, Strategic and Defence Security Review, TNLA, National Security, United Nations Police, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, wildlife and prisons services, Fire brigade, South Sudan Women Block Association, South Sudan Youth Association, South Sudan Political Forum, South Sudan Hotel Industry Association, Chambers of Commerce and SPLM secretariat situated in Juba City.

3.6 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

This section presents the sample size and the sampling procedure used to arrive at the required sample.

3.6.1 Sample Size

The simplified formula by Yamane (1967) was used to calculate the sample size from the security sector personnel as follows;

$n = N/ (1+Ne^2)$

$n = 700/ (1+700 \times 0.07^2)$

$n = 158$

For purposes of inclusion and exclusion however, the study picked equal number of respondents (9) from all the security sectors (18) which added to 162 respondents. Hence, from a target population of 700, a sample size of 162 was obtained.

To enrich the information received from the main respondents, the researcher purposefully selected a total of twenty (20) key informants from international donor organizations involved in SSR. From each of the organizations, two (2) respondents were selected purposefully based on their knowledge and experience of security issues. The total sample for the study was thus 182.

3.6.2 Sampling Procedure

In this study, stratified and proportionate sampling was used in selecting five (9) respondents from each of the security sector institutions namely; Ministry of Interior, South Sudan People Defense Forces, South Sudan Law Review Commission, South Sudan Constitutional Amendment Committee, Joint Defense Board, Strategic and Defense Security Review, TNLA, National Security service, United Nations Police, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, wildlife and prisons services, Fire brigade, South Sudan Women Block Association, South Sudan Youth Association, South Sudan Political Parties Forum, South Sudan Hotel Industry Association, Chambers of Commerce and SPLM. The numbers of respondents required from security sector institutions were systematically selected by identifying the Kth individual in the selection interval. The list of officers from which the respondents were selected were obtained from the security sector institutions. To enrich the information provided by the main respondents, twenty (20) key informants were selected by purposeful sampling method based on knowledge and experience from international donor organizations and countries involved in SSR. These included UK, US, UN, DFID, OECD, UNDP, UNMIS, UNPOL, NEPAD and ADMISS. The summary of all Sample Respondents is shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Summary of Respondents

CATEGORY	DESCRIPTION	SAMPLE SIZE
Main respondents	South Sudan Law Review	9
	Ministry of Interior	9
	South Sudan People Defence Forces	9
	South Sudan Constitutional Amendment Committee	9
	Joint Defence Board	9
	TNLA	9
	Wildlife and Prisons Services	9
	Fire brigade	9
	South Sudan Youth Association	9
	South Sudan Political Parties Forum	9
	Chambers of Commerce	9
	SPLM	9
	South Sudan Hotel Industry Association	9
	South Sudan Women Block Association	9
	National Security service	9
	Selected citizens	9
	Political leaders	9
	Strategic and Defence Security Review,	9
	TOTALS	**162**

Table 3.2: Key Informant Sample

K.I	UK	2
	NEPAD	2
	AMDISS	2
	US	2
	UNPOL	2
	UNMIS	2
	DFID	2
	UN	2
	OECD	2
	UNDP	2
	TOTALS	20

3.7 Methods of Data Collection

The primary data was collected using questionnaires and interviews. Questionnaires are a research tool commonly used in social sciences, market research, and other fields to gather data from a large number of people. On the other hand The interview method is a data collection technique that involves asking questions directly to individuals or groups in order to obtain information.

3.7.1 Questionnaires

The study used a questionnaire as the tool to gather quantitative data. A questionnaire is a collection of prewritten or written questions offering a variety of answers developed for statistical research purposes. Questionnaires had both open and closed ended questions. Closed ended questions were used to capture opinions and comments on specific issues that did not require further elaboration, open ended questions were used to solicit information in details. This instrument's advantage is that it uses a minimum number of resources in terms of human resources, costs, and time. The questionnaire was useful in obtaining information on the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Sudan Juba City. The questionnaires were administered to security personnel, selected citizens and political leaders.

3.7.2 Key Informant Interviews

To support the quantitative data from the questionnaires, qualitative data was collected through key informant interviews. Key informant interview is a structured conversation where one participant asks questions, and the key informants who have knowledge on subject under study provide answers. The key informant interviews contained open-ended questions. Open ended questions were used to obtain in-depth knowledge and insight as well as personal experiences and observations from the Key informants (K.I). The key informants interviewed included representatives from international donor organizations and countries involved in SSR.

3.8 Data Analysis

The quantitative data collected from the completed questionnaires were edited to correct errors and omissions. The data was then placed in categories by coding then tabulating and counting. The researcher organized data by using SPSS computer package for data processing. Descriptive statistics including percentages and frequency distribution were used for analysis of quantitative data which was presented in tables and graphs. The qualitative data was also edited and put in categories and themes or patterns for coding purposes. The data was then analysed by content analysis. The researcher then interpreted the results from data analysis and wrote the research findings. The study also used inferential statistics such as correlation analysis (Spearman Correlation Coefficient) and multiple regression analysis. Correlation analysis (Spearman Correlation Coefficient) was used to establish the relationship between the variables while Multiple regression analysis was used to establish the influence of independent variable on the dependent variable. The multiple regressions took the following form:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

Where:

Y = Prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan

β_0 = the constant; $\beta_1, \beta_2,$ and β_3 = Regression coefficients

X_2 = Security sector reform policies and legal provisions

X_3 = Donor technical assistance

X_4 = Obstacles to SSR

ε = error term

Table 3.3: Data Analysis Matrix

Data type	Respondents	Data collection Technique	Analysis Technique	Data Presentation
Quantitative	SSR personnel	Drop and pick	1. SPSS Descriptive Statistics 2. Correlation Analysis 3. Regression	Frequency and Percentages in tables and charts
Qualitative	Donor personnel	Face to face interview	Thematic/Content analysis	Verbatim quotes/Narratives

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher sought introduction letter for fieldwork from Egerton University graduate school. The researcher also sought consent from the Ministry of Interior of South Sudan in Juba City to be allowed to conduct the study. Participants were consulted and adequately convinced as well as assured of their anonymity and confidentiality so that they allow for their inclusion in the study. The researcher observed professional guidelines considering that SSR is a sensitive security issue. The researcher also ensured confidentiality and privacy of respondents' views and identities by making them anonymous in the final report. All the instruments were carefully structured to avoid questions that might embarrass or place the participants in an awkward situation.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the study results and the discussion guided by the objectives. The chapter also presents the findings thematically based on the set objectives. This chapter is divided into sections and sub sections guided by the specific objectives. First, the chapter starts with brief introduction, then; the response rate, the demographics, and then the discussion of findings in line with the study objectives.

