

**EFFECT OF GROUP LENDING ON ACCESSIBILITY OF MICRO CREDIT FACILITIES
AMONG LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN KEIYO SOUTH SUB-COUNTY, KENYA**

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DECLARATION AND SUPERVISOR'S APPROVAL

Declaration

This research is my original work and has not been presented, either in part or full, in any University.

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Supervisors' Approval

This research has been submitted with my approval as the University Supervisor

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to my family members, parents, relatives, colleagues and entire Egerton University.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First my success in completing this study is due to the almighty God who gave me the courage to face different challenges in getting the information pertinent to the study. This research project is the result of support from several sources and I wish to thank the entire Egerton University and my supervisor Mr. Robert Mugo for his professional guidance and suggestions which made my work possible. My gratitude also goes to my dear friends and classmates for being helpful, who in their own small unique ways made the completion of this research work possible. To you all, May the Almighty God shower you with His blessings. Thank you very much.

ABSTRACT

The study sought to address the impact of group lending on accessibility of micro credit facilities among low income households in rural and sub-urban regions of Keiyo South Sub-county. The study specifically sought; to determine the effect of joint liability on accessibility of micro credit; examine the effect of group size on accessibility of micro credit; determine the effect of group members' education on accessibility of micro credit and to establish the impact of group diversity on accessibility of micro credit. Agency theory was applied in the study to intuit how group co-borrowers reduce agency costs by acting as agents to the microfinance institutions. This study adopted a descriptive research design. The study was conducted in Keiyo South Sub-county in Kenya; the target population was members of registered social organizations of 779 groups. Random sampling was used in the study to select groups while purposive sampling technique was subsequently used to select the two participating members. The primary data for the study was obtained using structured questionnaires. Reliability test of the instruments was done using Cronbach alpha coefficient. Analysis of the data was done using descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics specifically mean and standard deviation were applied in the study and inferential statistics were Pearson correlation coefficient to test linear relationship between dependent and independent variables, while multiple regression model using t-test and p-values were used to test the hypotheses. The study revealed that joint liability ($\beta_1=0.205$, p value $0.000<0.05$), group size ($\beta_2=0.458$, p value $0.000<0.05$) and group members' diversity ($\beta_4=0.122$, p value $0.032<0.05$) had a positive and significant effect on accessibility of microcredit facilities while group members' education indicated an insignificant effect. This means that group lenders makes the decision to lend based on these factors other than group members' level of education. The group needs to jointly share credit liability and put pressure on defaulters so as to prevent them from defaulting, have adequate number of members to curtail the problem of free-riding in larger groups and the need for diversity in the groups in terms of gender, age and ethnicity. With these in place, access to credit will be enhanced. The researcher therefore suggested that the study be conducted on a wider perspective to determine other factors that influence group lending on micro credit accessibility among low income households.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FINCA	Foundation for International Community Assistance
MFI	Microfinance Institution
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
SME	Small Market Enterprise
SPSS	Statistical Package of Social Science
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Globally, Access to credit plays a significant role in the lives of the poor households, particularly those that are plagued by financial shocks like illness and funerals. This role is central to contemporary debates surrounding strategies for poverty reduction and economic development. The majority of the people live in informal settlements and/or rural areas where poverty is still rife. Wilson (2006) points out that some survive below the minimum poverty level, usually the equivalent of US \$1 per day. This makes these people to be exposed to even minor shocks which have detrimental effects on them (Mashigo, 2013). It is, therefore, difficult for the poor households to survive in the long run.

In developed countries such as UK and US, microfinance is associated with joint liability lending. When borrowers form groups and are held liable for each other, lending to the poor can be profitable even if borrowers do not possess any collateral and lack a credit history. Interestingly, however, a large part of microfinance institutions do not offer group but individual loan (Lehner, 2009). Group liability is often cited as a key innovation responsible for the expansion of access to credit for the poor in developing countries (Armenda´riz & Morduch, 2005).

According to Giné and Karlan (2006), the different features of group and individual lending schemes have not yet been studied in detail despite being a question of first order importance. Currently, the households find it difficult to access credit from the formal credit market due to the asymmetric information problem associated with adverse selection and moral hazard (Karlan & Zinman, 2008). This problem restricts access to credit and discourages the market from servicing the poor households who are regarded as unprofitable and risky. Improving access to credit and removing the constraints that have deterred the households from accessing credit can assist them to cushion themselves against the effects of financial shocks, thus reducing their vulnerability, poverty, and improving their living standards in general (Cassar, Crowley and Wydick 2007). The poor households, therefore, resort to group lending as an insurance

mechanism of sorting between risky and non-risky members and to enforce and monitor contracts and regular payments. Studies show that the persistence of social interactions among informal groups as a way of improving social capital and deepening friendships and the benefits of contributing money together give the households a head start in their financial status (Al-Azzam, Carter and Sarangi 2011).

A growing range of financial institutions have developed an alternative lending mechanism that has turned around the conventional wisdom that lending to poor households is doomed to failure (State of the Micro credit Summit Campaign Report, 2005). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) as these are called share a commitment to providing poor households with very small loans to assist them start productive activities or grow their current small businesses. MFIs extend micro credit to poor household through innovative use of information that potential borrowers may have about each other resulting in high repayment rates. The hope is that much poverty can be mitigated by extending micro credit and financial services to poor households.

One innovation to extend credit to the poor that simultaneously addresses the asymmetric information problem and enforcement concerns lies in group lending; lending to self-selected groups of entrepreneurs who are jointly liable for a loan. Groups form voluntarily, and, while loans are made to individual in the group, all members of the group are held responsible for loan repayment by the entire group. (Karlan, 2011) stressed group lending's informational and enforcement advantages over individual lending. Since group members are jointly liable for loan repayment, group lending can achieve better screening to dilute adverse selection, induces peer monitoring to contend moral hazard and provides group members with incentives to enforce loan repayments (Aniket, 2011).

Numerous theoretical papers have addressed the positive effects of group lending mechanisms. Aniket (2011) showed that group lending achieves self-selection of borrowers and acts as a screening device. Giné and Karlan (2010) found out that even if borrowers do not know each other's type, group lending may be feasible due to lower interest rates as a result of cross subsidization of borrowers. Madajewicz (2011) conclude that social connections facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of joint liability loan contracts. This result has been confirmed in an empirical study by Karlan (2007). Furthermore, Maria (2009) point to a fall in transaction costs

when instead of individual visits of clients group meetings are held. In addition, the contact with banks to which poor borrowers typically are not used to is facilitated. However, certain drawbacks of group lending exist. Giné and Karlan (2006) state that the demand for credit within a group may change over time, forcing clients with small loans to be liable for larger loans of their peers. Furthermore, the growth of group lending programs may slow down when new borrowers with looser social ties enter and, consequently, the group lending technology loses some of its power.

If group members do not have complete information about each other, then group lending may not lead to any improvements in loan repayment rates. This has also been shown in Laffont and N'Guessan (2000) that the burden of moral hazard problem between a borrowing member and the lender falls on the monitoring members who are responsible for repaying the loan of the defaulting member. They show that with an increasing cost of monitoring, a monitor can impose higher penalties on the borrowing member in the case of default, giving the borrowing member an incentive to choose a safer project.

Another set of theoretical papers focus on the strategic default strategies of group members. In the Warui (2012) model borrowers choose whether to repay or not after realizing projects returns by comparing the repayment amount with the severity of the official penalties imposed by the lender, and the unofficial penalties imposed by the other group members and the community. They show that group lending can improve repayment rates relative to individual lending given that social penalties are strong enough. Pereira and Mourao, (2012) argues that monitoring and the threat of social sanctions can prevent strategic default in group lending. In this model, a borrower can verify her partner's true project returns at some cost and inflict sanction upon default.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The dynamic formal credit market or financial sector which provides a wide range of financial services, particularly credit, in Kenya, seems to be inefficient in its current form to provide credit to the poor households (Faulu, 2010). According to Kenya's National FinAccess Survey (2013), 55.3% of Kenya's poorest adult population is totally excluded from the credit market access due

to magnitude of barriers that they face in accessing credit such as Lack of tangible security by SMEs, the limited capacity, outreach and linkages by financial intermediaries and a hostile legal and regulatory framework for financial services. Access to credit remains a farfetched goal to the vast majority of Kenyans. There is therefore a need to address this problem so as to improve access to credit thereby improving the living standards of the households. To solve the problem of inaccessibility of credit, financial institutions have come up with an innovation for extending micro credit to the poor through group lending lending to a self-selected group of borrowers.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

To assess the effect of group lending on micro credit accessibility among low income households living in rural and sub-urban regions of Keiyo south Sub-county

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

This research was guided by the following specific objectives:

- i. To determine the effect of joint liability on accessibility of micro credit.
- ii. To examine the effect of group size on accessibility of micro credit.
- iii. To determine effect of group members' education on accessibility of micro credit
- iv. To determine the impact of group diversity on accessibility of micro credit

1.4 Research Hypotheses

This research was guided by the following hypotheses:

- H₀₁: Joint liability has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit.
- H₀₂: Group size has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit.
- H₀₃: Group members' education has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit.
- H₀₄: Group diversity has no significant effect on accessibility of micro credit.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study came up with interventions that need to be put in place by financial institutions to make use of group lending to low income households and thus improve their enterprises as well

as their living standards. The study is of help to low income households who are in need of loans to borrow funds from micro-finance institutions to thereby improve on their enterprises so as to avoid the consequences of poverty and also help financial institutions to know how to give financial advice to existing and potential customers, thus reducing the chances of default. Academicians also find the research useful in assessing the impact of group lending on micro credit accessibility and thus contribute in finding solutions.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study sought to analyze the impact of group lending on accessibility of micro credit facilities among low income households in rural and sub-urban regions of Keiyo South Sub-county and the study was limited to members of registered social organizations of 779 groups. The study analyzed existence of a relationship between group lending, poverty alleviation and micro credit accessibility among low income households, perception and attitudes of group lending, impact of group lending on loan repayment and awareness of group lending.

1.7 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

The limitations of this study involved the perception of residents on the effect of group lending. The data were collected from individuals who were self-reporting their perceptions. The perceptions of those who participated are no factual information and could be biased based on the respondents own experiences and attitudes and the geographical expanse of the study area. These limitation was mitigated by making sure that, there is purposive simple selection, piloting and careful scrutiny of the perceived parameters of measurement in the group lending, populations and samples.

The population was limited to group lending members only in Keiyo South Sub-county. Most of respondents were from rural areas and some of them were semi-literate. The researcher ensured that questionnaires were physically administered for interpretation and higher participation purposes.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Group Diversity: Refers to groups comprising of members with different personalities, age and gender

Group Lending: A process whereby individual loans are disbursed to small group of borrowers who are collectively responsible for loan repayment (Bosch, 2002; Mashigo, 2007)

Group Size: The number of members involved jointly in group lending

Joint Liability: Refers to where two or more persons are both responsible for a debt, claim or judgment. It can be important to the person making the claim, as well as to a person who issued, who can demand that anyone with joint liability for alleged debt or claim for damages be joined in (brought into) the lawsuit with them.

Low Income Households: These are households that survive below the minimum poverty level, usually the equivalent of US \$1 per day Wilson (2006).

Members' Access to Credit: Refers to members' flexibility and ease of accessing credit. It will be measured by asking the members whether the group has enabled them to receive credit since they joined the group.

Members' Education: Refers to the level of education that members have in group lending.

Micro Credit: Micro credit is the extension of very small loans (microloans) to impoverished borrowers who typically lack collateral, steady employment and a verifiable credit history.

Micro Finance Institution: An establishment that provides hard-to-find financial services to local individuals and groups in their aim to promote economic activity among low-income earners, for whom access to official banking services is impossible or nearly so.

Rural and sub-urban Regions: Residential geographic area that is located outside cities and towns

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Concept of Group Lending

Group-based lending in United States is the term that already indicates and requires individuals to organize themselves into groups in order to gain access to financial services from a program. US have witnessed different programs and projects to be involved in providing loans to these people. Sometimes, governments own and run these programs; in other cases international institutions, local and foreign NGOs are involved in reaching poor borrowers. Normally, group-based lending works as follows; Loans are made to individuals, but all members of the group are held responsible for the loan repayment (joint liability principle). In some programs loans are given strictly for a certain period of time (usually a year), while in other programs the members are allowed to decide the loan terms themselves. Repayments are made on a weekly or monthly basis; this is done at group meetings or directly to the branch of the microfinance institution (Harper, 2007). Group lending has proven effective in ensuring high repayment rates for MFIs abroad by providing peer support and a form of loan collateral. U.S. MFIs, on the other hand, have adapted an individual lending model to ready borrowers for the financial mainstream, where borrowing as a group is not accept

According to Harper (2007), Group-based lending contracts effectively make a borrower's neighbors' co-signers to loans, mitigating problems created by informational asymmetries such as adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement. Thus, in group-lending programs the functions of screening, monitoring and enforcing repayments is to a large extent transferred from the bank agent to group members. Prior to the microfinance revolution poor people's opportunities to take up loans had been severely limited. First, with few substantial possessions poor households cannot offer collateral to back up their loans. Second, the potential addressees of small loans in less developed countries often live in remote rural villages beyond the reach of the traditional banking system. Third, although loans needed for individual projects are small, their myriad nature makes monitoring and enforcement costs prohibitively high. Poor villagers' only access to credit had been through non-commercial development programs which provided

subsidized credit. However, since these schemes faced the same monitoring difficulties as traditional banks they often suffered from poor repayment rates and high costs and were typically doomed to failure for that reason (Bhole & Ogden, 2010).

Poor individuals lack formal credit because lenders have little means of screening clients, monitoring the use of funds, or enforcing repayment. In recent years many development organizations have used group lending to deliver credit to poor individuals. Group lending purports to pass off the screening, monitoring and enforcement of the loans to the peers (Carpena, Cole, Shapiro and Zia 2010). In addition, group loans help formal lenders overcome the prohibitively high fixed cost of delivering small loans. This is because of the extent to which someone's social networks is critical and positively related to the ability to monitor or be monitored. Fafchamps McKenzie, Quinn and, Woodruff (2011), showed how peer monitoring alone, with random formation of groups, can help overcome adverse selection problems when monitoring is costly for the lending institution itself. Stronger social networks have lower monitoring costs, which results in more credit being extended. This in turn results in increased access to credit and the eventual empowerment of the communities to alleviate poverty under the supervision of the lending institutions.

Giné and Karlan (2010) Microfinance institutions use innovative means to overcome these problems. Though the single schemes differ vastly in their concrete implementations most of them share some main characteristics, the most prominent of which is that of group lending. In a typical microfinance scheme, borrowers with individual risky projects form groups which apply for loans together. The whole group is liable if one or more group members default. Thus, joint liability provides an insurance against individual risks. Even if an individual project fails and some of the borrowers are unable to repay, the group as a whole might still be able to do so. In this sense joint liability serves as a substitute for collateral. Unless the individual risks are perfectly correlated, the overall risk of involuntary non-repayment can be substantially lower than with individual borrowing.

Compared with traditional credit programmes in less developed countries, microcredit schemes have proved to be a great success. Repayment rates leaped to levels previously unseen in less developed regions. Grameen reports in India repayment rates of more than 90%; other

programmes replicated such figures. However, the story is not without blemish: while many were successful, numerous MFI programmes have failed to live up to their promise. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of establishing sustainable credit schemes for the poor has not been reached, and most programmes still rely on subsidies and donations (Yunus, 2008). To improve the performance of micro lending it is vital to improve the design of these schemes. Among practitioners as well as academic scholars there is a heated debate on the appropriate design of their key features. Lending to groups involves a fundamental dilemma: It may insure the credit against involuntary defaults, but individual borrower's reliance on fellow borrowers to repay the loan gives the former an incentive to free-ride (Augsburg, Haas, Harmgart and Meghir 2011). Indeed, if the success of an individual project is not sufficiently verifiable by other group members the dominant strategy for each individual is to shirk and hold others liable for own default. Being aware of this peril, MFI schemes have usually incorporated a number of safeguards, the most prominent of which is that borrower groups be self-selected. This is the case in many programmes, the expectation being that close social ties enhance peer pressure and group solidarity.

The group lending model, first used in Bangladesh, may not be exactly replicable in the Kenyan context: Bangladesh has an area of 147,600 km² with 130 million people while Kenya has an area of 580,400 km² with 43 million people. This implies that the information network in Kenya could be much weaker than that of Bangladesh where group lending model has operated efficiently; members of a group in Kenya may not be able to as fully monitor how funds borrowed from MFI are used by their peers as members of a Bangladeshi group. Nevertheless, the microfinance sector in Kenya has largely adopted the Bangladeshi model and runs two broad microcredit programs: personal lending and group lending. Credit is typically granted to finance business/entrepreneurial activities under both programs but it is believed that significant unfulfilled market demand also exists for personal loans to finance consumption and emergency needs (Woller, 2002). The two credit programs (personal and group lending) exhibit different characteristics defined by, among others, the rapidity of loan approval, repayment periods (defines as weeks or months), interest rates, and other program specific terms.

2.2 Theoretical review

The study reviewed various theories which include agency theory, Game Theory, Social Capital Theory and Grameen bank model.

2.2.1 Agency theory

Agency theory provides the connection between borrowers and lenders. The Agency problem exists when the principal and agent have different interests. The self-interest of the management (agent) can compromise the best interest of investors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory provide a framework for linking borrower behavior, because co-borrowers act as guarantors, they screen and monitor each other and in so doing, reduce agency problems between the MFI and its borrowers. While all members might be better off if they could delegate decision-making authority to a specialized agent, collective settings compound the standard principal-agent problems of hidden action, hidden information and Madison's dilemma. Hence, members will have difficulty coordinating in order to write contracts, screen and select agents, monitor agent actions, sanction deviant behavior, and redesign administrative procedures that will guide agent activities. Any factor that systematically inhibits cooperation within a group should be examined as a potential cause of agency losses (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991).

As noted, collective-action problems may dramatically compound problems of agency slack. Resolution of collective-action problems in delegation settings should not be assumed, but either derived from deductive models or uncovered inductively through multiple observations of collective principals attempting to delegate authority to an agency.

2.2.2 Grameen Bank Model

In the early 1980s, Yunus founded the Grameen Bank model of Bangladesh which pioneered group lending in reaching the poor and improving their income levels by extending small group loans for investment. The basic idea of the Grameen Bank model and similar microfinance institutions is to provide small loans to the poor with minimum transactions costs and maximum probability of repayment, by lending to small groups of borrowers who become jointly liable for

each other's debts to the bank (the principle of group liability). Additional features of the loans made by these institutions are that loans are repaid in small, periodic payments rather than in one lump sum and secondly, default by the group can trigger the inability of the group to obtain loans in the future from the bank.

According to Yunus, Grameen Bank is built on the philosophy of 'total trust in human capability' irrespective of whom or where [a person] or what kind of social background or family background he or she comes from, everyone has enormous potential inside. In line with this philosophy, the bank targets the poorest of the poor; that is, 'the bottom 50% of those whose income is below the poverty line' (Mathie, 2011). The bank does this by setting strict eligibility criteria to guide client selection, and adopts practical measures to screen out those who do not meet the criteria. Often, those that do not meet the criteria are the 'not so poor'.

Grameen Bank further qualifies the 'poorest of the poor' as those who have less than half an acre of land. Grameen credit, as the bank's loan is called, is based on the premise that the poor have skills that remain 'unutilized or under-utilized' (Yunus, 2008b), and the assumption that it is societal institutions and policies that create poverty. Therefore, rather than regard the poor as perpetual objects of charity, or condemn them to a state of permanent dependency, their skills, energy and creativity should be challenged. This, the Bank believes, is the practical step out of poverty. There is support for this view in the literature. For instance, Morduch and Haley (2012) have argued that 'there is no proof of either an inverse relationship between a client's level of poverty and their entrepreneurial skills, or minor inclination to save among the poorest'. Justifying poverty targeting on the grounds of equity, Mathie (2011) argues that it was morally imperative to help the poor to restore their dignity, especially if they have been exploited, impoverished or marginalized. He also argues that no meaningful economic development can occur in a society if poverty is not reduced through programmes designed specifically for that purpose.

After granting a loan, Grameen Bank requires that borrowers to use the money on a business in which they already have an existing skill, and particularly on very basic income generating activities that will bring immediate returns.

2.2.3 Game Theory

Game theory was applied to intuit how group borrowers play the microfinance game with the microfinance institution. From a theoretical perspective, the initial positive results from the group lending experience are puzzling. The group lending mechanism described by Yunus (2008) is vulnerable to moral hazard problems. In particular, free-riding by individual group members and collusive behavior by the whole group against the financial institution. The group-based borrowers played the lending game according to the rules set out by the microfinance institution. However, as play ensued, groups become savvier on how to play the game to their advantage. Therefore, while group liability is used to harness the cooperative relationship among the members of the group to the advantage of the microfinance institution, in time, these same cooperative relationships are used to collude against the bank. That is, groups begin to make riskier investments to increase their expected payout. This eventually results in reduced loan repayment rates and a consequent change in the lending practices of the microfinance institution. Specifically, once players know the expected payoffs from their investment choices, the optimal investment strategy for the group is to make at least one risky investment for which the probability of loan repayment is less than one. And, once the group engages in a risky investment strategy, they are more likely to continue to choose risky investments for the balance of the game.

2.2.4 Social Capital Theory

Coleman, often identified as the ‘father’ of social capital theory, offers a broad interpretation of social capital as a type of resource available to an economic actor through her relationship with others, and defined by its function: It is not a single entity but a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure. Social capital is a sociological concept which has been applied to a variety of issues in recent times. Bard (1985) defined the concept as “the aggregate or the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. As the concept experienced considerable theoretical and empirical analysis various other definitions have emerged over the years. Baker (1990) defined the concept

as a “resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes in the relationship among actors”.

According to Omola (2012), being a member of an informal group made a greater contribution to social capital if the group was more heterogeneous across kinship groups, more inclusive and horizontal and better functioning. Hence the contribution of each group to social capital was made an equally weighted sub-index of these three characteristics.

Other studies which have used characteristics of group membership as proxy for social capital include Maluccio, Haddad and May (2008). The main characteristics considered were gender composition, group performance, income heterogeneity and measures of meeting attendance by group members. Both studies found positive and significant impact of social capital on household welfare.

2.3 Empirical Review

The study empirically reviewed the effects of joint liability, group size, group members' education and group diversity on accessibility of microcredit facilities.

2.3.1 Group Size on Accessibility of Micro Credit

The extent to which group-based lending can give access to micro credit lending depends largely on the optimal group size. Certain programs using VB models in Latin American and West African countries use larger group sizes to the detriment of their efficiency in enabling access to micro credit. In certain Burkina Faso programs Banerjee Maluccio, Haddad and May (2010), observed that large sized groups have access to micro credit facilities as compared to small groups.

Accessibility of Micro Credit depends crucially on the size of the borrowing groups since a number of individuals who are jointly liable for the loan are better than one borrower. In practice, it is unclear how far group size affects repayment rates. FINCA, the organization which pioneered the village banking concept, lends to large borrower groups of between 10 and 50 members, and boasts repayment rates of 96%. On the other hand, Grameen prefers smaller

groups with typically only five members, in order to keep free-riding and in-group coordination problems under control. In the academic literature, both positions have their advocates.

Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) argue that despite the insurance effect of larger groups, smaller groups are to be preferred for their better in-group co-ordination and reduced level of free-riding hence better accessibility to microcredit facilities. On the other hand, De Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2009), empirically finds that groups with ten or more members still can work effectively in accessing microcredit facilities.

Ahlin and Townsend (2007) argued that larger groups have more group solidarity hence more accessibility to microcredit facilities. To implement dynamic incentives, follow-up loans are subject to full repayment in the past. In their experiment each member of a group of n players invests in an individual risky project. Whether the project succeeds is known only to the individual investor. Subjects decide individually whether or not to contribute to the group repayment. However, only those with successful projects are able to contribute.

They observed a high and robust performance of accessibility of micro credit in large group lending institutions in all their treatments. In fact repayment rates are generally higher than those achievable by individual lending. While individual contribution rates decrease slightly with larger groups, the accessibility to credit is alleviated by the greater dispersion of risks. They clearly identified the importance of dynamic incentives. Towards the end of the experiment repayment rates decrease substantially (Ahlin, 2007). Group size also impacts the leadership and the social and cultural cohesion of the total group which affects the group's creditworthiness.

2.3.2 Group members' education on Accessibility of Micro Credit

Group members' education refers to variations in the literacy levels of the members and its effects of accessibility of microcredit services. Baydas, Meyer and Aguilera (2004), observed that the amount of informal credit supplied to group lending was significantly positively influenced by education level of the members, interest rates, loan period, and business profits.