4.2 Response Rate

The study sought to collect data from 162 main respondents through questionnaires. The total number of questionnaires received back was 118 and this gave a response rate of 72.8%. Further, researcher was able to interview 14 out of 20 key informants which gave a response rate of 70%. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) and Orodho (2002) the response rate of more than 70% is very good and 50% response rate is considered good and adequate for analysis respectively. Hence, based on this recommendation the response rate of 70.9% and 70% were considered ideal for this research.

4.3 Demographic Information

The background information of the respondents assessed included age, security force, how long they have served in the security force and the highest level of education. The findings are illustrated in various subsections.

4.3.1 Age of the Respondent

The study sought to establish the age of the respondents participating in the study. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Age of the Respondent

	Frequency	Percent
25 -31 years	48	40.7
32-38 years	51	43.2
39-45 years	12	10.2
Above 45 years	7	5.9
Total	**118**	**100**

From the findings in Table 4.1 above, majority of the respondents indicated that they are aged between 32 and 38 which represent 43.2% of all the respondents. The other respondents' ages ranged between 25 and 31 years (40.7%), between 39 and 45 years (10.2%) and the remaining 5.9% of the respondents above 45 years old. This implies that data is very representative as it cuts across all the desired age groups. The findings also implies that most security personnel are aged 25 years and above.

4.3.2 Highest Level of Education

The researcher sought to establish the level of education of the respondents. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: Respondents Highest Level of Education

	Frequency	Percent
Secondary Education	81	68.6
College Diploma/Certificate	23	19.5
Bachelor's Degree	11	9.3
Master's Degree	3	2.5
Total	**118**	**100**

From the findings, a majority of the respondents (68.6%) indicated to have secondary education, those with college diploma/certificate were 19.5%, bachelor's degree 9.3% and master's degree at 2.5%. This implies that all the respondents were learned enough to give credible information regarding how Security Sector Reform influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

4.3.3 Gender of the Respondents

The study sought to establish the gender of the respondents. The findings are presented in the Table 4.3 below.

**Table 4.3: Gender of Respondents**

Gender of Respondents	No of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Male	73	61.8
Female	45	38.2
Total	**118**	**100**

Findings in Table 4.3 shows that majority of the respondents (61.8%) were male while that of the minority respondents were (38.2%). While there was no bias in sampling this may have happened by chance.

4.3.4 Length of Service in the Security Sector

To assess the magnitude of the problem under research, the study sought to get the perceptions of security personnel themselves. These included the SSPDF, SSNP, Wildlife, Prison Service and Fire brigade. Figure 4.1 indicate the length of their service in the security forces as shown below.

Figure 4.1: Length of Service in the Security Sector

From the findings in Figure 4.1 above, the respondents indicated to have served in the security force for 7 to 9 years which represents 44.1%, for 10 to 12years (23.7%), for 4 to 6 years (14.4%), for 13 years and above (11%) and for 1 to 3 years represented by 6.8%. This implies that most of the respondents have served in security force for long enough to be able to provide adequate information on how Security Sector Reform influence on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

4.4 Functionality and Influence of Security Institutions Roles on Crime Prevention

The first objective in this study sought to explore perceptions of security sector reform actors on the relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention against two variables; Duplicity of roles and Overlapping of Mandates. The results are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Respondents' perspective on major security concerns in the area

		No	Yes	Total
Duplicity of Roles	n	20	98	118
	%	**17.0**	**83.0**	**100.0**
Overlapping of Mandates	n	18	100	118
	%	**15.2**	**84.8**	**100.0**

As shown in Table 4.4 the general trend in this study are perceptions that there was a relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention that was explained by two variables; Duplicity of roles and Overlapping of Mandates. Overall, the findings present a picture of security reform actors that perceives that there is both overlapping of mandates (84.8%) and duplicity of roles (83.0%) in the functioning of security forces institutions. This implies that there was a general dissatisfaction by the security reform actors on how the security forces carry out their duties. The findings correlate with Baker (2009) who noted that perceptions are critical in shaping the effectiveness of security sector reform programs and that reform efforts need to take into account the perceptions of all stakeholders, including the police, military, and civilian population. Some security sector reform actors may view the primary role of security institutions as maintaining law and order and preventing crime through traditional law enforcement measures, such as investigations, arrests, and prosecutions.

According to a senior security force male Key informant this affects their effectiveness in crime prevention leading to upsurge of crimes;

> *There is lack of political will in security operations. In addition to micro-management and/or arm twisting by the political class resulting to bias in operations, doing what is according to us the preserve of other organs which have the requisite prowess to handle such. At times, we find ourselves doing the same operations with other institutions that we think does not have what it takes to execute such tasks. This weakens the war against crimes in this country.*

The above verbatim response implies that security institutions are perceived not function well because of lack of political will in security operations. This lends support to what Sebit et al. (2009) argued that civilian disarmament (an important crime prevention operation is besieged by confusion and the overlapping mandates of different GoSS institutions coupled with weak institutional arrangements. As a result, the GoSS has mandated SPLA to carry out the task of civilian disarmament, an approach that has proved to be largely ineffective and sometimes counter-productive with negative impacts on crime reduction. The findings agree with Nsiah-Poku and Agyarko (2017) who noted that perceptions are central to the success of security sector reform efforts, and that reform programs need to take into account the perceptions of both the security sector actors and the population they serve.

4.5 Influence of Policies and Legal Provisions on Prevention of Crime

The second objective sought to establish the influence of policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. Further the relationship between policies and legal provisions on one hand and crime prevention is also in this section. The findings are illustrated in the following subsections.

4.5.1 Frequency of Crimes Experienced in Juba City

The respondents asked the respondents to indicate the frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City. The findings are shown in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Frequency of Crimes Experienced in Juba City

From the findings, the respondents indicated that the frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City was very high as shown by 61%, high as shown by 23.7%, moderate as shown by 10.2% and low as shown by 5.1%. This implies that there is a very high frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City.

From the interviews, the interviewees were of the view that security forces have not succeeded in preventing crime. This because despite their existence, the cases of criminal activities have continued to increase. In support of this, one interviewee said,

> *Despite the existence of SSPDF and SSNPS officers, cases of criminal activities like theft, vandalism, sabotage, cyber-attacks and physical violence have continued to rise. The existence of security agencies seems not to be working effectively towards crime prevention in Juba city*

The above quote implies that there is still increase in number of criminal activities despite the existence of police officers and the ongoing security sector reforms. Further from the interviews, the interviewees said that the rate the frequency of crime in Juba City South Sudan is very high. In a support of this, one of the interviewees said,

> *As to be expected in a country that has been experiencing large-scale conflict for more than two years, people in South Sudan have been exposed to very high rates of violent crime. Security situation across South Sudan remains volatile. This is because Weapons are plentiful and easily obtained in South Sudan and criminals are often armed. Moreover, many armed actors who are without jobs or have not been paid are resorting to criminality*

The above quote implies that unstable security situation in South Sudan, compounded by the involvement of armed individuals who have resorted to criminal activities due to lack of employment or payment, is not surprising given the ongoing conflict and the easy availability of weapons, leading to a high prevalence of violent crime in the country. The findings correlate with Bryden and Chappuis (2016) who argued that political and legal provisions are important in SSR. Free and fair democratic communities require more effective and accountable security provision. New legal architecture is one of the examples that make valuable progress in security governance. The findings agree with Bagayoko and Hutchful (2022) who established that effective security sector reform policies and legal provisions can help to improve intelligence gathering and sharing, which is critical in preventing crime. This includes enhancing information sharing between law enforcement agencies, promoting community engagement, and developing effective crime reporting systems.

4.5.2 Success Extent of Policies and Legal Provisions in Prevention of Crime

Further, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which the policies and legal provisions have succeeded in prevention of crime. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Success Extent of Policies and Legal Provisions in Prevention of Crime

From the findings in Figure 4.3 above, a majority of the respondents (55.9%) indicated that the extent to which the policies and legal provisions have succeeded in prevention of crime was high, those who said it was very high were 20.3%, moderate as illustrated by 14.4% and low as illustrated by 9.3%. This implies that there is a high extent to which the policies and legal provisions have succeeded in prevention of crime. From the interviewees, most of the interviewees said that SSR policies and legal provisions have influenced prevention of crime to a great extent. The findings agree with Vhumbunu (2021) who noted that law enforcement agencies may be used to curb the rising pattern of criminality in the city of Juba and other crime hotspots in the country. However, most of the policies have been externally driven with limited meaningful local participations and ownership to prevent crime in Juba city.

4.5.3 Various SSR Policies and Legal Provisions Leading to Prevention Crime

The respondents were further asked to give their ratings on the extent to which various SSR policies and legal provisions have led to prevention crime using 1-5 Likert scale where 1 is not at all, 2 is very low, 3 is low, 4 is high and 5 is very high. The findings are shown in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Extent Various SSR Policies and Legal Provisions have led to Prevention Crime

	Very Low	Low	High	Very High
Training on human rights	5.1%	17.8%	61.9%	15.3%
Strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society	8.5%	17.8%	66.1%	7.6%
Building the capacity of the military justice system	11.0%	14.4%	61.0%	13.6%
Increasing transparency over military expenditure	16.1%	55.1%	21.2%	7.6%
Strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA/SSNPS	5.9%	17.8%	65.3%	11.0%
SPLA Act	55.1%	22.0%	20.3%	2.5%
SSNPS Act	11.9%	18.6%	54.2%	15.3%
Criminal laws	8.5%	10.2%	66.9%	14.4%

From the findings in Table 4.5 above, most of the respondents as shown by 66.1% and strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA/SSNPS as shown by 65.3% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. In addition, majority of the respondents indicated that training on human rights as shown by 61.9% and building the capacity of the military justice system as shown by 61.0% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. Further, majority of the respondents indicated that SSNPS Act as shown by 54.2% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. However, most of the respondents indicated that increasing transparency over military expenditure as shown by 55.1% have led to prevention crime to a low extent while SPLA Act as shown by 55.1% have led to

prevention crime to a very low extent. The findings agree with Breitung et al. (2016) who noted that failure in sufficient internal streamlining and reconciling of security forces makes security sector reform a difficult undertaking in South Sudan. Structural international support for the security services mostly targeted the SPLA and SSNPS while interventions followed the two traditional approaches to SSR of increasing the accountability of, and democratic control over the armed forces and increasing its operational efficacy.

4.5.4 The Relationship between Policies and Legal Provisions and Prevention of Crime

This section sought to establish whether there was a relationship between policies and legal provisions of SSR and crime prevention. The results were significant (*p=0.01*)

Table 4. 6: The relationship between Policies and Legal Provisions and Prevention of Crime

(n=118)

|			Prevention of crime	Security sector reform policies and legal provisions
Spearman's rho	Prevention of crime	Correlation Coefficient	1	
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	
		N	118	
	Security sector reform policies and legal provisions	Correlation Coefficient	.468**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.
		N	118	118
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).				

As indicated in Table 4.6, there is a strong and significant relationship between security sector reform policies and legal provisions and prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (rho=0.468; p=0.001). The implication here is that the government of South Sudan should put more emphasis on the nature of policies and legal provisions to be put in place

if crimes and insecurity are to be reduced. the findings in this study suggest that, this will strengthen the oversight role of parliament and civil society, building the capacity of the military justice system and increasing transparency over military expenditure. The findings agree with Billerbeck and Schnabel (2012) who established security sector reform policies and legal provisions play a crucial role in the prevention of crime. The study concluded that Security sector reform policies and legal provisions can help to strengthen law enforcement agencies, ensuring that they are properly equipped, trained, and resourced to prevent and respond to crime.

4.6 Influence of Donor Technical Assistance on Prevention of Crime

The third objective sought to establish the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. Further the relationship between the influence of Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime is also presented in this section. The findings are illustrated in the following subsections.

4.6.1 Level of Donor Technical Assistance

The respondents were asked to indicate the level of donor technical assistance that they have received. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4.4.


Figure 4. 4: Level of Donor Technical Assistance

From the findings in Figure 4.4 above, majority of the respondents (64.4%) indicated that the level of donor technical assistance that they have received have been moderate. Other respondents indicated that the level of donor technical assistance that they have received have been high as shown by 19.5%, low as shown by 9.3% and very high as shown by 6.8%. This implies that there has been a moderate level of donor technical assistance that they have received.

4.6.2 Extent Donor Technical Assistance Have Contributed to Prevention of Crime

The researcher asked the respondents to indicate the extent to which donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4. 5:Extent Donor Technical Assistance Have Contributed to Prevention of Crime

From the findings in Figure 4.5 above, a majority of the respondents (64.4%) indicated that donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime to a high extent, to a moderate extent as shown by 17.8%, to a very high extent as shown by 11% and to a low extent as shown by 6.8%. This implies that donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime to a high extent.