Vaessen (2001) in a study of accessibility of rural credit in Northern Nicaragua, showed that access to credit is influenced by both the lender and members characteristics. At the institutional

level, the lender makes decisions based on the target groups' level of education, the selection criteria of clients, the geographic area of operation, and the features of financial products to be provided to address sustainability concerns, all of which influence credit supply. At the household level, being part of the specific target group or living in the targeted geographical area influences credit access. The logit regression results suggested that the probability of credit access is positively and significantly influenced by education level

A study in Egypt by Mohieldin and Write (2000) employing a probit model analysis of the formal credit sector shows the impact of the explanatory variables on the outcome of whether a person has a loan or not. Both the requirements of the individual (demand side) and of the lending institution (supply side) determined whether a loan is enough. The results of the study indicated that educational level was significant factor.

Okurut, Schoombee and Berg (2005), employed a logit model to investigate factors that influence both credit demand and supply in Uganda by using observed household and individual characteristics. The household characteristics that influenced demand included age and education

2.3.3 Joint Liability on Accessibility of Micro Credit

There are two major factors involved in the joint liability for a lender to consider understanding and overcoming the adverse selection and his or her accessibility to micro credit. Joint liability provides better access to micro credit facilities and the higher the group riskiness, the higher the interest rates charged, hence the safe members would be inclined towards the formation of the group with the safe members than with the risky members in order to prevent from paying the installments of defaulting members. This leads to the risky individuals forming their group with other risky individuals and hence the interest rates charged is higher (Kiiru, 2007).

Laffont (2003) finds that provision of the communication and information flow between the joint groups members would lead to the optimum levels of access to micro credit facilities. However in the absence of the information flow due to lack of social collusiveness and joint performance, it would lead to the performance which will be no different from the performance of an individual loan scheme hence low accessibility to credit facilities.

Ahlin and Townsend (2007) explain that joint liability has been better at functioning when the group members who are highly familiar and also ready to punish the member on default hence provision of micro credit lending services. However not every culture would have the same phenomena and hence the group credit with joint liability will be successful only in the communities who would be interested in punishing rather than looking at the individual preference. The joint liability scheme also fails when group members find that the other members are defaulting irrespective of monitoring. Then the rest of the members would also default as they would be rejected for further loan irrespective of present performance. At the same time presence of insurance for the loan portfolio would also encourage the clients to involve in the higher risk projects and less concerned towards the repayment of the loans as described by Karlan (2005).

The low risk project members would be forming groups with the low risk members as due to the high conformity of certain cash flows in the projects and hence the regular repayments whereas in the case of the risky members the probability of failure of the projects is high and hence the group members have high risk in repayment of the installments hence a risk to accessibility to credit services. However in the case of risky projects, returns are high and hence the successful member would be ready to pay higher repayments. Hence there is clear formation of the same risk customers in the same group. This would help in providing the lower risk groups with lower interest rates and higher risk group with higher interest rates as detailed by Lin (2008). Lin (2008) adds a point that the formation of the groups on the basis of homogeneous risk is also said as the positive assortative matching.

Majority of the funding agencies have continuously used termination threat i.e. on partial or total default of the installment payment by a group member or members who are jointly liable and that would lead no further loan provision to all the members of the group. The second channel of management of the enforcement of the repayment is by group characteristics establishment as provided by (Schicks, 2013). Social and cultural cohesion formed in the group provides the peer pressure on an individual to repay the installments without default because all the members in the group are liable, therefore enabling their access to microcredit services. The leadership of the group also impact upon the repayments as they help in the commitment of surplus resources by all the members in case of default scenario.

The collusion between the group members may lead to the negative impact on the performance of the loan and hence lender could be at a risk of losing access to credit service. However the lender would be able to make optimum level of returns only when the group credit is provided and the information flow is between the members. At the same time the members need to monitor and enforce the commitment to each member, hence the group credit would perform better over the individual credit scheme as due to the group skills in monitoring and enforcement in repayments as described by Laffont and Rey (2003).

2.3.4 Group Diversity on Accessibility of Micro Credit

It is well documented that a group's composition can affect its accessibility to micro credit, but the exact nature of diversity's impact remains the subject of debate (Mannix & Neale, 2005). The most frequently mentioned negative outcome of diversity broadly defined is interpersonal conflict which leads to default in paying the loan and this makes the lender to deny loan to the group hence less accessibility to credit facilities (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003).

More specifically, various types of heterogeneity can reduce the accessibility of micro credit (Schicks, 2013; Simtowe, Zeller and Phiri 2006), as well as predict decreases in group cohesion and morale, outcomes that in turn lead members to seek alternative groups or to simply drop out (Khandker, 2012; Karlan, 2007; Al-Azzam *et al.*,2012). The potential negative impact of diversity is not limited to morale in obtaining loan but can also be seen in a group's actual loan repayment (Cornée & Szafarz, 2013; Dufhues, Buchenrieder, Quoc and Munkung 2013; Cassar *et al.*, 2007).

Micro-finance programs provide poor people with small loans given to jointly liable self-selected groups. Follow-up loans provide incentives to repay. Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2006), show the influence of those features on strategic default. They investigate group size and social ties effects and observe robust accessibility of micro credit. Group lending out-performs individual lending. Self-selected groups show high but less stable contributions. Dufhues *et al.*, (2011) present evidence in favor of the positive effects of informational and relational social capital on group loan repayment.

Ahlin and Townsend's (2007) estimation results support the group self-selection models in the wealthier central region near Bangkok, and the models emphasizing the importance of social sanctions in the poorer, northeastern Thailand. Yet the fact that they find strong social ties within borrowing groups to be negatively correlated with group repayment causes them to challenge the idea that group lending works through its ability to harness all types of existing social capital.

Abbink *et al.*, (2006) carried out a conventional lab experiment in which students in the social sciences at the University of Erfurt participate in a microfinance game. Their results show that social ties and heterogeneities within groups induce higher, but less stable, group loan repayment and that the personal differences of borrowing members in groups weaken the social ties which affect group reputation and thus its access to micro credit. Gine' (2005), find evidence that group lending may actually induce moral hazard (through risk-taking and free-riding) rather than reduce it; though group self-selection counteracts some of these problems.

2.3.5 Group Level of Trust on Accessibility of Micro Credit

Karlan (2005) studied the importance of innate trust-worthiness, as opposed to trustworthiness driven by the fear of social sanctions hence more accessibility of micro credit. Alessandra (2007) results indicate first that specific trust between a borrower and other individual group members appears to be relatively more important than trust in society as a whole for group loan repayment thus more accessibility of micro credit. Additionally, Alessandra believes accessibility of micro credit is likely to be more successful when a borrower faces a pool of potential borrowing partners that contains a large number of people whom she personally trusts. Moreover, to the extent that borrowers have a choice within this pool, it supports the notion that informational social capital in the process of group self-selection and screening is likely to matter in group lending.

Consistent with Karlan (2005) no evidence was found that trusting behavior is at all positively related to greater rates of accessibility of micro credit. He actually finds that it is negatively related, and interprets the result as possibly due to risk loving behavior.

Personal trust appears to play a far more important role than simple acquaintanceship in accessibility of micro credit. The implication is that accessibility of micro credit may not be

successful when people simply know one another well; it is more likely to succeed where people can choose among a large number of trustworthy group members. Results offer little support to Szafarz (2013), hypothesis that the potential for social sanctions is vital to group lending. Al-Azzam and Mimouni (2012) find that an accurate portrayal of cooperative behavior is only revealed when social distance diminishes and subjects interact with an identifiable person.

2.4 Research gap

It is evident in the forgone sections that the structure of credit market presents limitations in the provision of microcredit and seems inefficient in its current form to effectively provide credit to the poor households. Previous studies have discussed group lending constructs and how it is linked with loan repayment; however, few studies have demonstrated how group lending is linked to accessibility of micro credit in Kenya (Bosch, 2002; Mashigo, 2007). Moreover, the studies in group lending have been giving more attention to developing countries in Asia such as India with limited studies concentrating in Kenya, particularly Keiyo South Sub-county. Kenya also fashioned its financial system in a group lending method where groups improve social ties by holding compulsory weekly meetings regarding savings and credit to boost their future access to micro credit services.

The jointly liable groups in group lending serve as collateral for microcredit. Additionally, Microfinance institutions supports community credit programs by providing training to group members on loan management and financial discipline.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

In this study, the dependent variable is accessibility of micro credit facilities while the independent variables are joint liability, group size, members' education and group diversity. The variables and their relationship are shown in the figure below.




Figure 1: Relationship between group lending and accessibility of micro credit

Source: Author (2015)

2.6 Operationalization of Variables

Group diversity: Refers to heterogeneity in groups' composition in terms of age ethnicity, gender and interpersonal characteristics. This has an impact on the trustworthiness of the group.

Group size: This refers to groups' member composition and its magnitude in terms of size, savings and jointly owned assets. This may affect accessibility of micro credit since a large or small size of members and assets owned enables the group to jointly be liable for the loan in case of default and thus affecting the groups' reputation.

Joint liability: Where group members are each liable up to the full amount of the loan whether borrowed as a group or individually by any member. Its measurements are the relationship

between the members, level of trust, whether group members are jointly liable for the whole amount, if the group jointly guarantees all loans and group members' pressure and sanctions on defaulters.

Members Access to micro credit: Refers to members' flexibility and ease of obtaining micro credit services provided by micro finance institutions. It will be measured by asking the members if group has enabled them to access loan and other financial services.

Members' education: This refers to the literacy level of the group members measured in level of education, trips, seminars and training attendance which boosts the reputation of the group and thus its access to micro credit services.

Members' salary: It is an intervening variable that affect dependent variable since salaried group members may boost their access to micro credit facilities.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

Kothari (2004) described research design as a conceptual structure within which research is conducted; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data. The study adopted a descriptive research design. This design was suitable for the study since the study was concerned with describing the characteristics of individuals and the groups. This design was the best for investigating and describing the effect of group lending on accessibility of credit.

3.2 Target Population

The study was conducted in Keiyo South Sub-county in Kenya; the target populations were members of registered social organizations of 779 groups as per the records of the Sub-county social development department.

3.3 Sampling Technique

The study adopted Nassiuma (2000) sample size formula. According to Nassiuma (2000), in most surveys with over 1000 elements, a coefficient of variation in the range of $21\% \leq C \leq 30\%$ and a standard error in the range $2\% \leq e \leq 5\%$ is usually acceptable. Therefore the study used a coefficient of variation of 30% and a standard error of 2%. Nassiuma (2000) gives the formula as follows:-

$$n = \frac{Nc^2}{c^2 + (N - 1)e^2} = \frac{779(0.3)^2}{0.3^2 + (779 - 1)0.02^2}$$

= 174 groups

Where	n	=	Sample size
	N	=	Population
	c	=	coefficient of variation
	e	=	standard error

The participating 174 groups were selected randomly and Purposive sampling was used to select the two participating members from each group who comprised of the groups' chairpersons and secretaries to give a total of 348 respondents for the study. The groups' chairpersons and secretaries provided were a representation since they had enough information about the groups and its members.

3.4 Data Collection Instruments

The primary data for the study was obtained using structured questionnaires. The researcher employed structured questionnaires as instruments of data collection. Questionnaires were appropriate because they could be completed anonymously, allowing potentially embarrassing questions to be asked with a fair chance of getting a true reply. A questionnaire is a form that features a set of questions designed to gather information from respondents and thereby accomplish the researchers' objectives (Grewal & Levy, 2009). In addition, it was relatively economical method in cost and time of soliciting data from a large number of people and the time for checking on facts and pondering on questions can also be taken by respondents, which tend to lead to more accurate information (Walliman, 2005). Moreover, questionnaires are easy to administer due to alternative answers provided to the respondents and also enhances easy analysis.

3.5 Data Collection Procedures

The questionnaires for this study were administered to the selected members. The advantages of personal delivery of the questionnaires are that respondents can be helped to overcome difficulties with the questions and the researcher can ensure a high response rate and enables possibility of checking on responses if they seem odd or incomplete (Walliman, 2005).

3.6 Reliability and Validity of Data

Reliability refers to the stability or consistency of measurement; that is whether or not the same results would be achieved if the test or measure is applied repeatedly (Somekh & Lewin, 2007). Reliability test of the instruments was done using Cronbach alpha coefficient. Nunnally (1967) suggested that the minimally acceptable reliability of 0.7 is recommended. Validity refers to

whether or not the measurement collects the data required to answer the research question (Somekh & Lewin, 2007). Content validity of the instrument was done by using instruments from previous studies that have been reviewed, discussions with the supervisor and colleagues. Pilot study was carried out using 10 members of 3 groups from Uasin Gishu County.