According to this study donor technical assistance have huge influence on crime prevention. Donor assistance supports programs for crime prevention through social development, crime prevention through environmental design, community crime prevention and reduction of recidivism. In support of this, a female adult interviewee said,

> *Donor technical assistance ensures that crimes are reduced by security force as they offer basic police training, crowd control, training of trainers (ToT), defence techniques and conflict and post-traumatic management. This ensures that the police force have the required capacity and competence to deal with all cases of criminal activities. Donors also provide financial assistance to ensure the enforcement of legal frameworks meant to prevent or avert criminal activities.*

The above verbatim response means that donor technical assistance plays a critical role in reducing crime rates in countries by providing training to security forces. This includes basic police training, crowd control, training of trainers, defence techniques, and conflict and post-traumatic management. It also implies that by providing this technical assistance, donors help security forces to build the capacity and competence to effectively deal with criminal activities. It is also deduced that the provision of technical and financial assistance by donors is essential in ensuring that the police force has the necessary resources and skills to combat crime and maintain law and order in society.

4.6.3 Forms of Donor Technical Assistance Leading to Prevention Crime

The respondents were also asked to give their ratings on the extent to which various forms of donor technical assistance have led to prevention crime using 1-5 Likert scale where 1 is not at all, 2 is very low, 3 is low, 4 is high and 5 is very high. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.7.

Table 4. 7: Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention Crime

	Very Low	Low	High	Very High
Training of Trainers	8.5%	17.8%	57.6%	16.1%
Basic Police Training	7.6%	20.3%	66.9%	5.1%
Crime investigation	14.4%	11.9%	59.3%	14.4%
Conflict and Post-Traumatic Management	20.3%	66.9%	5.9%	6.8%
Defence Techniques	4.2%	16.9%	61.0%	17.8%
Crowd Control	15.3%	13.6%	66.1%	5.1%

From the findings, majority of the respondents indicated that basic police training as shown by 66.9% and crowd control as shown by 66.1% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. Moreover, most of the respondents indicated that defence techniques as shown by 61.0%, crime investigation as shown by 59.3% and training of trainers as shown by 57.6% have led to prevention crime to a high extent. However, majority of the respondents indicated that conflict and post-traumatic management as shown by 66.9% have led to prevention crime to a low extent. The findings are in line with Sebit et al. (2009) who noted that donor governments and development partners offering reform programs or projects to support SSR include the UK, UN and US while agencies include USAID and DFID on the international front. The stakeholders collaborated to offer election security training for Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) through various courses like basic police training, crowd control, training of trainers (ToT), defence techniques and conflict and post-traumatic management.

4.6.4 The Relationship between Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime

This section sought to establish whether there was a relationship between donor technical assistance and prevention of crime. The results were significant (*p=0.01*).

Table 4. 8:The relationship between Donor Technical Assistance and Prevention of Crime

			Crime prevention	Donor technical assistance
Spearman's rho	Crime prevention	Correlation Coefficient	1	
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	
		N	118	
	Donor technical assistance	Correlation Coefficient	.613**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
		N	118	118

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

As indicated in Table 4.8, there is a strong and significant relationship between donor technical assistance and prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (rho=0.613; p=0.000). The general trend in this study were perceptions that implored the government of South Sudan should seek more funding to support crime prevention initiatives such as; Training of Trainers, Basic Police Training, Conflict and Post-Traumatic Management and Defence Techniques.

4.7 Influence of Obstacles to SSR in Prevention of Crime

The study sought to establish the influence of Obstacles to SSR in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. There are various obstacles to security sector reforms which include failures of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), failures of force integration, failure of coordination, neglected peripheries and non-state actors and failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention. Following section shows how these obstacles influence prevention of crime.

4.7.1 General Opinion on how SSR Obstacles influences Crime Prevention

The respondents were requested to indicate the extent to which SSR Obstacles have contributed in prevention of crime. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4. 6:Extent SSR Obstacles on Crime Prevention

From the findings in Figure 4.6 above, the respondents indicated that SSR Obstacles have contributed in prevention of crime to a low extent as shown by 65.3%, to a moderate extent as shown by 16.1%, to a high extent as shown by 13.6% and to a very high extent as shown by 5.1%. This implies that SR Obstacles have contributed in prevention of crime to a low extent.

The interviewees said that the SSR obstacles to the prevention of crime included failures of disaster, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), failures of force integration, failure of coordination, neglected peripheries and non-state actors and failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention. A significant number of interviewees (30%) placed a huge importance in all these SSR obstacles. For instance, the interviewees insinuated that DDR failures due to inadequate funding and underestimation of the task has left some combatants out of the process. The findings corelates with Vhumbunu (2021) who noted that there are various challenges that security sector reforms have faced in South Sudan. Some of the challenges include lack of political will and Corruption which undermines the effectiveness of security institutions and erodes public trust. Other challenges identified include weak

institutions which are often characterized by a lack of resources, inadequate training, and insufficient oversight and inadequate legal framework which can make it difficult to hold security institutions accountable for their actions, and it can also make it difficult to implement necessary reforms.

4.7.2 Extent of Influence of Obstacles Facing Security Sector Reforms on Prevention of Crime

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which obstacles facing Security sector reforms influencing prevention of crime using 1-5 Likert scale where 1 is not at all, 2 is very low, 3 is low, 4 is high and 5 is very high. The findings are shown in Table 4.9 below.

Table 4. 9:Extent Obstacles Facing Security Sector Reforms Influences Prevention of Crime

	Very Low	Low	High	Very High
Failures of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)	8.5%	14.4%	53.4%	23.7%
Failures of Force integration	9.3%	16.9%	57.6%	16.1%
Failure of Coordination	11.9%	22.9%	45.8%	19.5%
Neglected peripheries and non-state actors	14.4%	30.5%	48.3%	6.8%
Failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention	10.2%	19.5%	56.8%	13.6%

From the findings in Table 4.9 above, most of the respondents indicated that the failures of force integration as shown by 57.6% highly influences prevention of crime. When former combatants are not effectively integrated into society, they may turn to criminal activities to sustain themselves or to pursue their objectives. This is particularly true in situations where ex-combatants do not have access to basic resources such as education, employment opportunities, or healthcare.

The findings also showed that failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention as shown by 56.8% have highly influenced prevention of crime. If law enforcement agencies fail to recruit qualified personnel, they may be unable to carry out these strategies effectively, leaving communities vulnerable to crime. Furthermore, unqualified personnel may be more likely to make mistakes, such as mishandling evidence or conducting flawed investigations, which can compromise the integrity of criminal cases and ultimately undermine the criminal justice system.