3.7 Data Analysis

Data from the field were checked for completeness, accuracy, precision, relevance and keyed into SPSS package version 20 for analysis. Analysis of the data was done using descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics specifically frequencies, mean and standard deviation were applied in the study to describe, classify, analyze and interpret the data. Inferential statistics were Pearson correlation coefficient to test linear relationship between dependent and independent variables. Multiple regression model using t-test and p-values were used to test the hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis was carried out to analyse the relationship between several independent variables and one dependent variable. Variables were tested at a significant level of 0.05 (5%). Data presentation was done using tables and pie charts. The multiple regression model is explained as follows:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots 1$$

Where;

y- Accessibility of micro credit

α - Constant of an equation

X_1 = Joint liability

X_2 = group size

X_3 = group members' education

X_4 = group diversity

$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$, - These are the coefficient of regression for independent variables.

ε = This is random error term.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics involved the use of mean and standard deviation as well interpretation of percentages and frequencies.

4.1.1 Demographic Information

The demographic information of the respondents was considered necessary because the ability of the respondents to give satisfactory information on the study variables may be affected by their background. The demographic information considered included the age bracket, gender, highest level of education, period of membership and number of members.

The study considered the age brackets of the respondents. As evidenced in table 4.1, 46.9% (153) are between 18 and 24 years, 23.9% (78) are between 25-29 years, 18.7% (61) are between 30-35 years and 10.4% (34) are above 35 years. Majority of the respondents according to the study findings were 18 years and above and were mature enough to provide analytical opinion on the effect of group lending on micro credit accessibility among low income households.

The gender of the respondents was also sought by the researcher. As shown in table 4.1, 67.5% (220) were male and 32.5% (106) were female. This implies that there were more male than female members in the groups. In reference to the highest level of education of the respondents, 49.7% (162) of the respondents have a Bachelor's degree, 16.3% (53) had high school as their highest level of education, 12% (39) standard 8 and below, 10.4%(34) had dipoma while 9.5% (31) certificate level of education.

In regards to period of membership of the respondents, 60.7% (198) of the respondents have been members in the organization for 1-4 years, 18.7% (61) less than a year, 18.1% (59) between 4-7 years and 2.5% (8) for 7-10 years. Further, 45.1% (147) of the respondents had membership of 15-20 members, 33.4% (109) had 5-10 members, 12% (39) had 20-30 members and 3.1% (10) confirmed that there are between 30-45 members in their groups.

Table 4.1 Demographic Information

		Frequency	Percent
Age bracket	18-24 yrs.	153	46.9
	25-29yrs	78	23.9
	30-35 yrs.	61	18.7
	above 35yrs	34	10.4
	Total	326	100
Gender	Male	220	67.5
	Female	106	32.5
	Total	326	100
Education Highest	Postgraduate	7	2.1
	Bachelors	162	49.7
	Diploma	34	10.4
	Certificate	31	9.5
	high school	53	16.3
	standard 8 and below	39	12
	Total	326	100
period of membership	less than 1 yr.	61	18.7
	1-4 yrs.	198	60.7
	4-7 yrs.	59	18.1
	7-10 yrs.	8	2.5
	Total	326	100
number of members	fewer than 5	21	6.4
	5-10	109	33.4
	15-20	147	45.1
	20-30	39	12
	30-45	10	3.1
	Total	326	100

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.2 Joint Liability

The respondents were requested to indicate the effect of joint liability on accessibility of micro credit facilities. Table 4.2 presents the results. From the table, 66.6% (217) of the respondents confirmed that they have strong relationship (mean = 3.9908, SD = 0.79416). It was also confirmed by 47.5% (155) of the respondents that they trust each other (mean = 4.1963, SD = 0.93716), 46.3% (151) also agreed that they are jointly liable for entire amount (mean = 4.2638, SD = 0.75511). Additionally, it was confirmed by 50.9% (166) of the respondents that the group guarantees or furnish information about the members (mean = 4.0399, SD = 0.91228). Finally, 58.6% (191) of the members noted that the group puts pressure on defaulters (mean = 4.5245, SD = 0.69571).

Table 4.2 Joint Liability

							Std.						
							Mean	Deviation					
							SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Deviation
We	have	strong											
relationship?			Freq.	0	32	8	217	69	3.9908	0.79416			
			%	0	9.8	2.5	66.6	21.2					
we trust each other			Freq.	14	5	18	155	134	4.1963	0.93716			
			%	4.3	1.5	5.5	47.5	41.1					
we are jointly liable for													
entire amount			Freq.	0	11	28	151	136	4.2638	0.75511			
			%	0	3.4	8.6	46.3	41.7					
group guarantees or furnish													
information			Freq.	0	37	18	166	105	4.0399	0.91228			
			%	0	11.3	5.5	50.9	32.2					
group put pressure on													
defaulters			Freq.	6	2	0	127	191	4.5245	0.69571			
			%	1.8	0.6	0	39	58.6					
joint liability										4.2031	0.52117		

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.3 Group Size

The study also sought to determine the group size. From table 4.3, there was a maximum of 36 members in a group and a minimum of 4. Further findings revealed that there is a maximum of 27 female members and 26 male members.

Table 4.3 Group size

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
total number of members	4	36	14.5798	7.13592
number of female members	0	27	7.8344	7.28054
number of male members	0	26	6.7454	5.49849

Source: Field Data (2015)

The researcher went a step further to establish the effect of group size on accessibility of micro credit in a five point Likert scale. The range was “strongly agree” (5) to “Strongly disagree” (1). The findings are presented in table 4.4. The results from the study revealed that, of the total respondents, 12.3% (40) strongly agreed that they have adequate number of members, 55.8% (182) agreed, 12.9% (42) disagreed and 17.2% (56) were neutral. The mean value was 3.638 and standard deviation 0.92035.

In determining whether the group size is sufficient, the study revealed; 36.2% (118) of the respondents were agreeable, 25.8% (84) strongly agreed while 12.9% (42) disagreed, 6.4% (21) strongly disagreed and 18.7% (61) were neutral. The results also showed a mean of 3.6196 and standard deviation of 1.183.

In a related question of whether their group size does not hinder them from performing their duties, results from the study revealed that, the question had a mean of 3.1963 and standard deviation of 1.15217. This was as a result of 14.1% (46) of the respondents answering in the affirmative, 35.6% (116) agreeing, 44.2% (144) disagreeing and 6.1% (20) neutral. In order to find out whether, the group size has been able to increase members savings, respondents were asked to state the degree to which they concurred with the above and of the total respondents,

50.6% (165) agreed, 44.2% (144) strongly agreed and 4.3% (14) disagreed. The results revealed a mean of 4.3282 and standard deviation of 0.76838.

Finally, 74.2% (242) of the respondents agreed that they own assets as a group, 18.7% (61) strongly agreed, 2.8% (9) were neutral while 4.3% (14) disagreed. The item revealed a mean of 4.0736 and standard deviation of 0.61827. In general, group size had a mean of 3.7712 and standard deviation of 0.65051.

Table 4.4 Group Size

		SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Std. Deviation
we have adequate number of members	Freq.	6	42	56	182	40	3.638	0.92035
	%	1.8	12.9	17.2	55.8	12.3		
group size is sufficient	Freq.	21	42	61	118	84	3.6196	1.183
	%	6.4	12.9	18.7	36.2	25.8		
our group size does not hinder us from performing our duties	Freq.	0	144	20	116	46	3.1963	1.15217
	%	0	44.2	6.1	35.6	14.1		
due to group size we have been able to increase members savings	Freq.	3	14	0	165	144	4.3282	0.76838
	%	0.9	4.3	0	50.6	44.2		
we own assets as a group	Freq.	0	14	9	242	61	4.0736	0.61827
	%	0	4.3	2.8	74.2	18.7		
group size							3.7712	0.65051

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.4 Members' Education

To establish members' education, the respondents were asked to respond accordingly. Data is presented in table 4.5 and from the table, 29.8% (97) had a Diploma, 29.4% (96) undergraduate degree, 17.2% (56) secondary level of education, 12% (39) primary level of education, 9.8% (32)

certificate level of education and 1.8% (6) postgraduate level of education. In light of the aforementioned, the group members were fairly educated.

Table 4.5 Members' Education

		Frequency	Percent
highest level of education	Primary	39	12
	Secondary	56	17.2
	Certificate	32	9.8
	Diploma	97	29.8
	Undergraduate	96	29.4
	Postgraduate	6	1.8
	Total	326	100

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.5 Training on Group Lending

Figure 2 presents findings on whether the respondents have undergone training on lending and as evidenced in the figure, majority 60% (197) of the respondents have not undergone training on lending. Only 40% (129) of the respondents were found to have undergone training on lending.




Figure 2: Training on Lending

Source: Field Data (2015)

The study sought to find out the effect of training on group lending in a five point Likert scale. The results of the study are illustrated in table 4.6. With reference to whether members are highly educated, 13.2% (43) of the respondents agreed, 10.7% (35) strongly agreed, 36.5% (119) disagreed, 28.5% (93) strongly disagreed and 11% (36) were neutral. The mean value of 2.411 was a confirmation of doubt as to whether members are highly educated and the standard deviation was 1.31374.

In a bid to establish if most members have attended seminars on group lending, the respondents were asked to respond accordingly. 56.1% (183) of respondents agreed, 2.1% (7) of the respondents strongly agreed, 28.2% (92) disagreed while 3.1% (10) were neutral. The mean was relatively low at 3.1135 and the standard deviation was 1.15665.

To establish whether members are trained regularly on group lending, respondents were requested for their opinion and the results were such that, 47.2% (154) of the respondents agreed, 12.3% (40) strongly agreed, 18.7% (61) disagreed, 16.9% (55) strongly disagreed and 4.9% (16) were neutral. The mean to this item was 3.1933 and minimum variations in the responses at 1.33914 standard deviation.

In order to ascertain whether leaders of the group plan trips for members to learn more on group lending, results revealed that 26.1% (85) of the respondents agreed, 0.3% (1) strongly agreed, 5.5% (18) disagreed, 62.6% (204) strongly disagreed and 5.5% (18) of the respondents were neutral. The study further revealed that this item had a mean of 1.9601 and standard deviation of 1.32489. The results on training on group lending summed up to a mean of 2.6695 and standard deviation of 1.05604.

Table 4.6 Training on Group Lending

		SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Std. Deviation
our members are highly educated	Freq.	93	119	36	43	35	2.411	1.31374
	%	28.5	36.5	11	13.2	10.7		
most of our members have attended seminars on GL	Freq.	34	92	10	183	7	3.1135	1.15665
	%	10.4	28.2	3.1	56.1	2.1		
our members are trained regularly on GL	Freq.	55	61	16	154	40	3.1933	1.33914
	%	16.9	18.7	4.9	47.2	12.3		
leaders of the group plan trips for us to learn more on GL	Freq.	204	18	18	85	1	1.9601	1.32489
	%	62.6	5.5	5.5	26.1	0.3		
Training on Group lending							2.6695	1.05604

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.6 Group Diversity

The researcher also examined the impact of group diversity on accessibility of micro credit. The results of the findings are presented in table 4.7. In relation to whether the group has both male and female members, the results indicated that 22.4 % (73) agreed, 43.9% (143) strongly agreed, 15.3% (50) disagreed, 17.5% (57) strongly disagreed and 0.9% (3) were neutral. The question mean was 3.5982 which showed that the group has both male and female members. The standard deviation was 1.57515.

The study also wanted to establish whether the group is composed of both the young and old. Results from the study indicate that 38.3% (125) agreed, 3.1% (10) strongly agreed and 40.8% (133) disagreed. The mean was 2.7791 and the standard deviation was 1.17683. In determining whether the group is composed of many tribes, the study revealed that; 44.2% (144) of the respondents agreed, 24.8% (81) strongly agreed, 23% (75) disagreed and 8% (26) were neutral. The results also showed a mean of 3.7086 and standard deviation of 1.08034.

Finally, when asked whether the group admits new members basing on age, 24.5% (80) of the respondents agreed, 1.2% (4) of the respondents strongly agreed, 31% (101) of the respondents disagreed, 28.2% (92) strongly disagreed while 15% (49) of the respondents were neutral. There was a mean of 2.3957 and standard deviation was 1.17139, an indication that respondents were in disagreement. The mean for group diversity was 3.1204 and standard deviation was 0.76452.

Table 4.7 Group Diversity

		SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Std. Deviation
our group has both male and female	Freq.	57	50	3	73	143	3.5982	1.57515
	%	17.5	15.3	0.9	22.4	43.9		
our group has both young and old	Freq.	42	133	16	125	10	2.7791	1.17683
	%	12.9	40.8	4.9	38.3	3.1		
our group is composed of many tribes	Freq.	0	75	26	144	81	3.7086	1.08034
	%	0	23	8	44.2	24.8		
our group admits new members basing on age	Freq.	92	101	49	80	4	2.3957	1.17139
	%	28.2	31	15	24.5	1.2		
group diversity		1					3.1204	0.76452

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.1.7 Accessibility

The study examined the effect of joint liability on accessibility of micro credit. Below are the results of this study in table 4.8. As evidenced in the table, 59.5% (194) of the respondents agreed that they are able to access loan, 19.3% (63) strongly agreed on the same, 2.8% (9) disagreed, 5.8% (19) strongly disagreed and 12.6% (41) were neutral. The item had a mean of 3.8374 and standard deviation of 0.96458. When asked whether the credit they access is sufficient, 40.2% (131) of the respondents agreed, 19% (62) strongly agreed, 28.8% (94) disagreed and 12% (39) of the respondents were neutral. The results summed up to a mean of 3.4939 and standard deviation of 1.10033.

In regards to whether the bank/microfinance responds swiftly to their loan requested, 30.7% (100) strongly agreed, 58.9% (192) agreed while 7.1% (23) disagreed and 3.4% (11) of the respondents were neutral. The item had a mean of 4.1319 and standard deviation of 0.77921 indicating that the respondents were entirely in agreement.

The respondents were also asked whether they got the exact amount of loan they had requested. The results were such that 54.9% (179) of the respondents agreed, 6.1% (20) strongly agreed, 11.3% (37) disagreed, 15.3% (50) strongly disagreed while 12.3% (40) were neutral. The mean was 3.2515 and standard deviation was 1.20942. In order to establish whether they were comfortable with the amount of they received, the respondents were asked to state their views on the same. The results were such that 43.3% (141) of the respondents agreed, 7.1% (23) strongly agreed, 19.6% (64) disagreed, 16.3% (53) strongly disagreed while 13.8% (45) of the respondents were neutral. Findings on accessibility of microcredit summed up to a mean of 3.5534 and standard deviation of 0.6431.

Table 4.8 Accessibility

		SD	D	N	A	SA	Mean	Std. Deviation
I am able to access loan	Freq.	19	9	41	194	63	3.8374	0.96458
	%	5.8	2.8	12.6	59.5	19.3		
the credit I access is sufficient	Freq.	0	94	39	131	62	3.4939	1.10033
	%	0	28.8	12	40.2	19		
The microfinance responds swiftly to our loan request	Freq.	0	23	11	192	100	4.1319	0.77921
	%	0	7.1	3.4	58.9	30.7		
I got the exact amount of loan I had requested	Freq.	50	37	40	179	20	3.2515	1.20942
	%	15.3	11.3	12.3	54.9	6.1		
I am comfortable with amount of loan that I received	Freq.	53	64	45	141	23	3.0521	1.25037
	%	16.3	19.6	13.8	43.3	7.1		
Accessibility							3.5534	0.6431

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.2 Inferential Statistics

Inferential statistics involved the use of Pearson correlation coefficient, ANOVA and regression analysis to test the Hypotheses. Pearson correlation coefficients were used to test the linearity of study variables. Moreover according to Wong and Hiew (2005), correlation coefficient value (r) range from 0.10 to 0.299 is considered weak, from 0.30 to 0.49 is considered medium and from 0.50 to 1.0 is considered strong. According to Field (2005), also cited by (Toh Tsui hui *et al.*, 2008), correlation coefficient should not go beyond 0.8 to avoid multicollinearity. Since the highest correlation coefficient in this study is 0.682 there is no multicollinearity problem in this research. ANOVA test was used to test for goodness of fit of the model. Regressions results were used to test hypothesis. Multiple regression analysis was employed to test hypothesis in this research, According to Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham (2005), Multiple Regression Analysis is applied to analyze relationships between a single Dependent Variable and Independent Variables, and hence it was considered an appropriate method for this study

4.2.1 Correlation Results for Testing Linearity

Pearson's product moment correlation analysis was used to assess the relationship between the variables. Conducting Pearson product-moment correlation enabled the researcher to identify the relationships between dependent variable (accessibility of microcredit) and independent variables (joint liability, group size, members' education and group diversity). Therefore, the study conducted Pearson correlation in order to measure the extent of any relationship between each of the variables. Correlation results are presented in table 4.9. Correlations results in table 4.8 showed that joint liability had correlation coefficient $r=0.149$ with a p value less than 0.01 (as shown by the two asterisk) indicating that there was positive and significant correlation between accessibility of microcredit and joint liability. However, the relationship is weak since the coefficient value is less than 0.5. This shows that joint liability is related to accessibility of credit with 14.9%.

Findings in table 4.9 further shows that Group size had correlation coefficient of 0.621 with p value less than 0.01 level of significance (as indicated by the two asterisks) hence, the study can infer that Group size had positive and significant association with accessibility of microcredit

($r=0.621$, $\rho<0.01$). The relationship is stronger than the other variables as shown by a coefficient 0.621 which is more than 0.5. This shows that the association increase in group size is likely to increase accessibility of credit with 62.1% or vice versa.

Findings also showed that Members' education had coefficient correlation of 0.446 with p value less than 0.01 indicating members education had positive significant correlation with accessibility of microcredit ($r=0.446$, $\rho<0.01$). This shows that accessibility of credit may increase with an increase in the members' education in the group with 44.6%

Finally, group diversity had coefficient correlation of .329 with p value less than 0.05 hence the study concludes that there was a positive and significant correlation between group diversity and Accessibility of microcredit ($r=0.329$, $\rho<0.01$). This infers that having more members of diverse characteristics may increase accessibility of credit with 32.9% or vice versa. From the foregoing, all the factors were significant with group size being the most significant factor followed by members' education, group diversity then joint liability was the least significant.

Table 4.9 Correlation Results

	Accessibility	Joint Liability	Group Size	Members Education	Group Diversity
Accessibility	1				
Joint Liability	.149**	1			
Group Size	.621**	.322**	1		
Members education	.446**	.286**	.542**	1	
Group diversity	.329*	.118*	.332**	.682**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.2.2 Regression Results for Testing Hypotheses

Coefficient of determination explains the extent to which changes in the dependent variable can be explained by the change in the independent variables or the percentage of variation in the dependent variable (accessibility of microcredit) that is explained by all the four independent variables (members' education, joint liability, group size and group diversity).

Table 4.10 illustrates the model summary for the regression model. The multiple correlation coefficient (R) between the predictors in the model and the dependent variable was 0.669 indicating a positive correlation between the variables. The study findings further showed that the R square was 0.448 meaning that the independent variables under consideration in the study explain the variation in accessibility of microcredit up to 44.8% while other factors such as groups' repayment records, policies and procedures for loan qualification, the need for credit and accessibility of lenders explain 55.2% of the variation which creates room for further studies in the area to explain these factors. This shows that members' education, joint liability, group size and group diversity will contribute to accessibility of microcredit with 44.8% *ceteris paribus*.

Table 4.10 Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.669a	0.448	0.441	0.48092

Predictors: (Constant), members education, joint liability, group size, group diversity

Source: Field Data (2015)

The study used ANOVA to test the relationships since ANOVA removes some of the random variability so that significant differences can be found more easily and also helps to look at interactions between factors. The sum of squares is a mathematical approach for determining the dispersion of data points. The degree of freedom (df) is the number of independent components minus the number of parameters estimated. F-statistics is a measure of the correlation between variables drawn. Residual of a sample is the difference between the sample and the estimated function value. Significance indicates the relationship between variables. As illustrated by table

4.11 below the significance value is 0.000 which is less than 0.05 and the F critical (value = 65.038) thus the model is statistically significant in predicting accessibility to microcredit.

Table 4.11 ANOVA Model

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	60.169	4	15.042	65.038	.000b
Residual	74.242	321	0.231		
Total	134.411	325			

a Dependent Variable: accessibility

b Predictors: (Constant), members education, joint liability, group size, group diversity

Source: Field Data (2015)

4.3 Hypotheses Testing

Table 4.12 Coefficient of Estimates

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	0.599	0.219		2.738	0.007
Joint liability	0.191	0.041	0.205	4.664	0.000
group size	0.473	0.049	0.485	9.585	0.000
Members education	0.034	0.039	0.056	0.887	0.376
Group diversity	0.105	0.048	0.122	2.157	0.032

a Dependent Variable: accessibility

Source: Field Data (2015)

Multiple regression analysis was conducted so as to determine the relationship between accessibility to microcredit and the four variables. The regression equation becomes:

$$\text{Accessibility of microcredit} = (0.599) + X_1 (0.205) + X_2 (0.485) + X_3(0.056) + X_4(0.122) + \varepsilon$$

Where;

X_1 = Joint liability

X_2 = group size

X_3 = group members' education

X_4 = group diversity

ε = random error term

According to the regression equation, taking all factors into account (members' education, joint liability, group size and group diversity), the constant will be 0.599. The model had positive coefficients. Hypothesis testing is based on standardized coefficients beta and p-value to test whether the hypotheses are rejected or not.

4.3.1 Effect of Joint Liability on Accessibility of Microcredit

The study sought to investigate the effect of joint liability on accessibility of micro credit hence the study hypothesis was that:

H₀₁: Joint liability has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit

The results of multiple regressions, as presented in table 4.11 revealed that joint liability has a positive and significant effect on accessibility of microcredit with a beta value of $\beta_1 = 0.205$ (p-value = 0.000 which is less than $\alpha = 0.05$), whereby if p-value is less than α , then we reject the Null Hypothesis and accept the Alternative. This is also supported by correlation which indicated a linear relationship between joint liability and accessibility of microcredit. Therefore, the researcher rejects the null hypothesis that joint liability has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit and it is accepted that for each unit increase in joint liability, there is 0.205 (β_1) units increase in accessibility of microcredit. The effect of joint liability was stated by the t-test value = 4.664 which implies that the standard error associated with the parameter is less than the effect of the parameter. B and Beta show the rate of change in the dependent variable brought about by each independent variable. B is actually the slope of the regression line used to represent mathematically the linear regression formula. The unstandardized regression coefficient (B) can be compared to the other coefficients only if the variables are in the same unit of measures and If not, the standardized regression coefficient, Beta is more appropriate to use.

This implies that joint liability affects accessibility and provides better access to micro credit. Consistently, Laffont (2003) finds that information flow between the joint groups leads to optimum levels of access to microcredit facilities. In a similar vein, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) echoed that joint liability enhances provision of micro credit lending services when group members are highly familiar with each other and are ready to punish the members that default. The study further revealed that 58.6% of the respondents strongly agreed that the group puts pressure on defaulters to enhance repayment for future reputation of the group in terms of creditworthiness and thus enhancing access to future credits. Other than familiarity with each other, social and cultural cohesion provides the peer pressure for individuals within a group to repay the installments without default since all members in the group are liable thereby leading to increased access to microcredit (Schicks, 2013).

4.3.2 Effect of Group Size on Accessibility of Microcredit

The study sought to determine the effect of Group size on Accessibility of Microcredit. As such the study hypothesis was that:

H₀₂: Group size has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit

Results from table 4.11 showed that the standardized coefficient beta and p value of group size were positive and significant (beta = 0.485, $p < 0.05$), Thus the researcher rejects the null hypothesis since p-value of (0.000) is lesser than α -value of (0.05). A p-value of 0.000 means that there is a higher level of significance and it is accepted that group size has a positive and significant effect on accessibility of microcredit facilities. Beta value of 0.485 indicated that for each unit increase in group size, there is 0.485 unit increases in accessibility of microcredit. The effect of group size is shown by the t-test value of 9.585 which implies that the effect of group size surpasses that of the error by over 9 times.

In line with the findings of the study, Banerjee *et al.*, (2010) noted that large sized groups have access to micro credit facilities as compared to small groups. The study results indicated that average membership of 15 members is adequate and manageable to avoid the effects of free-riding. Similarly, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) argued that larger groups have more group solidarity hence more accessibility to microcredit facilities. However, Banerjee (2010) argued

that smaller groups are most preferable because of their in-group co-ordination and reduced level of free-riding as compared to larger groups, hence better access to micro credit.

4.3.3 Effect of Members' education on Accessibility of Microcredit

The study sought to investigate the effect of group members' education on accessibility of microcredit; as such the study hypothesis was that:

H₀₃: Members education has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit

As shown in table 4.11, Group members' education was found to have a positive effect though at 0.05 significance level it tested not to be statistically significant basing on $\beta_3 = 0.056$ (p-value = 0.376 which is greater than $\alpha = 0.05$). Therefore, the researcher accepts the null hypothesis and concludes that members' education has a positive effect on accessibility of microcredit though it tested statistically insignificant at a significance level of 0.05. Beta value of 0.056 indicated that for each unit increase in members' education, there is 0.056 (β_3) units increase in accessibility of microcredit. Therefore, the researcher accepts the null hypothesis and concludes that members' education has a positive insignificant effect on accessibility of microcredit. Also, the effect of members education was stated by the t-test value = 0,887 which implies that the standard error associated with the parameter is more than the effect of the parameter.