In addition, the respondents indicated failures of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as shown by 53.4% have highly influenced prevention of crime. The failure of DDR programs can have a significant impact on the prevention of crime, as it can lead to the re-mobilisation of ex-combatants and their involvement in criminal activities. When DDR programs fail, ex-combatants may have limited options for livelihoods and may resort to illegal activities to make ends meet. They may also continue to have access to weapons and may use them for criminal purposes, including robbery, kidnapping, and extortion.

Finally, the findings showed that neglected peripheries and non-state actors as shown by 48.3% and failure of coordination as shown by 45.8% have highly influenced prevention of crime. Neglected peripheries can also be breeding grounds for radicalization and extremism, which can lead to the commission of violent crimes. Neglecting non-state actors can allow them to establish themselves as power centers in society and make it more difficult to combat criminal activities. The findings are supported by Chanaa (2014) who argued that the challenge lies in the conceptual-contextual divide whereby the conceptualization of SSR had outpaced any understanding of how the concept might adapt to the exigencies of specific reform contexts. Peake et al. (2015) also pointed out that SSR programs tend to be designed in technocratic and non-specific terms at the expense of political context. As a result, after more than a decade of convergence in concept and policy, relatively little is understood about how SSR is implemented in practice, and with what effect for local-level security governance and ownership.

4.8 Crime Prevention through Security Sector Reforms

The study sought to assess the crime prevention through security sector reforms. The respondents indicated that security forces contributed towards the prevention of crime by deterring criminals who are intent on committing theft, vandalism, sabotage, cyber-attacks, physical violence or terrorism. The security force also assists in enforcing the law against those who commit criminal activities.

4.8.1 Level of Importance Given to Crime Prevention

The respondents were asked to indicate the level of importance that they have given to the various indicators of crime prevention. using 1-5 Likert scale where 1 is not at all, 2 is very low, 3 is low, 4 is high and 5 is very high. The findings are shown in Table 4.10.

Table 4. 10:Level of Importance given to Crime Prevention

	Very Low	Low	High	Very High
Types of crimes prevented	10.2%	27.1%	53.4%	9.3%
Frequency of crimes	10.2%	24.6%	55.1%	10.2%
Number of violations	6.8%	24.6%	49.2%	19.5%
Number of arrests	32.2%	38.1%	20.3%	9.3%
Types of Criminals	11.9%	22.0%	56.8%	9.3%

From the findings in Table 4.11 above, most of the respondents indicated that the level of importance that they have given to types of criminals (56.8%), frequency of crimes (55.1%), types of crimes prevented (53.4%) and number of violations (49.2%) was high. However, most of the respondents indicated that the level of importance that they have given to number of arrests (38.1%) was high. This implies that crime prevention could be attributed to types of crimes prevented, frequency of crimes, number of violations, number of arrests and types of criminals apprehended.

4.8.2 Extent Measures to Implement SSR Contributed in Prevention of Crime

The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which various measures to implement SSR have contributed in prevention of crime using 1-5 Likert scale where 1 is very Low, 2 is low, 3 is moderate, 4 is high and 5 is very high. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.11

Table 4. 11:Extent Measures to Implement SSR Contributed in Prevention of Crime

	Low	Moderate	High	Very High
Coupling security with development	20.3%	13.6%	48.3%	17.8%
Addressing behavioural sources of instability	11.9%	24.6%	53.4%	10.2%
Addressing structural sources of instability	14.4%	55.9%	22.9%	6.8%
DDR programmes applied to state and non-state armed actors	12.7%	19.5%	53.4%	14.4%
DDR programmes focused on downsizing of the military	55.1%	22.9%	17.8%	4.2%

From the findings, majority of the respondents (53.4%) indicated that addressing behavioural sources of instability and DDR programmes applied to state and non-state armed actors (53.4%) have contributed in prevention of crime to a high extent. In addition, majority of the respondents (48.3%) indicated that coupling security with development has contributed in prevention of crime to a high extent. However, the respondents indicated (that addressing structural sources of instability (55.9%) has contributed in prevention of crime to a low extent while DDR programmes focused on downsizing of the military (55.1%) have contributed in prevention of crime to a very low extent. This implies that for effective prevention of crime there is need to couple security with development, address behavioural and structural sources of instability and ensure that DDR programmes focuses on downsizing of the military and are applied to state and non-state armed actors.

From the interviews, a significant number of K.I (40%) indicated that limitations in measures to successfully implement SSR can be addressed by allocating adequate funds, building capacity of civil society and ensuring effective conflict management and peace building. In support of this for example, one of the interviewees said;

One of the ways to address limitations to SSR is strengthen the institutional framework for managing the security sector by ensuring the proper location of security activities within a constitutional framework defined by law and to develop security policies and instruments to implement them and building the capacity of policy makers to effectively assess the nature of security threats and to design strategic responses supportive of wider development goals.

The above quote implies that there are crucial steps involved in addressing the security sector reforms and these include strengthening the institutional framework for managing the security sector, developing security policies and instruments, and building the capacity of policy makers to effectively assess security threats and design strategic responses. Further, another K.I supported others sentiments by saying;

One of the ways to address limitations to SSR is strengthening mechanisms for ensuring security sector accountability by enabling the state and non-state actors responsible for monitoring security policy and enforcing the law to fulfil their functions effectively.

The above quote implies that strengthening accountability mechanisms for security sector oversight is key to addressing limitations in SSR, enabling both state and non-state actors to effectively monitor and enforce security policies. Muthondeki (2017) noted security sector reforms significantly influencing Transformation of National Police Service in their efforts to prevent crime in Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya. It was established that legal provisions can also enhance the judicial system by providing for fair trials, impartial judges, and an effective system of punishment for offenders.

4.9 Multiple Regression Analysis

The researcher conducted a multiple regression analysis to establish the influence that various aspects of security sector reforms have on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan. The findings are illustrated in Table 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14.

Table 4. 12:Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error
1	0.860	0.739	0.730	0.282

From the findings, the R square was 0.739 and this showed that 73.9% of the variations in prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan are explained by perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles, SSR policies and legal provisions, donor technical assistance and obstacles facing SSR. This implies that 26.1% of the variations in in prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan are attributed to other factors.

Table 4. 13: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	26.116	4	6.529	80.115	.000[b]
	Residual	9.209	113	0.081		
	Total	**31.913**	**117**			

From the ANOVA Table, p-value was 0.000 and F-calculated was 80.115. Since p-value was less than 0.05 and the F-calculated was greater than F-critical (2.4519), then the regression model was significant. This implies that security sector reforms significantly influence prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan.

Table 4. 14:Regression Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.806	.208		3.875	.000
	Perceptions of SSR actors	.711	.117	.601	6.077	.000
	SSR policies and legal provisions	.804	.146	.712	5.507	.000
	Donor technical assistance	.768	.214	.639	3.589	.000
	Obstacles facing SSR	.654	.072	.5340	9.083	.000

The established model for the study was:

$Y = 0.806 + 0.711\ X_1 + 0.804\ X_2 + 0.768\ X_3 + 0.654\ X_4$

Where: - **Y** = Prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan

X_1 = Perceptions of SSR actors

X_2 = SSR policies and legal provisions

X_3 = Donor technical assistance

X_4 = Obstacles facing SSR

From the findings, the study showed that perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles significantly influences prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.711; p=0.000). The study also established that policies and legal provisions for security sector reform have a significant influence on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.804; p=0.000). It was established that donor technical assistance has a significant influence on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.768; p=0.000). Finally, the study found that obstacles facing security sector reforms significantly influences prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.654; p=0.000). The findings imply that all the aspects of security sector reforms have a significant influence on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter presents the summary of key findings, the conclusion drawn from the highlighted findings and recommendations made thereto. The conclusions and recommendations were drawn in addressing the research question or achieving the study objectives.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The study established a relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention. The study showed that perceptions of the security sector reform actors on functionality of security institutions roles significantly influences prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.711; p=0.000). Overall, the findings present a picture of security reform actors that perceives that there is both overlapping of mandates and duplicity of roles in the functioning of security forces institutions. According to this current study, this led ineffectiveness of security institutions in crime prevention leading to upsurge of crimes.

The study sought to establish the influence of policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. The study also established that policies and legal provisions for security sector reform have a significant influence on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.804; p=0.000). The study found that there is a very high frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City and that there is a high extent to which the policies and legal provisions have succeeded in prevention of crime. Further, the study established that criminal laws, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society and strengthening the operational capability of the SSPDF/SSNPS have led to prevention crime to a high extent.

The study sought to establish the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. It was established that donor technical assistance has a significant influence on prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.768; p=0.000). The study found that training on human rights and building the capacity of the military justice system have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study established that SSNPS Act have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study revealed that increasing transparency over military expenditure have led to prevention crime to a low extent while SSPDF Act have led to prevention crime to a very low extent. The study sought to establish the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. The study found that there has been a moderate level of donor technical assistance that they have received and that donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime to a high extent. The study established that basic police training and crowd control have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study found that defence techniques, crime investigation and training of trainers have led to prevention crime to a high extent. The study revealed that conflict and post-traumatic management have led to prevention crime to a low extent.

The study sought to establish the influence of obstacles to SSR in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. The study found that obstacles facing security sector reforms significantly influences prevention of crime in Juba city, South Sudan (B= 0.654; p=0.000). The study established that SR Obstacles have contributed in prevention of crime to a low extent. The study found that the level of importance that they have given to the failures of force integration and failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention of crime was high. The study found that high level of importance that they have given to failures of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in crime prevention, neglected peripheries and non-state actors in crime prevention and failure of coordination in crime prevention.

5.3 Conclusions

This section presents both empirical and theoretical conclusion as follows;

5.3.1 Empirical Conclusions

Perceptions are very crucial in shaping the effectiveness of security sector reform programs and hence perceptions of all stakeholders, including the police, military, and civilian population need to be taken into account. It was perceived that in security institutions there is duplicity of roles and overlapping of mandates. When multiple agencies are involved in crime prevention, there is a risk of duplication of efforts, which can result in inefficiency and wasted resources. Overlapping mandates can lead to a lack of coordination and cooperation among agencies, which can hamper their ability to effectively prevent crime. This can also create opportunities for criminals to exploit gaps and weaknesses in the system.

Policies and legal provisions are very important in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. However, despite the existence of policies and legal provisions in South Sudan, frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City remains high. Crimes can be highly prevented through enforcement of criminal laws, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society as well as strengthening the operational capability of the SSPDF/SSNPS. In addition, training on human rights and building the capacity of the military justice system could also help in preventing crimes in Juba City.

Donor technical assistance has played a key role and is very important in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. In Juba City, donor technical assistance has highly contributed to prevention of crime. Donor assistance ensures there is basic police training, effective procedures for crowd control, instil defence techniques among security force and in crime investigation. Through these, donor assistance has helped in preventing criminal activities as it also helps in conflict and post-traumatic management.

There are obstacles to SSR which have lowly contributed to prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. Some of the obstacles identified included failures of force integration and failure to recruit qualified personnel, failures of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), neglected peripheries and non-state actors and failure of coordination. These obstacles need to be addressed urgently by both government and international community to ensure that the SSR plays its role in crime prevention.

5.3.2 Theoretical Conclusions

As indicated in this study legitimacy chain theory, three dimensions of governance theory and control theory adequately explained the relationship between security sector reform and crime prevention in South Sudan. The three approaches view the security sector as an important ingredient to crime prevention but each fall short in this attempt. Legitimacy chain theory explained how different actors in security sector reform and crime prevention are related but fails to consider prevention of crime through control of low-level crime or using a dimensional approach to lead to positive results in other dimensions. The three-dimensional theory lacked the descriptions of the legitimacy chain theory and the control theory while similarly; the control theory falls short in the values explained by the other two theories. The three theories therefore complemented each other in explaining the relationship between security sector reform and crime prevention in South Sudan. The literature failed to show how policies and legal provisions of SSR significantly influences crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan and has not showed how obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. This study bridged those gaps by establishing that policies and legal provisions of SSR significantly influences crime prevention and that there are obstacles facing SSR influence crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.

5.4 Recommendations

This current study makes a number of recommendations based on the findings from the field. The study was based on four specific objectives which yielded different major findings and conclusions which form the basis of the recommendations.

Objective one set out to establish perceptions of the Security Sector Reform Actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study found out that there is a relationship between the functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention. Overall, the findings presented a picture of security reform actors that perceived both overlapping of mandates and duplicity of roles in the functioning of security forces institutions. The study concluded that this to a great extent affected crime prevention initiatives. As a matter of policy the study recommends that clear mandate of each institution should be defined and constitutionalised. By so doing this will improve crime prevention initiatives and also ensure institutional accountability.

The second specific objective was to assess the influence of Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan.

The study established that criminal laws, strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society, strengthening the operational capability of the SSPDF/SSNPS, training on human rights, building the capacity of the military justice system and the SSNPS Act have led to crime prevention to a high extent. The study concluded that established new policies and legal architectures are important prerequisites in security governance. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan through the ministry of internal security should ensure that existing SSR policies and legal provisions are effectively enforced. This can be done by ensuring that capacity of the military justice system is built, transparency over military expenditure is increased and the operational capability of the SSPDF/SSNPS is strengthened.