Contrary to the results, Baydas *et al.*, (2004) observed that the education level of group members positively influenced the amount of informal credit supplied to the group. Further, as opposed to the study, Vaessen (2001), in a study of accessibility of rural credit in Northern Nicaragua found that the target groups' level of education as well as the geographic area of operation was among the features that influenced access to micro credit. This infers that the probability of credit access is positively and significantly influenced by education level. Furthermore, a study in Egypt by Mohieldin and Write (2000), employing a probit model analysis of the formal credit sector showed that educational level was significant factor in determining the access to micro credit. To sum up, Okurut *et al.*, (2005) also found that age and education influenced access to micro credit.

4.3.4 Effect of Group Diversity on Accessibility of Microcredit

The study sought to investigate the effect of group members' diversity on accessibility of microcredit; as such the study hypothesis was that:

H₀₄: Group diversity has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit

Table 4.12 further shows that group diversity has a positive and significant effect on accessibility of microcredit with a beta value of $\beta_4 = 0.122$ (p-value = 0.032 which is less than $\alpha = 0.05$). Therefore, the researcher rejects the null hypothesis that group diversity has no significant effect on accessibility of microcredit and it is accepted that for each unit increase in group diversity, there is 0.122 unit increase in accessibility of microcredit. Also, the effect of group diversity was stated by the t-test value = 2.157 which implies that the standard error associated with the parameter is less than the effect of the parameter.

Concurrently, Mannix and Neale, (2005) echoed that a group's composition can affect its accessibility to micro credit, though the nature of diversity remains the subject of debate. However, De Dreu and Weingart, (2003) were of the opinion that diversity brings about interpersonal conflict which leads to default in paying the loan leading to less accessibility to credit facilities. Additionally, contrary to the results, group diversity has a negative impact on the group's actual loan repayment thereby reducing the chances of access to credit (Cornée & Szafarz, 2013; Dufhues *et al.*, 2013; Cassar *et al.*, 2007).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

The general purpose of this study was to assess the effect of group lending on micro credit accessibility among low income households living in rural and sub-urban regions of Keiyo south Sub-county. Descriptive research design was adopted for this study. To ensure that all levels of respondents were represented, the study used stratified random sampling technique.

The study used primary data collected through the use of questionnaires. Quantitative data was coded and entered into Statistical Packages for Social Scientists (SPSS Version 20.0). Analysis was then based on both descriptive and inferential statistics. Multiple regression analysis was used to establish the relationship between the independent variables and accessibility to micro credit.

From the study findings, in regard to their level of education, the study findings revealed that most of the respondents had an undergraduate degree. On the period of membership, majority of the respondents have been members for 1 to 4 years and most of them are between 18 to 24 years with majority of them being male. On average, there are between 15 and 20 members per group.

The results of the regression model show that there is a positive relationship between the independent variables and access to micro credit.

Ceteris paribus, single units increase in any of the independent variable, results into a corresponding increase in access to micro credit. In relation to joint liability, the study established that there was strong relationship and trust in the group. There was also joint liability for the entire loanable amount. As well, the group guarantees or furnishes information and puts pressure on the defaulters.

With reference to group size, the study established that there are adequate number of members hence the group size is sufficient. Further, the group size has been able to increase members' savings. As such, members own assets as a group though there was doubt whether group size

does not hinder members from performing their duties. In regards to group diversity, there is presence of both male and female group members. The group is composed of many tribes though there was doubt whether the group is composed of both the young and old. However, it was confirmed that admission to the group was not based on age. Findings from Pearson correlation results showed a positive and significant linear relationship between Joint liability, group size, Members education and Group diversity on accessibility of microcredit. In addition, multiple regression results showed that Joint liability, group size and Group diversity have a significant and positive effect on accessibility of microcredit with the exception of group members' education which indicated insignificant positive effect.

5.2 Conclusions

There is overwhelming evidence from the study indicating that joint liability of group members has a positive influence on accessibility to micro credit as shown by multiple regression results. Particularly, trust, high familiarity of group members and social collusiveness contribute to the access of micro credit. However, the joint liability scheme fails in the event that members default despite being monitored. As such, partial or total default of the installment payment by a group member or members who are jointly liable leads to withdrawal of access to micro credit.

Analysis of multiple regression results of the study indicated that group size had a positive influence on accessibility of micro credit. The study established that the group size is sufficient. Therefore, adequate number of members provides joint liability of the loaned amount thus increasing the chances of access to credit compared to one borrower. Though there is high repayment rates for large groups, smaller groups are better coordinated and they do not experience free-riding problems hence they have enhanced control and less default among their members. In so doing, their access to microcredit is enhanced.

The study further established that the level of education of group members had no influence on the amount of credit accessed. This means that the lender makes the decision to lend based on other factors other than the groups' level of education. On average, most of the group members were in the secondary, diploma and undergraduate levels of education. Since the group members were fairly educated, access to micro credit was not impeded by their literacy level.

Finally, correlation and regression analyses established that group diversity has a positive influence on access to micro credit. Specifically, the presence of both male and female members, composition of many tribes as well as composition of both the young and old is instrumental to increasing access to micro credit. However, group diversity brings about interpersonal conflict which reduces access to microcredit facilities.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Recommendations to Stakeholders

In view of the findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

The study established that joint liability has a positive and significant effect on accessibility of micro credit. There is therefore need for strong relationship and trust in the group. Additionally, the group needs to jointly share the credit liability and put pressure on defaulters so as to prevent them from defaulting. As well, it would be paramount to provide the lower risk groups with lower interest rates and higher risk group with higher interest rates since the high risk group have higher returns in case of success.

Further, group size also had a positive influence on accessibility of micro credit. It is therefore imperative for groups to have adequate number of members for the purpose of joint liability of loaned amount. Additionally, there is need for coordination in groups and also measures to curtail the problem of free-riding in larger groups.

Finally, group diversity impacts positively on accessibility of micro credit. There is therefore need for both male and female members in the group. As well, all ethnic backgrounds need to be equally represented. In addition, there is also need for both the old and young so as to benefit from the experience of the old, and creativity and skills of the young. With this in place, access to credit will be enhanced.

5.3.2 Recommendations for Further Study

This research takes exception to the fact that the findings of the study were generalized to rural and sub-urban regions of Keiyo south Sub-county. The researcher therefore suggested that the study be conducted on urban areas since the study was limited to rural and sub-urban regions and

that the study to be conducted on a wider perspective to determine other factors that influence group lending on micro credit accessibility among low income households. Moreover, including moderating factors, incorporating descriptive variables in the regression model such as age and gender, and looking forward to direct or indirect relationship towards access to micro credit can also be made in the research models of new researches by other scholars in future.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Dear sir/ madam,

RE: AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT ACADEMIC RESEARCH

I am a student of Egerton University pursuing Masters Degree in Business Administration. I am undertaking an academic study on the effect of group lending on accessibility of micro credit facilities among low income households in Keiyo South Sub-county.

In view of this your group has been identified to participate in providing the necessary information as regards this study. The study in particular will be addressing group characteristics and their influence on accessibility of micro credit facilities. I therefore kindly request to fill this questionnaire as accurate as possible to ensure the study achieves its intended objective. The information that you will give is confidential and will be used only for the purpose of my academic research.

Thanking you in anticipation,

Yours faithfully,

C.K. Kapkiyai

APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Respondent,

RE: REQUEST TO FILL THE ATTACHED QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a student of Egerton University. I am currently on research work and would like to request your assistance to fill the attached questionnaire. The questionnaire has been designed to gather information on the “**EFFECT OF GROUP LENDING ON ACCESSIBILITY OF MICRO CREDIT FACILITIES AMONG LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLD IN KEIYO SOUTH SUB-COUNTY.** The information you will present will be entirely for academic and learning purposes and will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

In this section the study would like you to provide some background information about yourself.

Kindly tick (✓) appropriately.

1. What is your age bracket?

Below 18 Years [] between 18-24 [] between 25-29 [] between 30-35 [] above 35 years []

2. Gender

Male Female

3. Indicate your highest education level.

Postgraduate Bachelors Diploma Certificate
High school Standard 8 and below

4. How long have you been a member of your group?

Less than 1 year 1-4 years 4-7 years
7-10years above 10 years

5. How many members do you have in your group?

- Fewer than 5 5-10 15-20
 20-30 30-45 More than 45

6. Specify the name of your group.

.....

SECTION B: JOINT LIABILITY

In this section the study is interested in your view about joint liability. Read each of the statements carefully and tick the appropriate choice.

Key SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, N- Neutral, D- Disagrees, SD – Strongly Disagree

		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	We have strong relationship with our members					
2	We trust each other					
3	We are jointly liable for the entire amount of the loan					
4	Group jointly guarantees all loans or simply furnishes information about individual participants					
5	Group members can put pressure on potential defaulters when their own interests are at stake					

SECTION C: GROUP SIZE

How many members are there in your group.....

How many female members are there in your group.....

How many male members are there in your group.....

		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	We have adequate number of members					
2	The group size is sufficient					
3	Our group size does not hinder us from performing our duties					
4	Due to our group size we have been able to increase members' savings					
5	We own assets as a group					

SECTION D: GROUP MEMBERS' EDUCATION

Please indicate your highest level of education

Primary Secondary Certificate Diploma

Undergraduate Post graduate

Have you ever received any training on group lending?

Yes No

If yes please specify

.....

		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	Our members are highly educated					
2	Most of our members have attended seminars on group lending					
3	Our members are trained regularly on group lending					
4	Leaders of the group plan trips for us to learn more on group lending					

SECTION F: GROUP DIVERSITY

In this section the study is interested in your view on group diversity. Read each of the statements carefully and tick the appropriate choice.

Key SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, N- Neutral, D- Disagrees, SD – Strongly Disagree

		SA	A	N	D	SD
1	Our group has both male and female					
2	Our group has both young and old members					
3	Our group is composed of many tribes					
4	Our group admits new members basing on age					

SECTION E: MEMBERS' ACCESS TO MICRO CREDIT

In this section the study is interested in your view about **access to micro credit on adoption of group lending**. **Read** each of the statements carefully and tick the appropriate choice.

Key SA- Strongly Agree, A- Agree, N- Neutral, D- Disagrees, SD – Strongly Disagree

	Member's access to micro credit	SA	A	N	D	SD
1	I am able to access loan					
2	The credit I access is sufficient					
3	The microfinance institution responds swiftly to our loan request					
4	I got the exact amount of loan that i had requested					
5	I am comfortable with the amount of loan that i received					

APPENDIX III: LIST OF GROUPS

1	Adaft Self Help Group
2	Agjogla Self Help Group
3	AIC Metkei North DCC Fellowship Women Group
4	AIC Tulwobei
5	Aim Higher Youth Group
6	Ainabkoi Women Group
7	Aiyabei Women Group
8	Alpha Self Help Group
9	Amazing Grace
10	Amoken Kosabei Self Help Group
11	Angaza Ungae Youth Group
12	Angwan Self Help Group
13	Arise and Shine Self Help Group
14	Atebei Self Help Group
15	Atebei Women Group
16	Baitugul Self Help Group
17	Bamwai Self Help Group
18	Bandaptai Tumeiyo Self Help Group
19	Bandaptai Youth Group
20	Baraka Self Help Group
21	Baraka Silc Women Group
22	Barkoryet Youth Group
23	Barnotik (BAYODAS) Youth Group
24	Bartai Kimamet Youth Group
25	Baruki Self Help Group
26	Berea Women Group

27	Berur Women Group
28	Bethel self-help group
29	Biashara Youth Group
30	Biirgwen Self Help Group
31	Biut Youth Group
32	Blue Springs Youth Group
33	Bochibei Multipurpose
34	Boe Leel Women Group
35	Boiboiwo Village Youth Group
36	Bonanza Self Help Group
37	Bondeni Youth Group
38	Boresha Women Group
39	Borotet Self Help Group
40	Brochik Youth Group
41	Brosil Self Help Group
42	Burgei Youth Group
43	Calvary Action Women Group
44	Celtai Cheboen Youth Group
45	Chamasika Self Help Group
46	Chamcham Gaa Women Group
47	Chamei Tugul Women Group
48	Chamgaa Women Group
49	Chamkokwet Women Group
50	Chamnyet Self Help Group
51	Chamtany Self Help Group
52	Chamtany Welfare Self Help Group
53	Chamtany Women Group

54	Chamtany Women Group
55	Chamyet Women Group
56	Chang'ach Hope Link Self Help Group
57	Charma Cattle Dip Project
58	Chatit Self Help Group
59	Chebelel Self Help Group Project Group
60	Chebena Make Farming Self Help Group
61	Chebirei Youth Group
62	Cheboen Farmers Self Help Group
63	Cheboen Women Group
64	Cheboen Women Group
65	Cheboite Youth Group
66	Chebusie AIC Local Church Self Help Group
67	Chebusie Village Youth Group
68	Chegeren Youth Group
69	Chekapolo Self Help Group
70	Chekeren Women Group
71	Chekeren Women Group
72	Cheketwo Self Help Group
73	Chema Self Help Group
74	Chemabai Youth Group
75	Chemaech Women Group
76	Chemaluk Self Help Group
77	Chemarkach Longet Village Youth
78	Chemarkach Sobetab Gaa Self Help Group
79	Chemasis Self Help Group

80	Chemoibon Location Self Help Group
81	Chemonin Farming and Welfare Self Help Group
82	Chemuge Village
83	Chepka Women Group
84	Chepkabo Self Help Group
85	Chepkenden Women Group
86	Chepket Women Group
87	Chepketeret Self Help Group
88	Chepkogel Self Help Group
89	Chepkorio Retirees Self Help Group
90	Chepkorio Self Help Group
91	Chepkorio Sports Project
92	Chepkorio Women Culture
93	Chepkosom Exodus Women Group
94	Chepkosom Self Help Group
95	Chepkosom Women Group
96	Chepkosom Women Group
97	Chepkulung Youth Group
98	Chepkurgung Women Group
99	Cheplelach Self Help Group
100	Chepronya Investment Self Help Group
101	Chepsamo Bridge Community Project
102	Chepsamo Intergrated Self Help Group
103	Chepsamo self-help group
104	Chepsamo Sobetab Gaa Women Group
105	Chepsamo Youth Politechnic
106	Chepsitie Kimamet Dairy Farming Self Help Group

107	Chepwalel Riptany Self Help Group
108	Chepwalel Youth Group
109	Cherabik Youth
110	Cherota Self Help Group
111	Cherotu Gaa Women Self Help Group
112	Cherotuu Gaa Women Group
113	Choronok Self Help Group
114	Choronok Self Help Group
115	Chororget Women Group
116	Chorwa Women Group
117	Chorwa Youth Group
118	Chorwet Women Group
119	Christian Youth In Action
120	Clasus Women Group
121	Corner Ndizi Self Help Group
122	Digital Self Help Group
123	Discovery Self Help Group
124	Dorcus Group Widows
125	Ebenezer Daughters Women Group
126	Ebenezer Kimwogo Women Group
127	Ebit Youth
128	Eburwone Village Youth Group
129	Educational Self Help Group
130	Ekwenbei Women Group
131	Elinino Women Group
132	Elnino-Kabawa Com.Project
133	Emitik Toroplongon Village Youth
134	Emkop Self Help Group
135	Emkwen Women Group
136	Emonet Self Help Group

137	Emous self-help group
138	Emsea Youth Group
139	Emte Village
140	Enego Gaa Self Help Group
141	Epke Tegelgaa Women Group
142	Epkee Berur Self Help Group
143	Epkee Water Project
144	Eswa Self Help Group
145	Etiet Gaa Village Youth Group
146	Evergreen Overview 2030 Youth Group
147	Excel Vision Self Help Group
148	Excel Youth
149	Exodus Self Help Group
150	Faith In Action Women Group
151	Family Development Women Group
152	Flax Daystar Self Help Group
153	Flax Mungano Women Group
154	Flax Ogilgei Self Help Group
155	Flax United Network Self Help Group
156	Fr. Martin Angaza Youth Group
156	Gaa Kibagenge Youth Group
157	Gaa Kwen Self Help Group
159	Galaxy Youth Group
160	Generation Youth Group
161	Germen-Gaa Women Group
162	Global Hope Youth Group
163	Goshen Self Help Group
164	Green Network Youth
165	Green Stars Youth Group

166	Group 5 Self Help Group
167	Hekima Women Group
168	High-Way Youth Group
169	HIV Vision Youth Group
170	Honesty Self Help Group
171	Ideal Kibitai Women Group
172	Imanda Self Help Group
173	Imara 2013 Self Help Group
174	Imugaskei Iman Youth Group
175	Inder Self Help Group
176	Itet Women Group
177	Jasho Self Help Group
178	Jikaze Women Group
179	Joy Women Group
180	Jubilee Self Help Group
181	Juhudi Youth Group
182	Kababii Fish Farmers Self Help Group
183	Kabalborokwo Youth Group
184	Kabaraimok Self Help Group
185	Kabaraimok self-help group
186	Kabateb Dairy Self Help Group
187	Kabchep Global Youth Group
188	Kabechei dairy farmers group
189	Kabechei Lel Youth Group
190	Kabendich Women Group
191	Kabiemit Akiba Youth Group
192	Kabiemit Gaa Self Help Group
193	Kabiemit Luget Women Group
194	Kabiemit Tumaini Youth Group
195	Kabigor Bandaptai Youth Group

196	Kabitoi Chepkowo Self Help Group
197	Kabitoi Self Help Group
198	Kableel Youth Group
199	Kabokbok Sunshine Youth
200	Kabore Youth Group
201	Kabrisuus Women Group
202	Kaibora Passion Youth Group
203	Kaiwakta Youth Group
204	Kakiche Self Help Group
205	Kakisor Women Group
206	Kakoech Women Group
207	Kakoset Self Help Group
208	Kalwa Coffee Farmers Self Help Group
209	Kalwal Kolongei Women Group
210	Kalyet Segero Youth Group
211	Kalyet Women Group
212	Kalyet Youth Group
213	Kamain Youth Group
214	Kamaram Women Group
215	Kamelil Village Self Help Group
216	Kamenon Youth Group
217	Kamindo Self Help Group
218	Kamoi Youth Group
219	Kamondia Umoja Self Help Group
220	Kamongunet Women Group
221	Kamosa Women Group
222	Kamosong Cereal Self Help Group
223	Kamosong Cereals Self Help Group
224	Kamosong Entreprise Self Help Group

225	Kamulee Women Group
226	Kamwago Self Help Group
227	Kamwago Village
228	Kamwosor Chepsitie Self Help Group
229	Kamwosor Junior Athletics Project
230	Kamwosor Location Shaags Com. Project
231	Kap Kobil Self Help Group
232	Kapalwat Sorich Self Help Group
233	Kapchagan Self Help Group
234	Kapchebelel Cattle Dip Women Group
235	Kapchebelel Escarpment Youth Group
236	Kapchelax Women Group
237	Kapchepkei Women Group
238	Kapchii Self Help Group
239	Kapchorwa Boda Boda Self Help Group
240	Kapchorwa Neema Women Group
241	Kapkatit Self Help Group
242	Kapkelimo Self Help Group
243	Kapkemeloi Youth Group
244	Kapkenyor Youth Group
245	Kapkesem Self Help Group
246	Kapkipkaat Youth Group
247	Kapkirwai Women Group
248	Kapkitony Athletic Self Help Group
249	Kapkitony Women Group
250	Kapkoin Youth Group
251	Kapkokwara Women Group
252	Kapkosom Youth Group

253	Kapkwoni Youth Self Help Group
254	Kaplabotwo B. Youth Group
255	Kaplelach Self Help Group
256	Kaplelmet Dairy Youth Group
257	Kapletingi Self Help Group
258	Kaplolo Women Group
259	Kapmut Self Help Group
260	Kapmutwo Women Group
261	Kaprugut Self Help Group
262	Kapsaisai Self Help Group
263	Kapsang Ripgaa Self Help Group
264	Kapsegut Self Help Group
265	Kapseret Women Group
266	Kapsergong Testai Women Group
267	Kapserten Community cattle Dip Project
268	Kapsesia Youth Group
269	Kapsochi Self Help Group
270	Kapsoen Horticulture Self Help Group
271	Kapsonok Self Help Group
272	Kapsonok Self Help Group
273	Kapsoo Village Youth Group
274	Kapsorei Self Help Group
275	Kaptagat Conservancy Women Group
276	Kaptarakwa Boda Boda Welfare Self Help Group
277	Kaptebei Women Group
278	Kaptebei Youth Group
279	Kaptek-Kimondwo Youth
280	Kapterik Kogilgei Women Group

281	Kapterik Village Youth
282	Kaptich Youth Group
283	Kaptingil Bandaptai
284	Kaptingil bandaptai educational Self Help Group
285	Kaptingil Central Village Youth Group
286	Kaptiriot Youth Group
287	Kaptogom Youth
288	Kapungui Women Group
289	Kashema Kapchorwa Self Help Group
290	Kasit Women Group
291	Katumoi Kosyin Self Help Group
292	Kayanet Women Group
293	Kebechei
294	Keben self-help group
295	Keergaa Women Group
296	Keertai Educational Fund Self Help Group
297	Keetkim Women Group
298	Keis Self Help Group
299	Keiyo Key Youth Group
300	Keiyo Kogilgei Self Help Group
301	Keiyo Self Help Group Environment
302	Keiyo South Persons with Disability Support Group
303	Keiyo South Retiree Welfare Self Help Group
304	Keiyo South Women Group
305	Kelbomoi Self Help Group
306	Kelchin Self Help Group

307	Kerewo Women Group
308	Kergemoi Self Help Group
308	Kerio Stars Self Help Group
309	Kerio Valley Youth Education
309	Kerionge Youth Group
310	Kertai self-help group
311	Kertai Women Group (Kapchebelel)
312	Kesem Youth Group
313	Ketigoi Vision Youth Group
314	Ketipyut Youth Group
315	Kewamoi Women Group
316	Kewane Village
317	Kewapkony Women Group
318	Kiadsiiito Self Help Group
319	Kibagenge Focal Youth Group
320	Kibagenge-Talal Self Help Group
321	Kibendo Youth Group
322	Kibengaa Education Group
323	Kibonge-Merry-Go-Round Women Group
324	Kiborori Self Help Group
325	Kibtibot B Youth Group
326	Kibumbum Village Youth
327	Kiebor Village
328	Kilatgoi Women Group
329	Kilawa Youth Group
330	Kimariny Village Youth Group
331	Kimoloi Kalyet Women Group
332	Kimoloi Self Help Group
333	Kimugut Youth Group

334	Kimwarer Soy Water Project
335	Kinapgei Self Help Group
336	Kinaptany Self Help Group
337	Kipchain Vision Self Help Group
338	Kipchain Women Group
339	Kipchep Self Help Group
340	Kipchiloi Medapop Self Help Group
341	Kipchiloi Road Project
342	Kipkalwa Youth Group
343	Kipkanao Village
344	Kipkanawa Village Youth Group
345	Kipkeiyo Sosio Kapsio Project
346	Kipkingwo Women Group
347	Kipkingwo Women Group
348	Kipkinwo Youth Group
349	Kipkob Women Group
350	Kipkono Hill Self Help Group
351	Kipkoro Water Project Self Help Group
352	Kipkuimet Self Help Group
353	Kiplagaa Youth Group
354	Kipsaina North Youth Group
355	Kipsaina Self Help Group
356	Kipsaina Sports Youth
357	Kipsaina Water Project
358	Kipsaniak Village
359	Kipsaos Sub-location Youth Group
360	Kipsaos Visionary Youth Group
361	Kipsaos Widow Single Women Group
362	Kipsaos Women Group

363	Kipsaos Youth Group
364	Kipsetai Youth Group
365	Kipsiciti Village
366	Kipsinende Women Group
367	Kipsumanja Women Group
368	Kipyakinje Women Group
369	Kisook Women Group
370	Kitany Village Self Help Group
371	Kitany Youth Development Group
372	Kobur kokwet Self Help Group
373	Kocholwo Educational Group
374	Kocholwo Interdeminaton Widow and Widowers Self Help Group
375	Kocholwo Upendo Self Help Group
376	Koibarak Self Help Group
378	Koibarak Youth Group
379	Koigeny Self Help Group
380	Koilebel Fish Farmers Women Group
381	Koimur Women Group
382	Koisekut Self Help Group
383	Koisogei Self Help Group
384	Koisogei Women Group
385	Koisur river side group
386	Kokwatai Women Group
387	Kokwet self-help group
388	Kokwet Women Group
389	Koleel Women Group
390	Kolongei Kapkitony Self Help Group
391	Kolongei Self Help Group
392	Kolongei self-help group