Further, the government of South Sudan should also increase efficiency in law enforcement, prosecution of crime suspects, by improving intelligence gathering and the police should be effectively trained to deal with criminal incidences. There is also a need

for Government of South Sudan in conjunction with international community strengthens the oversight role of parliament and civil society. Developing and strengthening the oversight role of the legislature with respect to the security sector can be very helpful, including through supporting the legislature and its staff functions. Financial oversight, through regular legislative review and debate on the security budget, as well as review of audit reports on security expenditures, is a good entry point and is fully consistent with the more general fiscal review and oversight functions normally assigned to legislatures. This will ensure effective prevention of crimes in Juba City.

The third specific objective was to determine the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime in Juba City-South Sudan. The study found out that there has been a moderate level of donor technical assistance that they have received and that donor technical assistance has contributed to prevention of crime to a high extent. of trainers have led to prevention crime to a high extent. Therefore, the study recommends that there should also be inclusion of communities in the formulation and implementation of SSR policies and legal provisions by relevant organs and institutions. The community should be involved from the formulation stage in order to avoid the perception of the community being mere recipients of the policy and encourage the notion of partnership. The study also recommends that there is need for streamlining the security forces and ensure they work together in preventing crimes. This is because the failure in sufficient internal streamlining and reconciling of security forces makes security sector reform a difficult undertaking in South Sudan

The fourth specific objective was to establish and the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence in crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study found that; recruitment of unqualified personnel for crime prevention, failed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in crime prevention, neglected peripheries and non-state actors in crime prevention and lack of coordination of security agencies affected crime prevention. Therefore, the study recommends that the government of South Sudan together with other Stakeholders should seek more donor technical assistance to assist in

police training for capacity and competence enhancement, the study further recommends that the government of South Sudan through the Ministry of internal security and other stakeholders could ensure that there is effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs. This is because DDR processes contribute to stabilization and peacebuilding efforts, and to creating an environment in which a peace process, political and social reconciliation, access to livelihoods and decent work, as well as sustainable development can take root. This will effectively prevent crimes in South Sudan.

Further, the government of South Sudan through the Ministry /department of Armed forces could also ensure that there is recruitment of qualified personnel for crime prevention. This will ensure that SSPDF, SSNPS and prisons services have competent and qualified staff to enforce the law and effectively prevent crimes in Juba City. There is also need for coupling security with development and addressing behavioural sources and structural sources of instability.

5.5 Areas for Further Research

The study was conducted in Juba City of South Sudan only. This study therefore recommends that future studies could look at influence of security sector reforms on crime prevention in other cities in South Sudan like Malakal, Winejok and Wau. Further research should also look at challenges facing implementation of security sector reforms in South Sudan. There is also need for future studies to look at contribution of private security companies on crime prevention in Juba City, Republic of South Sudan.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire for Security Sector Personnel

I am Charles Ciec Mayor, an M.A. student from Egerton University, Department of Peace, Security and Social Studies. This questionnaire is aimed at collecting information on the influence of Security Sector Reform on crime prevention in Juba City – South Sudan. The information you give will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Tick (√) as appropriate or write down your answer.

I.   Background Information

1.   Name ....(Optional)

2.   Age

   (1)   25 -31 years   [   ]

   (2)   32-38   [   ]

   (3)   39-45   [   ]

   (4) Above 45 years   [   ]

3.   Security Force ....

   (1)   SSPDF   [   ]

   (2)   SSNPS   [   ]

   (3)   Wildlife   [   ]

   (4)   Prisons services   [   ]

   (5)   Fire brigade   [   ]

4.   What is your designation/rank?..

5.   How long have you served in the security force?

   (a)   1– 3 years   [   ]

   (b)   4 – 6 years   [   ]

   (c)   7 – 9 years   [   ]

   (d)   10 – 12years   [   ]

   (e)   13+ years   [   ]

6.   Highest level of education

   (a)   Masters Degree   [   ]

   (b)   Bachelors Degree   [   ]

(c)   College Diploma/Certificate   [   ]

(d)   Secondary Education   [   ]

II. Influence of Policies and Legal Provisions in Prevention of Crime

7.   What is the frequency of crimes experienced in Juba City?

(5) Very High [   ] (4) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ] (2) Low [   ] (1) Very Low [   ]

8.   To what extent have the policies and legal provisions succeeded in prevention of crime?

(1) Very High [   ] (2) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ] (4) Low [   ]

(5) Very Low [   ]

9.   Please explain the reason for your answer above………...

…………………………………………………………………………………………

10.   How would you rate the extent to which the following SSR policies and legal provisions have led to prevention crime? Please use the following key;

(5) Very High

(4) High

(3) Low

(2) Very Low

(1) Not at all

SSR policies and Legal provisions	Extent to prevention of crime				
	1	2	3	4	5
Training on human rights					
Strengthening the oversight role of parliament and civil society					
Building the capacity of the military justice system					
Increasing transparency over military expenditure					
Strengthening the operational capability of the SPLA/SSNPS					
SPLA Act					
SSNPS Act					
Criminal laws					

III. Influence of Donor Technical Assistance in Prevention of Crime

11. What is the level of donor technical assistance that you have received?

    (1) Very High [   ] (2) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ] (4) Low [   ]

    (5) Very Low [   ]

12. To what extent has donor technical assistance contributed to prevention of crime?

    (1) Very High [   ] (2) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ] (4) Low [   ]

    (5) Very Low [   ]

13. How would you rate the extent to which the following forms of donor technical assistance have led to prevention crime? Please use the following key;

    (5) Very High

    (4) High

    (3) Low

    (2) Very Low

    (1) Not at all

Forms of Donor Technical Assistance	Extent to prevention of crime				
	1	2	3	4	5
Training of Trainers					
Basic Police Training					
Crime investigation					
Conflict and Post-Traumatic Management					
Defence Techniques					
Crowd Control					

IV. Influence of Obstacles to SSR in Prevention of Crime

14. On a scale of 1-5, which are the SSR obstacles to the prevention of crime?..

    Please explain the reason for your answer above..

15.   To what extent have SSR Obstacles contributed in prevention of crime?

       (1) Very High [   ] (2) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ] (4) Low [   ]

       (5) Very Low [   ]

16.   Give the level of importance that you have given to the obstacles in the prevention
       of crime. Please use the following key;

       (5) Very High

       (4) High

       (3) Low

       (2) Very Low

       (1) Not at all

Obstacles to the prevention of Crime	Extent of importance to Prevention of Crime				
	1	2	3	4	5
Failures of Disaster, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)					
Failures of Force integration					
Failure of Coordination					
Neglected peripheries and non-state actors					
Failure to recruit qualified personnel for crime prevention					

17.   Please give an explanation for your answers above…………………………............

       ……………………………………………………………………………………

       ....……………………………………………

V. Crime prevention through Security Sector Reforms

18.   How have security forces contributed towards the prevention of crime?

       ……………...