393	Koloswet Women Group
394	Kombatich Elite Youth Group
395	Kombatich Kolongei
396	Kombatich Youth
397	Komolwo Self Help Group
398	Komongu Self Help Group
399	Komutgei Youth
400	Kong'asis self-help group
401	Kongasis Youth Group
402	Konyit Self Help Group
403	Kopcheruiyot Village Youth Group
404	Koptega East Self Help Group
405	Koptega Women Group
406	Koropkwen Village Youth Group
407	Koropkwen Women Group
408	Koseet Gaa Self Help Group
409	Koseet Sile Women Group
410	Koshin Silc Women Group
411	Koshin Youth Group
412	Koshinet Self Help Group
413	Kosomek Widows and Widowers Group
414	Kosoop Gaa Women Group
415	Koswa Youth Group
416	Kosyin Self Help Group
417	Kosyin Self-Youth Group
418	Kosyin Shine Self Help Group
419	Kosyin Youth Group
420	Koteech Gaa Self Help Group
421	Koyumgaa self-help group

422	Koyumgaa Women Group
423	Kuiyetbei Women Group
424	Kulwane Self Help Group
425	Kulwane Self Help Group
426	Kulwane-Roots Self Help Group
427	Kumiat Youth Group
428	Kures Farmers Self Help Group
429	Kureswo Women Group
430	Kuser Women Group
431	Kwenbei Youth Group
432	Kwenbei Youth Group
433	Lamac Farm Group Self Help Group
434	Lamai Women Group
435	Lamaiwet Youth Group
436	Landate Etiet Youth Group
437	Lapkeiyet Youth
438	Legeetetwo Women Group
439	Lekera Self Help Group
440	Leketyo Kapitoi Women Group
441	Leketyo Samich Women Group
442	Lelachbei Youth Group
443	Lelach-Gaa Self Help Group
444	Lelchoni Youth Group
445	Lelechwet Women Group
446	Lelin Widows Group
447	Lelit Kapkonga Lower Self Help Group
448	Lelka Educational Group
449	Lelka Self Help Group
450	Lelkina Dairy Management Women

	Group
451	Lelmet Women Group
452	Lelmo Self Help Group
453	Lelmo Women Group
454	Leltai Women Group
455	Lengut Women Group
456	Lengut Youth Group
457	Limyo Women Group
458	Litei Youth Group
459	Living Hope Youth Group
460	Lo Maiyo Youth Group
461	Loboan Dairy Farmers
462	Loboan Self Help Group
463	Lokipo Youth
464	Luktai Self Help Group
465	Machweo Women Group
466	Mamoan Women Group
467	Manchester Youth Group
468	Mangar Quarry Self Help Group
469	Mapgaa Self Help Group
470	Marichor Women Group
471	Marichor Women Group
472	Mary Joseph Women Group
473	Masetwo Self Help Group
474	Mashariki Youth Group
475	Mashavic Women Group
476	Matim-Bei Self Help Group
477	Matrix Self Help Group
478	Mentors Self Help Group
479	Menwo Self Help Group

480	Mereon Women Group
481	Meswot Self Help Group
482	Metco Self Help Group
483	Metipso Women Group
484	Metkei Market Shade Comm. Project
485	Metkeiyo Self Help Group
486	Metro-Mat Self Help Group
487	Midililwo Women Group
488	Miki Self Help Group
489	Millenium Youth Group
490	Mindililwo Model Nursery Committee Project Group
491	Mindililwo R.C.E.A Youth Group
492	Mindililwo Self Help Group
493	Mobolet Youth Group
494	Modern Gaa Self Help Group
495	Moekiche Rock Hyrax Conservancy Self Help Group
496	Moet Self Help Group
497	Moing Water Project
498	Moita Women Group
499	Moitap Gaa Women Group
500	Momoncho Self Help Group
501	Monep Self Help Youth Group
502	Monep self-help group
503	Morich Women Group
504	Morning Glory Self Help Group
505	Morop Women Group
506	Mosop Kaptarakwa Youth Housing Project

507	Mosop/marichor Women Group
508	Mosop-Lomoiywo Self Help Group
509	Mosorto Self Help Group
510	Moytag Youth Group
511	Mugobtany Women Group
512	Muitat Youth Group
513	Murch Youth Group
514	Murguiwet Self Help Group
515	Muskut Tumaini Youth Group
516	Mwangaza self-help group
517	Mwangaza Women Group
518	Mwangaza Youth Group
519	Mwanzo Women Group
520	Mwen Christian Women Group
521	Mwen Community Road Project
522	Mwen Women Group
523	Mwochet Women Group
524	Nabartai Women Group
525	Naet Self Help Group
526	Naet Tree Nursery Self Help Group
527	Naet Women Group
528	Naet Women Self Help Group
529	Nazareth Youth Group
530	Nehema Women Group
531	Nerkei Self Help Group
532	Ng'enyne Self Help Group
533	Nganase self-help group
534	Ngeet Kesop Self Help Group
535	Ngelel Tarit Women Group
536	Ngetuny Tree Nursery Self Help Group

537	Ngobisi Elimu Shiners Self Help Group
538	Ngoromti Youth Group
539	Njomus Women Group
540	Nyaboda Youth Group
541	Nyaru Ogilgei Self Help Group Society
542	Ogilgei Chepkorio Women Group
543	Ogilgei-Koimur
544	Olchebit Women Group
545	Omongu Women Group
546	Ondilai Women Group
547	Ondilai/Kamwoch Self Help Group
548	Onget Youth Group
549	Ongetie Women Group
550	Orapbei Self Help Group
551	Oset Youth Group
552	Pambazuka Women Group
553	Pamoja Youth
554	Pandaptai Self Help Group
555	Polyapex self-help group
556	Poywech Lomoiywo Self Help Group
557	Poywech Sunrise Youth Group
558	Poywech Women Group
559	Precious Achievers Youth Group
560	Ramsam Self Help Group
561	Reako Women Group
562	Revelation Widow Group
563	Ripgaa Women Group
564	Riprai Self Help Group
565	Riptany Youth Group

566	Riptany Youth Group
567	Ririat Youth Group
568	Rising Star Self Help Group
569	Riverside Self Help Group
570	Rock Together and Shine
571	Rogondapгаа Women Group
572	Rokono Women Group
573	Rotigaa Youth Group
574	Royal Self Help Group
575	Sachangwan Self Help Group
576	Safari Ant Youth Group
577	Safina Self Help Group
578	Saina Self Help Group
579	Sait Agenge Women Group
580	Sakipo United Youth Group
581	Salga Self Help Group
582	Samaria Women Group
583	Samich Blessing Women Group
584	Samich Tui Self Help Group
585	Samich Village
586	Samich Widows Women Group
587	Samituk Walгаа
588	Samutega Women Group
589	Sania Self Help Group
590	Saramek Self Help Group
591	Saroiyot Women Group
592	Sarunet Advocacy Self Help Group
593	Sarunet Women Group
594	Sawi Women Group
595	Segero B. Village Youth

596	Sego Educational Self Help Group
597	Sekem Aloe Self Help Group
598	Sekemiat Youth Group
599	Sekerek Self Help Group
600	Sekertai Youth
601	Senetwo Women Group
602	Seremwai Self Help Group
603	Set Maluk Self Help Group
604	Setai Women Group
605	Setano Umoja Youth Group
606	Setгаа dairy farmers Self Help Group
607	Shalom Kosomek Self Help Group
608	Shalom Self Help Group
609	Shangii Youth Group
610	Shine Your Light
611	Shinners Youth Group
612	Shokwei Self Help Group
613	Sikero Women Group
614	Silipchet Women Group
615	Simboiyo Self Help Group
616	Simit (RCEA) Self Help Group
617	Simit Dispensary Self Help Group
618	Simit Kokwatai Women Group
619	Simit Women Group
620	Simotwet (Metkei) Self Help Group
621	Simotwet Women Group
622	Sinende Self Help Group
623	Sirey Young Farmers
624	Siro Centre One Self Help Group
625	Sirwot Self Help Group

626	Sisiyat Koibarak Women Group
627	Sitotwo Kapalwat Bridge Self Help Group
628	Sky Silc Women Group
629	Small Town Boda Boda Self Help Group
630	Smart Women Group
631	Sobech Youth Group
632	Sobech Youth Group
633	Sobet-Neleel Self Help Group
634	Sochem Self Help Group
635	Sofia Women Group
636	Sogom Single Mothers
637	Soiyo Self Help Group
638	Sokoch Self Help Group
639	Solid Rock Women Group
640	Sorich Village Youth Group
641	Sosiot Kapchorwa Self Help Group
642	Soy Agribusiness and Beekeepers Self Help Group
643	Soy Boiywo
644	Soy-Kurget Self Help Group
645	St. Brigid Women Group
646	St.James Self Help Group
647	Stage Boda Boda Youth Group
648	Stage One Women Group
649	Star Self Help Group
650	Sumbeiywo B. Youth Group
651	Sunday bright self-help group
652	Sunrise Self Help Group

653	Sunshane Youth Group
654	Sweal Imans Progressive Self Help Group
655	Taachasis Communication Youth Group
656	Taait Women Group
657	Tabare Central Youth Group
658	Tabare Chamгаа Women Group
659	Tabare Women Group
670	Tabare Women Group
671	Tabitha Self Help Group
672	Tacho Women Group
673	Taiita Women Group
674	Taiita Women Group
675	Tairop Towers Youth Group
676	Talai Tuinuane Self Help Group
677	Talai Water Project
678	Talai Women Group
679	Talasiet Women Group
680	Tambuiyot Women Group
681	Tambul Boarding Project Group
682	Tambul Polytechnic Self Help Group
683	Tambul Taachasis
684	Tambul Women Group
685	Tamsila Youth Group
686	Tangus Women Group
687	Tanykina Self Help Group
688	Tapkili Joy Self Help Group
689	Tapsirgei Women Group
690	Tapsirgei Women Group

691	Tarakwa Gaa Youth Group
692	Tausi Self Help Group
693	Techgaa Self Help Group
694	Tech-Gaa Self Help Group
695	Techgaa Women Group
696	Tech-Gaa Women Group
697	Tekat Single and Widows Women Group
698	Temitio Self Help Group
699	Tendwo Youth Group
700	Tendwone Women Group
701	Testai Self Help Group
702	Testai Youngstars Youth Group
703	Teta Self Help Group
704	Tetabgaa Self Help Group
705	The Valley Self Help Group
706	Tilil Youth Group
707	Tilolwo Kalyet Youth Group
708	Tilolwo Youngstars Brothers Youth Group
709	Tinet Women Group
710	Tingwa Youth Group
711	Tirgei Investment Self Help Group
712	Tirgei Investment Self Help Group Society
713	Tirigoi Tree Nursery Project Group
714	Tirim Women Group
715	Tirion Village
716	Tirok Youth Group
718	Titir Self Help Group

719	Tobentai Women Group
720	Tokosai Village
721	Toloita Women Group
722	Toot Taunet Neleel Women Group
723	Toroch Moi Self Help Group
724	Torok Youth Group
725	Toror Youth Group
726	Transnovate Youth Group
727	Trito Women Group
728	Tuga-Tai Self Help Group
729	Tugumoi Women Group
730	Tuilonget Women Group
731	Tuiyo Bei Self Help Group
732	Tuiyo Moy Youth Group
733	Tuiyo Tach Self Help Group
734	Tuiyo Women Group
735	Tuiyobei Horticultural Youth Group
736	Tuiyogaa Kamosong Self Help Group
737	Tuiyogaa Women Group
738	Tuiyogaa Women Group
739	Tuiyoluk Village Youth Group
740	Tujipange Youth Group
741	Tuloi Women Group
742	Tulwet Neleel Women Group
743	Tulwetab Kerio Self Help Group
744	Tulwob-Siro Village Youth
745	Tumaini 2011 Youth Group
746	Tumaini Women Group
747	Tumaini Youth Group
748	Tumeiyo Potato Growers Self Help

	Group
749	Tungaa Self Help Group
750	Tun Kibore Women Group
751	Tureria Youth
752	Tuyogaa Teber Self Help Group
753	Ubongo Self Help Group
754	Uhuru Women Group
755	Umoja Educational Self Help Group
756	Umoja Generation Self Help Group
757	Umoja Self Help Group
758	Umoja Women Group
759	Umoja Women Group
760	Umoja Youth Group
761	United Favourite
762	United Youth Group
763	Upendo self-help group

764	Uswa Self Help Group
765	Victorious Angels Women Group
766	Victory Women Group
767	Vision 2030 Youth Group
768	Vision Women Group
769	Vision Youth Group
770	Walgaa Youth Group
771	Werep Self Help Group
772	Widow/Widowers Self Help Group
773	Widowers and Singles Women Group
774	Yator Self Help Group
775	Yes-We-Can Women Group
776	Young Entrepreneurs Youth
777	Young Tags Youth Group
778	Youngstars Brothers Youth Group
779	Youngstars Self Help Group