       ....

       ....

19. Give the level of importance that you have given to the following indicators of crime prevention. Please use the following key;

(5) Very High

(4) High

(3) Low

(2) Very Low

(1) Not at all

Crime Prevention	Extent of importance				
	1	2	3	4	5
Types of crimes prevented					
Frequency of crimes					
Amount of violations					
Number of arrests					
Types of Criminals					

20. To what extent have the following measures to implement SSR contributed in prevention of crime?

Use the following level (1) Very High [   ] (2) High [   ] (3) Moderate [   ]
(4) Low [   ] (5) Very Low [   ]

   a) Coupling security with development
   b) Addressing behavioral sources of instability
   c) Addressing structural sources of instability
   d) DDR programmes applied to state and non-state armed actors
   e) DDR programmes focused on downsizing of the military

21. In what ways can the limitations in measures to successfully implement SSR be addressed?

…………...

....

....

Appendix II: Interview Guide for Key Informants from International Donor Organizations Involved in SSR

1. Do you think security forces have succeeded in preventing crime?
   Please explain

2. How would you rate the frequency of crime in Juba City South Sudan. Please explain your answer.

3. Explain the extent by which the SSR policies and legal provisions influence prevention of crime.

4. Describe the extent by which relevant donor technical assistance influence crime prevention.

5. Describe the SSR obstacles to the prevention of crime and give their level of importance.

6. Explain how security forces have contributed towards the prevention of crime.

7. Give the level of importance that you have given to the various indicators of SSR.

8. Outline the measures to successfully implement SSR.

9. List the ways by which limitations in measures to successfully implement SSR can be addressed.

Appendix III: Introduction of Charles Ciec Mayor-AME21/19029/17

EGERTON   UNIVERSITY
Tel. Pilot: 254-51-2217620   P.O. Box 536 - 20115
254-51-2217877   Egerton, Njoro, Kenya
254-51-2217631   Email: bpgs@egerton.ac.ke
Dir.line/Fax 254-51-2217847   www.egerton.ac.ke
Cell Phone

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GRADUATE SCHOOL

Ref: AME21/19029/17   13th June, 2022
                                                 Date:

Mr. Charles Ciec Mayor
Dept. of PSSS
Egerton University
P.O. Box 536
EGERTON

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: INTRODUCTION OF CHARLES CIEC MAYOR - AME21/19029/17

This is to introduce and confirm that the above named student, registration number
AME21/19029/17 is in the Department of Peace, Security & Social Sciences, Faculty
of Arts & Social Sciences, Egerton University.

He is a bona-fide registered M.A student in this University. His research topic is
**"Influence of Security Sector Reforms on Crime Prevention in Juba City,
Republic of South Sudan."**

He is at the stage of collecting field data. Am therefore kindly requesting you to grant
Charles Mayor permission to access the data for further analysis.

Please accord him any assistance he may require. For further clarification, kindly
don't hesitate to contact bpgs@egerton.ac.ke.

Yours faithfully,

1 3 JUN 2022

Prof. Nzula Kitaka
DIRECTOR, BOARD OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

NK/vk

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Appendix IV: Research Permit (Letter of No Objection to Mr. Charles Ciec Mayor to Conduct his Research in Juba City)

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
SOUTH SUDAN NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
(IGP)

RSS/MOI/OIGP/SSNPS/J/..22.1885...   Date:......03rd Oct-2022....

To,
Egerton University
Njore, Kenya

RE: NO OBJECTION LETTER TO MR. CHARLES CIEC MAYOR TO CONDUCT HIS
       RESEARCH IN JUBA CITY

The office of IGP South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) take this opportunity and presents its compliments to the administration of Egerton University and has the honor to inform your esteem administration that the office of IGP/SSNPS has no objection to allow Mr. Charles Ciec Mayor to collect the data's in his research topic, i.e. crime prevention in Juba City, Central Equatoria State, CES.

Thus, the Commissioner of Police of Central Equatoria Satate (CES) is here ask to accord him necessary assistance require.

Gen. Majak Akec Malok,
Inspector General of Police
South Sudan National Police Service
Juba-South Sudan

Cc. Commissioner of Police, CES
Cc. Mr. Charles Ciec Mayor
Cc. File

Appendix V: Journal Abstract

Influence of Security Sector Reforms on Crime Prevention in Juba City, Republic of South Sudan

Charles Ciec Mayor
Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

Wokabi Mwangi
Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

Hadija Murenga
Department of Peace Security,
Social Sciences, Egerton University, Kenya

ABSTRACT

This paper uses data collected for an MA Thesis on the influence of security sector reform on crime prevention in Juba City South Sudan. The study was motivated by the dearth of studies in this academic area and the increased levels of insecurity and crime in Juba and its environs. The study was guided by four objectives; to establish perceptions of the Security Sector Reform Actors on functionality of security institutions roles on crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan; to assess the influence of Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, to determine the influence of donor technical assistance in prevention of crime and to establish and the nature of obstacles facing SSR and their influence in crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan.This study was grounded on three theories; Legitimacy Chain, Three Dimensions of Governance, and Control Theories. The study used descriptive survey research design and Simple random sampling method in selecting respondents for the study. Key informants were selected by purposeful sampling. Questionnaires and interview schedules were used as the main data collection tools. This study comprised of 162 main respondents and 20 Key informants respectively. The main method of data collection was the questionnaire. Inferential statistics were used to analyse and present quantitative data. Qualitative data from the interview guide was analyzed by content analysis and presented as verbatim reports and narratives. Amongst other major findings, the study established a relationship between; Functionality of security institutions roles and crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan as a result of overlapping mandates and duplicity of roles with regard to security forces operations in Juba City-South Sudan. In addition, Donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention ($p=0.01$).Security Sector Reform policies and legal provisions in prevention of crime, and also donor technical assistance influenced crime prevention in Juba City-South Sudan. The study recommends that the government of South Sudan should ensure that the existing SSR policies and legal provisions are effectively enforced. There is also a need for Government of Sudan in conjunction with international community strengthen the oversight role of parliament and civil

Appendix VI: Turnitin Report

Turnitin Originality Report

INFLUENCE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS ON CRIME PREVENTION IN JUBA CITY, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN By Charles Ciec Mayor

Similarity Index 33%